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Abstract 
Cloud computing is widely considered as an attractive service model 
because it minimizes investment since its costs are in direct relation to usage 
and demand. However, the distributed nature of cloud computing 
environments, their massive resource aggregation, wide user access and 
efficient and automated sharing of resources enable intruders to exploit 
clouds for their advantage. To combat intruders, several security solutions 
for cloud environments adopt Intrusion Detection Systems. However, most 
IDS solutions are not suitable for cloud environments, because of problems 
such as single point of failure, centralized load, high false positive alarms, 
insufficient coverage for attacks, and inflexible design.  
The thesis defines a framework for a cloud based IDS to face the 
deficiencies of current IDS technology. This framework deals with threats 
that exploit vulnerabilities to attack the various service models of a cloud 
system. The framework integrates behaviour based and knowledge based 
techniques to detect masquerade, host, and network attacks and provides 
efficient deployments to detect DDoS attacks.  
This thesis has three main contributions. The first is a Cloud Intrusion 
Detection Dataset (CIDD) to train and test an IDS. The second is the Data-
Driven Semi-Global Alignment, DDSGA, approach and three behavior 
based strategies to detect masquerades in cloud systems. The third and final 
contribution is signature based detection. We introduce two deployments, a 
distributed and a centralized one to detect host, network, and DDoS attacks. 
Furthermore, we discuss the integration and correlation of alerts from any 
component to build a summarized attack report. The thesis describes in 
details and experimentally evaluates the proposed IDS and alternative 
deployments.  
 
Key Words: cloud computing, security, intrusion detection, attacks, 
masquerade, dataset, masquerade detection, sequence alignment, system 
calls, security events, NetFlow, feature extraction, DDoS.  
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Introduction 
Cloud computing is a large-scale distributed computing paradigm driven 
by economies of scale and outsourcing, where a pool of abstracted, 
virtualized, dynamically-scalable, managed computing, storage, platforms, 
and services are delivered on demand over the Internet. Cloud computing 
technology is enabling IT managers to provision services to users faster and 
in a much more flexible and cost-effective way without having to re-design 
or update the underlying infrastructure [4].  
Clouds in general provide services at three different levels [2] defined by 
what is called “SPI” models or Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a 
Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). In SaaS, a consumer 
can use applications running on a cloud infrastructure. In PaaS, the consumer 
can deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired 
applications developed through programming languages and tools supported 
by the provider. In IaaS, the provider offers a large amount of interconnected 
computing nodes to run a consumer-created network of virtual machines. 
Four deployment models exist for cloud services, with derivative variations 
that address specific requirements namely [4]: Public, Private, Community, 
and Hybrid Cloud. In a Public Cloud, the cloud infrastructure is made 
available to the general public or a large user group. In a Private Cloud, the 
cloud infrastructure is operated for a single organization. In a Community 
Cloud, the cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations to support 
a specific community that has shared concerns, and in Hybrid Cloud, the 
cloud infrastructure interconnects two or more clouds (private, community, 
or public).  
Given the benefits of cloud computing, its broad appeal is not surprising. 
However, this new approach does raise some concerns. Chief among them is 
securing data in the cloud. Security controls in cloud computing are, for the 
most part, the same ones that any IT environment can apply. However, 
because of cloud service and operational models and the technologies to 
enable these services, cloud computing may present new risks and threats to 
an organization. Furthermore, due to their distributed nature, cloud 
computing environments are easy targets for intruders looking for possible 
vulnerabilities to exploit. The impact of intrusions in cloud systems is 
potentially very large, as intruders can exploit for their advantage the 
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massive resource aggregation, wide user access, efficient and automated 
resource allocation of a cloud. The Cloud Security Alliance has defined 
seven top threats to cloud computing systems [1] namely:  
1. Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing. 
2. Insecure Interfaces and APIs. 
3. Malicious Insiders. 
4. Shared Technology Issues. 
5. Data Loss or Leakage. 
6. Account or Service Hijacking.  
7. Unknown Risk Profile.  
Some of these threats can be handled by an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS). An IDS is a software or a hardware system that monitors and analyzes 
events in a computer system or network to discover signs of security 
problems. As attacks increase in number and severity, IDSs have become a 
necessary addition to the security infrastructure of most organizations. There 
are three main categories of IDSs based on the protection objectives, namely 
[2]: 
 Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS), where sensors to 
detect an intrusion are focused on a single host. 
 Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), where  sensors 
are focused on a network segment.  
 Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) which integrates both 
types of sensors (i.e., HIDS and NIDS).  
According to the underlying technology and the characteristics of the 
system to be protected, DIDS can be categorized as Mobile Agent Intrusion 
Detection Systems (MAIDS), Grid based Intrusion Detection Systems 
(GIDS), and recently Cloud based Intrusion Detection Systems.  
Several deficiencies of current IDSs solutions hinder their adoption in a 
cloud environment. As an example, an attack against a cloud can be silent for 
a host-based IDSs (HIDS), because cloud-specific attacks may not leave 
traces in the operating system of the node running the host-based IDS. Since 
in a cloud computing environment distinct users share both computing and 
communication resources, attacks may be originated within the infrastructure 
itself. Hence, an attack originating in the cloud can be directed against 
resources of the same cloud. This increases the complexity of attack 
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detection for a NIDS as all the communications that implement the attack are 
among cloud nodes. Current distributed IDSs have shown their effectiveness 
in some large scale networks, but their adoption in cloud computing is still 
challenging. The complex architecture of a cloud infrastructure and the 
distinct kinds of users lead to different requirements and possibilities for an 
IDS. As an example, a distributed hierarchical IDS may be scalable but it has 
the problem of single point of failure because if any part of an internal node 
is disabled, a branch of the IDS will be unreliable. Furthermore, some IDSs 
lack the flexibility to support distinct cloud architectures. Another deficiency 
is that several IDSs detect attacks through either the behaviour base 
technique or the knowledge base one. Instead, a good IDS should integrate 
both techniques because the latter is efficient in detecting known attack 
patterns with low false positive alarms, i.e. an alert almost always signals a 
real attack, but it does not detect unknown attacks or even trivial 
modification of known attacks. Instead, the knowledge based technique 
detects unknown attacks but it has high false positive alarms.  
Hence, a proper defense strategy needs to: 
1. Support distinct cloud computing environments. 
2. Be distributed, resilient and with no single point of failure. 
3. Protect the intrusion detection components.  
4. Isolate the host from any vulnerability from the executed tasks. 
5. Integrate behaviour and knowledge base techniques to increase attack 
coverage. 
6. Collect and correlate user behaviours from all environments in the 
cloud system. 
Building a new cloud based IDS is a new challenging area of research. 
Few papers have addressed cloud IDSs in general and some have proposed 
some frameworks for cloud systems but without any real implementation and 
most of them do not satisfy the previous requirements. 
The main goal of this thesis is to develop a framework for a cloud based 
intrusion detection system that satisfies the previous requirements and deals 
with the following attacks:  
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1. Masquerade attacks: they abuse the privileges of a legitimate user to 
illegally use a service’s abundant resources. Only a behaviour based 
analysis can detect them. 
2. Host based attacks: they may be consequences of the previous attacks 
and result in an observable user behavior anomaly or leave some 
trails at the VM operating system. 
3. Network-based attacks: They generally result in an observable user 
behavior anomaly or leave some trails at the Network packets.  
4. Distributed Attacks: they are implemented with the help of tools or 
exploit scripts and include denial-of-service attacks, probes, and 
worms. They may leave their trails at several locations of a cloud’s 
infrastructure. 
The proposed framework assumes a fully distributed architecture to 
provide a scalable and elastic solution. To avoid a single point of failure, the 
framework distributes the processing tasks among cloud nodes. It isolates 
these tasks from the cloud node system, by executing them in a VM 
monitored by a VM monitor. The framework achieves a high coverage of 
attacks by integrating both knowledge and behaviour based techniques. It 
also provides an audit system to support the adoption of the framework in 
distinct cloud computing environments. This system also collects and 
correlates the user behaviours from the cloud VMs. The framework 
integrates the alerts from different IDSs and builds a final summarized attack 
report.  
To support several deployment models we have introduced two versions 
of the framework, the Cloud based Intrusion Detection System, CIDS, and 
its full virtual version, CIDS-VERT. CIDS P2P architecture hinders 
scalability but it achieves a high performance and low network overhead in 
small or private clouds. CIDS-VERT is ideal for hybrid and public clouds 
due to its better scalability and controllability. However, it consumes a large 
amount of resources because it reserves some management VMs for the 
detection and management tasks. The diagram in Figure 1 shows the main 
contributions of the thesis and the corresponding chapters. 
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Figure.1: Contributions of the thesis and chapters organization 
The first contribution is CIDD, the first cloud intrusion detection dataset 
that can be used to train and test any cloud IDS. It consists of both 
knowledge and behavior based audit data and has real instances of host and 
network based attacks and masquerades. CIDD provides complete diverse 
audit parameters from several environments to evaluate the effectiveness of 
detection techniques.  
The second contribution is related to behaviour based detection. The 
thesis defines the Data-Driven Semi-Global Alignment, DDSGA approach 
[DDSGA], and three detection strategies. DDSGA detects masquerade 
attacks in the cloud by aligning the sequence of the current session to the 
previous sequences of the same user. Then, it labels misalignment areas as 
anomalous and the presence of several anomalous areas is a strong indicator 
of a masquerade attack. DDSGA tolerates small mutations in user command 
sequences by allowing small changes in the low-level representation of the 
commands functionality. It also tolerates changes in user behaviour by 
updating the user signatures according to the current behaviours. We show 
that DDSGA improves both accuracy and performance with respect to 
current solutions. We apply three detection strategies based on DDSGA to 
detect masquerade attacks in clouds. The first one applies DDSGA to 
sequences of correlated audits from the VMs operating systems. This 
strategy is applied independently to two kinds of audits, system calls and 
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security events. The second strategy analyzes NetFlow data from the 
network environment. The third strategy improves the overall detection by 
integrating the first two strategies through a neural network. The evaluation 
has also considered the correlation of the behavior of the same user in 
distinct cloud nodes. We have evaluated three alternative correlation models 
through both CIDS and CIDS-VERT: Audit Exchange, Independent, and 
Centralized-Backup. These models are detailed in Chapter 3 that shows how 
the Independent model is the ideal one in combination with CIDS for small 
and private cloud, while the Centralized-Backup model is the most suitable 
one in combination with CIDS-VERT for large clouds such as public and 
hybrid ones.  
Finally, the third contribution is related to signature based detection. We 
introduce a hierarchical architecture that supports two deployments, a 
distributed and a centralized one for the proposed IDS. The deployments use 
host based and network based IDSs that exploit signature based analysis 
techniques. The hierarchical architecture overcomes some limitation of 
current IDSs and can efficiently detect host, network, and DDoS attacks. 
Furthermore, we discuss the integration and the correlation of alerts that 
come from all detection components.  
We briefly outline the content of the various chapters: 
Chapter 1: Background and Main Concepts.  
It introduces the main concepts underlying the thesis together with DDoS 
attacks and the related work on their detection in clouds. Finally, it outlines 
the software tools that the thesis uses.  
Chapter 2: Intrusion Detection and Related Works.  
It introduces the definition, architecture and techniques of intrusion 
detection systems, and surveys the previous works on intrusion detection, 
masquerade detection techniques, and the current intrusion detection 
datasets.  
Chapter 3: CIDS and CIDS-VERT Frameworks and their Correlation 
Models.  
It describes the components, architecture, testbed, pros and cons of both 
CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks. Furthermore, it discusses the proper 
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framework for each cloud deployment model. Finally, it details the three 
correlation models, Audit Exchange, Independent, and Centralized-Backup.  
Chapter 4: Cloud Intrusion Detection Dataset (CIDD).  
After discussing the major challenges to build a cloud dataset, it 
introduces the Log Analyzer and Correlator System (LACS) that helps in 
building CIDD dataset. Then it describes in details the distribution of attacks 
and masquerades in CIDD and compares CIDD against other publicly 
available datasets. 
Chapter 5: Data-Driven Semi Global Alignment (DDSGA).  
It introduces the DDSGA approach and describes its three main phases 
namely, configuration, detection, and update. It outlines the modules and 
experimental results for each phase and compares DDSGA against other 
approaches. 
Chapter 6: Detecting Masqueraders through System Calls and NetFlow 
Data. 
It introduces three strategies to detect masquerade attacks. The first one 
is based on sequences of system calls audits. We outline how it builds a 
consistent user profile from the features extracted from the system calls. 
Then, we adapt DDSGA to the extracted features by considering the CIDS 
and CIDS-VERT frameworks using the three correlation models in Chapter 
3. The second strategy is based on NetFlow data. We outline the main 
features extracted from the NetFlow data and the adaption of DDSGA to 
these features. The third detection strategy integrates the other two through a 
neural network. After evaluating the three strategies in isolation, the chapter 
compares their accuracy and performance. 
Chapter 7: Detecting Masqueraders through Security Events and 
NetFlow Data. 
Also this chapter considers the three strategies of Chapter 6 but with 
different audit data and distinct operating system. The first detection strategy 
uses sequences of security events. We outline the main features extracted 
from the security events and how DDSGA is adapted to these features by 
considering the CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks with the Independent 
and Centralized-Backup correlation models respectively. Lastly, we evaluate 
the efficiency and the computational performance of this strategy. The 
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second and third strategies are evaluated as in Chapter 6. Finally, this chapter 
compares the strategy based on security events and the one that uses system 
calls introduced in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 8: Efficient Deployments of HIDS and NIDS using A 
Hierarchical Architecture of CIDS-VERT  
It discusses the detection of host, network, and DDoS attacks by 
signature based techniques. It introduces a hierarchical architecture of CIDS-
VERT framework that supports two deployments: Distributed and 
Centralized one, and outlines their relative advantages. Furthermore, it 
discusses the approaches to integrate, correlate, and summarize distinct alerts 
from the signature based techniques i.e., HIDS and NIDS. Finally, this 
chapter shows some experimental results and evaluates the accuracy of the 
proposed deployments. 
Conclusion and Future Work: 
This section draws conclusion remarks and outlines future work. 
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Chapter 1 
Background and Main Concepts  
This chapter introduces the main concepts underlying the thesis namely 
the definition of cloud computing systems from the unique perspectives of IT 
network and security. Furthermore, we introduce the cloud essential 
characteristics and deployment and service models. We also present cloud 
security definition, the risks a cloud user should assess before committing 
and top threats to clouds. We also present some miscellaneous concepts 
regarding Virtual Machines (VM), Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM), 
system calls, security events, NetFlow, Entropy, Threshold Logic Unit 
(TLU), and the host based, network based attacks. Finally, this chapter 
discusses DDoS attacks and their detection in cloud systems and outlines the 
software tools we use. 
1.1. Cloud Computing 
Each of the current definitions of cloud systems addresses cloud systems 
from a distinct perspective. Here we assume the perspectives of IT network 
and security. 
According to NIST (National Institute of standards and Technology) [2], 
“Cloud computing (‘cloud’) is an evolving term that describes the 
development of several existing technologies and approaches to computing 
into something different. Cloud separates application and information 
resources from the underlying infrastructure, and the mechanisms used to 
deliver them”. According to Ian Foster et al. [4], “Cloud computing is a 
large-scale distributed computing paradigm that is driven by economies of 
scale, in which a pool of abstracted, virtualized, dynamically-scalable, 
managed computing power, storage, platforms, and services are delivered on 
demand to external customers over the Internet”. There are a few key points 
in this definition. First, cloud computing is a specialized distributed 
computing paradigm; it differs from traditional ones in that  
1) It is massively scalable. 
2) Can be encapsulated as an abstract entity that delivers different levels 
of services to customers outside the cloud.  
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3) It is driven by economies of scale, and 4) the services can be 
dynamically configured via virtualization or other approaches and 
delivered on demand. 
NIST defines cloud computing in terms of five essential characteristics, 
three service models, and four deployment models. They are summarized in 
visual form in Figure 1.1 and explained below as in [2, 4].  
1.1.1. Essential Characteristics of Cloud Computing 
Cloud services exhibit five essential characteristics that demonstrate their 
relation to, and differences from, traditional computing approaches [2]: 
 On-demand self-service. A consumer can unilaterally provision 
computing capabilities as needed and automatically, without human 
interaction with a service provider. 
 Broad network access. Computing capabilities are available over the 
network and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use by 
heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms (e.g. mobile phones, laptops, 
and PDAs) as well as other traditional or cloud based software services. 
 Resource pooling. A provider pools computing resources to serve 
several consumers using a multi-tenant model, which dynamically 
assigns and reassigns physical and virtual resources according to 
consumer demand. There is a degree of location independence in that the 
customer generally has no control or knowledge over the exact location 
of the provided resources.  
 Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be rapidly and elastically 
provisioned, in most cases automatically, and rapidly released to quickly 
scale out and scale in. For a consumer, the capabilities appear to be 
unlimited and can be purchased in any quantity at any time. 
 Measured service. Cloud systems automatically control and optimize 
resource usage by leveraging a metering capability according to the type 
of service. Usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported, providing 
transparency for both the provider and the consumer. 
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Figure 1.1: NIST Visual Model of Cloud Computing Definition 
1.1.2. Cloud Service Models 
In general, clouds offer services at three different levels [4]: IaaS, PaaS, 
and SaaS. However, some providers can expose services at multiple levels. 
 Software as a Service (SaaS) delivers software that is remotely 
accessible by consumers through the Internet with a usage-based pricing 
model. E.g., Live Mesh from Microsoft allows files and folders to be 
shared and synchronized across multiple devices. 
 Platform as a Service (PaaS) offers a high-level integrated 
environment to build, test, and deploy custom applications as in Google’s 
App Engine [7]. Inside this layer resides the middleware system, a 
portable component for both grid and cloud systems. Examples include 
WSO2 Stratos [5], Windows Azure [6], and our middleware HIMAN [8, 
9, and 10].  
 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) provisions hardware, software, 
and equipments to deliver software application environments with a 
resource usage-based pricing model. Infrastructure can scale up and 
down dynamically based on application resource needs. Typical 
examples are Amazon EC2 (Elastic Cloud Computing) Service [11], 
Eucalyptus [12], Microsoft Private Cloud [13]. 
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1.1.3. Cloud Deployment Models 
There are four deployment models for cloud services, with derivative 
variations that address specific requirements: 
 Public Cloud. The cloud is made available to the general public or a 
large industry group and is owned by an organization selling cloud 
services. 
 Private Cloud. The cloud is operated solely for a single 
organization. It may be managed by the organization or by a third 
party, and may exist on-premises or off- premises.  
 Community Cloud. The cloud is shared by several organizations to 
support a specific community that has shared concerns. It may be 
managed by the organizations or by a third party and may exist on-
premises or off-premises. 
 Hybrid Cloud. The cloud infrastructure consists of two or more 
clouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but 
are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that 
enables data and application portability. 
1.2.  Cloud Computing Security 
Cloud computing may adopt the same control of any IT environment. 
However, the cloud service models, the operational models, and the 
supporting technologies change the risk landscape for an organization with 
respect to traditional IT. The next section outlines seven risks a user should 
consider before committing and seven top threats to cloud computing 
systems. 
1.2.1. Seven Risks to be analyzed before Committing 
There are seven possible risks a user should assess before committing 
[14]: 
 Privileged user access: sensitive data should be processed outside the 
enterprise only with the assurance that they are only accessible and 
propagated to privileged users. 
 Data segregation: is the user data should be fully segregated from data 
of other users.  
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 Regulatory compliance: a cloud provider should have external audits 
and security certifications and the infrastructure should comply with 
regulatory security requirements.  
 Data location: the cloud provider should commit to storing and 
processing data in specific jurisdictions and to obey local privacy 
requirements on behalf of the customer;  
 Recovery: the provider should offer an efficient replication and 
recovery mechanism to fully exploit the potentials of a cloud in the 
event of a disaster;  
 Investigative support: support should to be ensured for forensics and 
investigation with a contractual commitment. 
 Long-term viability: a user data should be accessible even when the 
provider is acquired by another company or the user moves to another 
provider. 
1.2.2. Top Seven Threats to Cloud Computing 
We briefly highlight seven threats that CSA (Cloud Security Alliance) 
[1] ranks and that apply across all of the different cloud computing models. 
Threat #1: Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing 
The top threat that CSA identifies is the abuse and nefarious use of cloud 
computing. This is related to the use of botnets to spread spam and malware. 
Attackers can infiltrate a cloud system, by abusing the relative anonymity 
behind the cloud registration system and usage models. Then, they can 
upload malware and use the power of the cloud to attack other machines. The 
CSA suggests to: 
1. Monitor public blacklists for one’s own network blocks.  
2. Use a stricter initial registration and validation processes. 
3. Enhanced credit card fraud monitoring and coordination. 
Threat #2: Insecure Interfaces and APIs  
The CSA cautions against unsure application programming interfaces 
between applications for interoperability. The CSA suggests to: 
1. Analyze the security model of cloud provider interfaces. 
2. Ensure strong authentication and access controls are implemented in 
concert with encrypted transmission. Some Grid and Cloud portals 
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can be used for this target e.g. Nubifer [15], Ubuntu Portal [16], and 
our HIMAN-GP [17]. 
3. Understand the dependency chain associated with the API. 
Threat #3: Malicious Insiders 
Organizations need to assess the risk on the service provider's end and 
demand segregation of duties to prevent a malicious insider from accessing 
data. The CSA suggests to: 
1. Enforce strict supply chain management and conduct a 
comprehensive supplier assessment. 
2. Specify human resource requirements as part of legal contracts.  
3. Require transparency into overall information security and 
management practices, as well as compliance reporting. 
4. Determine security breach notification processes. 
Threat #4: Shared Technology Issues  
Cloud users have to be aware of vulnerabilities in shared technologies, 
such as VMs, communications systems or key management technologies. A 
zero-day attack can use these technologies and quickly spread across a public 
cloud and expose all data within it. The CSA suggests to: 
1. Implement security best practices for installation/configuration. 
2. Monitor environment for unauthorized changes/activity. 
3. Promote strong authentication and access control for administrative 
access and operations.  
4. Enforce service level agreements for patching and vulnerability 
remediation. 
5. Conduct vulnerability scanning and configuration audits. 
Threat #5: Data Loss or Leakage  
There are several alternative ways to compromise data. Deletion or 
alteration of records without a backup is an obvious example. A cloud 
increases the risk of data compromise, due to risks and challenges which are 
either unique to cloud, or more dangerous because of the architectural or 
operational characteristics of a cloud environment.  
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The CSA suggests to:  
1. Implement strong API access control. 
2. Encrypt and protect integrity of data in transit. There are many 
encryption schemes for high performance systems e.g., GridCrypt 
[18] and our “Ultra GridSEC” [19, 20, 21]. 
3. Analyzes data protection at both design and run time. 
4. Implement strong key generation, storage and management, and 
destruction practices.  
5. Contractually demand providers wipe persistent media before it is 
released into the pool. 
6. Contractually specify provider backup and retention strategies. 
Threat #6: Account or Service Hijacking 
Cloud users need to be aware of account service and traffic hijacking. 
Examples for attacks that may cause these threats are: man-in-the-middle, 
phishing, spam campaigns, and DDoS. Cloud solutions add a new threat to 
the landscape. If an attacker gains access to a user credentials, then she can 
eavesdrop on activities and transactions, manipulate data, return falsified 
information, and redirect the user clients to illegitimate sites. The CSA 
suggests to: 
1. Prohibit the sharing of account credentials between users and 
services. 
2. Leverage strong two-factor authentication techniques where possible. 
3. Employ proactive monitoring to detect unauthorized activity. 
4. Understand cloud provider security policies and SLAs. 
Threat #7: Unknown Risk Profile 
One of the tenets of cloud computing is the reduction of hardware and 
software ownership and maintenance costs to allow companies to focus on 
their core business strengths. This has clear financial and operational 
benefits, which must be weighed carefully against the contradictory security 
concerns when the migration to a cloud is driven by expected saving only by 
groups who may lose track of security issues. Information about who is 
sharing an infrastructure may be pertinent, in addition to network intrusion 
logs, redirection attempts and/or successes, and other logs. An IDS is the 
ideal tool for this threat, as it can deal with all suggestions of CSA like: 
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1. Disclosure of applicable logs and data.  
2. Partial/full disclosure of infrastructure details (e.g., patch levels, 
firewalls, etc.). 
3. Monitoring and alerting on necessary information. 
1.3.  Virtual Machines 
A virtual machine (VM) is as an efficient and isolated duplicate of a real 
one [22]. Typical applications of VMs include the development and testing 
of new operating systems, simultaneously running distinct operating systems 
on the same machine, and server consolidation [23]. 
A “virtual machine” is a fully protected and isolated copy of the 
underlying physical machine’s hardware that gives to its users the illusion of 
a dedicated physical machine. Figure 1.2 illustrates the traditional 
organization of a virtual machine system. The virtual machine monitor, 
VMM, is a software layer that takes complete control of the machine 
hardware and creates VMs, each of which behaves like a complete physical 
machine with its own operating system (OS).  
 
Figure 1.2: A virtual machine monitor 
 To maximize performance, the VMM gets out of the way 
whenever possible and allows a VM to execute directly on the 
hardware, albeit in a non-privileged mode. The monitor regains control 
anytime the VM tries to perform an operation that may affect the 
correct operation of other VMs or of the hardware. The monitor safely 
emulates the operation before returning control to the VM. The result 
of a complete machine virtualization is the creation of a set of virtual 
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computers that runs on a physical computer. An OS that runs in a VM 
is a guest OS. Since VMs are isolated from each other, the crash of a 
guest OS does not affect other VMs. [23] 
VMMs build some useful properties for system security, among them 
[24, 25]: 
 Isolation: Software running in a VM cannot access or modify 
the monitor or other VMs. 
 Inspection: The VMM can access the entire VM state.  
 Interposition: The VMM can intercept and modify operations 
issued by a VM.  
There are two classical approaches to organize VMs [26, 27]:  
 A type II VMM runs on top of a hosting operating system and then 
spawns higher level virtual machines. Examples include the JavaVM, 
Dot Net environment, Virtualbox [28] and Hosted Xen project 
(HXen) [29]. These VMMs monitor their VMs and redirect requests 
for resource to appropriate APIs in the hosting environment. Figure 
1.3-A depicts type II VMM. 
 A type I VMM, or hypervisor runs directly on the hardware without 
the need of a hosting OS. Examples include the mainframe 
virtualization solutions offered by Amdahl and IBM, and on modern 
computers by solutions like VMware ESX [30], Xen [31] and 
Windows virtualization. Figure 1.3-B depicts type I VMM. 
             
   Figure 1.3-A: type II VMM.     Figure 1.3-B: type I VMM (Hypervisor)   
1.4.  System Calls 
A system call [32] is a request for an action of an OS on behalf of a user 
program. System calls provide an essential interface between a process and 
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the OS like the API. On Unix-like systems, this API is usually part of an 
implementation of the C library (libc). On Windows systems, it is part of the 
Native API. Several tools can record the system calls sequences, the most 
common ones are the UNIX tool “strace” and the Linux audit daemon 
“auditd”. System calls can be categorized into five main categories [32]: 
1. Process Control 
2. File management: 
3. Device Management:  
4. Information Maintenance: 
5. Communication:  
1.5.  The Event Logs  
An event is a notification to the user or an entry added to a log that 
denotes any significant occurrence in hardware, software, and system 
components of a local or a remote computer [33]. The event log service 
records application, security, and system events. Event logs support the 
prediction, the identification and the diagnosis of system problems. 
Monitoring security events helps in detecting attacks and threats. Each OS 
has a specific auditing or event log service. In Windows systems it is the 
“Event Viewer” service [33]. The log entry consists of two parts, (a) the 
header information and (b) event description. 
a) Event Header:  
This header records [33]:  
 Date: The date the event occurred.  
 Time: The time the event occurred.  
 User: The name of the logged user when the event occurred.  
 Computer: The name of the computer where the event occurred.  
 Event ID: An event number that identifies the event type.  
 Source: The source of the event. This can be the name of a program, 
a system component, or an individual component of a large program. 
 Type: The type of event.  
 Category: A classification of the event by the event source.  
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b) Event Description 
The description of an event depends on its type. Events can be classified into 
one of the following types [33]:  
 Information: It describes the successful operation of a task, For 
example, an Information event is logged when a network driver loads 
successfully. 
 Warning: It does not imply an urgent necessity but it may indicate a 
future problem. For example, a Warning message is logged when 
disk space starts to run low. 
 Error: It signals a significant problem, such as the failure of a critical 
task. For example, the startup of an important process failed. 
 Success Audit (Security log): It records the successful execution of a 
security action. For example, a user logs onto/off the computer. 
 Failure Audit (Security log): It signals a partial failure of a security 
action. For example, a user cannot log onto the computer. 
Chapter 6 details security events and their important features. 
1.6.  NetFlow Data (Network Flows) 
NetFlow is a network protocol developed by Cisco Systems to collect 
network flows. A network flow is a unidirectional sequence of packets that 
share seven values [34, 35]: 
 Ingress interface. 
 Source IP address 
 Destination IP address 
 IP protocol 
 Source port for UDP or TCP, 0 for other protocols 
 Destination port for UDP or TCP, type and code for ICMP, or 0 for 
other protocols 
 IP Type of Service (TOS). Based on TOS values, a packet would be 
placed in a prioritized outgoing queue, or take a route with 
appropriate latency, throughput, or reliability. 
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Figure 1.4: NetFlow architecture [34] 
Figure 1.4 shows the export of NetFlow records. The router outputs a 
flow record when it determines that the flow is finished. It does this by flow 
aging: when the router sees new traffic for an existing flow it resets the aging 
counter. Flow record can be transmitted at a fixed interval even if the flow is 
still ongoing. Several software tools support NetFlow recording such as, 
Cisco NetFlow [36], vSphere [37], and sFlow [38]. A NetFlow record can 
contain a wide variety of information about the flow traffic such as [34]: 
 Input interface index. 
 Output interface index or zero if the packet is dropped. 
 Timestamps for the flow start and finish time, in milliseconds since 
the last boot. 
 Number of bytes and packets observed in the flow 
 Layer 3 headers: 
 Source & destination IP addresses 
 Source and destination port numbers for TCP,UDP, SCTP 
 ICMP Type and Code. 
 IP protocol 
 Type of Service (ToS) value 
 For TCP flows, the union of all TCP flags observed over the life of 
the flow. 
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 Layer 3 Routing information: 
 IP address of the immediate next-hop along the route to the 
destination 
 Source & destination IP masks. 
1.7.  Entropy 
The definition of the entropy is a quite broad and general and it is 
expressed in terms of the application field. In information theory, entropy 
measures the amount of information that is missing before reception and it is 
also referred to as Shannon entropy [39]. The conditional entropy (or 
equivocation) [40] is one of the information entropy categories that 
quantifies the amount of information to describe the outcome of a random 
variable Y if the value of another random variable X is known. The entropy 
of Y conditioned on X is written as H(Y|X). If H(Y|X=x) is the entropy of the 
variable Y conditioned on the variable X taking the value x, then H(Y|X) is 
the average of H(Y|X=x) over all possible values of X. Equation 1.1 [40] 
formally defines conditional entropy given a discrete random variable X with 
support  and Y with support . 
H(Y|X) = 0 if and only if the value of Y is completely determined by the 
value of X. Conversely, H(Y|X) = H(Y) if and only if Y and X are 
independent. 
                                         (1.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 use conditional entropy to measure the regularity of the 
training data for each user. 
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1.8.  The Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
An ANN [41] is a mathematical function that consists of some artificial 
neurons that receives and sums their inputs. Usually the sums are weighted, 
and the sum is passed through a non-linear function, a transfer or activation 
function.  
 
Figure 1.5: The basic structure of the artificial neuron  
As shown in Figure 1.5, the basic structure of the ANN consists of three 
types of nodes, input, hidden, and output. The artificial neuron receives m + 
1 inputs with signals x₀ through  and weights w₀ through . Equation 1.2 
defines the output of the k
th
 neuron: 
 
                                                        (1.2) 
 
 
Where, ϕ is the transfer function that translates the input signals to output 
signals.  
1.8.1. ANN Transfer Function  
Four types of transfer functions are commonly used, Unit step 
(threshold), sigmoid, piecewise linear, and Gaussian. 
1) Unit step (threshold) function:  
The output is one of two values depending on whether the total input is 
larger than a threshold x. Figure 1.6 shows the shape of this function. 
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Figure 1.6: The Unit step (threshold) transfer function 
2) Sigmoid function: 
The sigmoid function consists of 2 functions, logistic and tangential. The 
logistic function has a range 0..1, while the range of the tangential one is -1.. 
+1. Figure 1.7 shows the shape of this function. 
 
Figure 1.7: The sigmoid transfer function 
3) Piecewise Linear function:  
The output of the Piecewise Linear function is proportional to the total 
weighted output. Figure 1.8 shows the shape of this function. 
 
  Figure 1.8: The Piecewise Linear transfer function 
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4) Gaussian function:  
Gaussian functions are continuous curves with a bell shape. The node 
output is interpreted in terms of class membership (1/0), depending on how 
close the net input is to a chosen average value. Figure 1.9 shows the 
function shape. 
 
Figure 1.9: The Gaussian transfer function 
1.8.2. Threshold Logic Unit (TLU): 
TLU [42] is a simple type of ANN similar to the threshold transfer 
function that uses a simple model with binary inputs and outputs, some 
restrictions on the possible weights, and a more flexible threshold value. Any 
boolean function can be implemented by networks of such ANN.  
1.8.3. ANN Types 
There are different types [41] of neural networks, but they are generally 
classified into feed-forward and feed-back networks. 
A feed-forward network is a non-recurrent network where the signal 
travels in one direction. Input data is passed onto a layer of processing 
elements where each element computes a weighted sum of its inputs that 
feed the next layer. The process continues through all the layers to compute 
the final output. The output layer sometime uses a threshold transfer 
function. 
A feed-back network has feed-back paths that send the signal in both 
directions using loops. All connections between the neurons are possible and 
this may result in loops. Because of these characteristics, this type of 
networks is a non-linear dynamic system which changes continuously until it 
reaches an equilibrium. Feed-back networks are often used in associative 
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memories and optimization problems. We use this type of networks to train 
our IDS system to adjust the weights of the ANN. 
1.9.  Host, Network, and DDoS Attacks 
Attacks utilize network media and manipulate computing and/or network 
resources to severely degrade the performance of the services of an ICT 
network and eventually shutdown the entire network. We can classify attacks 
according to the type of penetration (inside, outside), type of interactions 
(passive, active) and the mechanism to launch the attack. [43, 44] 
Penetration Type: Penetration can be carried out as an outsider or as an 
insider. Insiders are legal users that are conducting malicious activities 
through their accounts or by illegally using other user accounts. Instead, an 
outsider launches attacks from outside the network perimeter or implements 
probing or scanning attacks to acquire information on the network before 
launching the real attacks. Potential outsiders range from amateur to 
organized crime, cyber terrorists, and hostile governments. 
Interaction Type: Attack classification should also consider the interaction 
between the attackers and the network environment. Based on this criterion, 
network attacks can be either classified as active or passive. In a passive 
attack (e.g., wiretapping, port scanner, idle scan), the attacker listens to the 
streams of traffic to gather valuable information. Thus the anomalous 
behaviors caused by this type of attacks are hard to observe because they 
leave the minimum footprint. Active attacks aim to change the configuration 
of system resources or affect their operation (e.g., Denial of Service Attacks, 
Spoofing, Man-in-middle attack, ARP positioning). They trigger an 
anomalous behavior that can be observed and quantified provided that the 
appropriate metrics are used. 
Mechanism Type: the mechanisms and techniques to launch an attack 
partition attack into five classes: Denial of Service (DoS), User to Root 
(U2R), Remote to Local, probing, and virus/worm attacks. 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack: It prevents services for the users by 
limiting or denying their access to system resources such as bandwidth, 
memory, buffers, and/or processing power. To this purpose, these attacks can 
target software vulnerabilities, change configuration, or exhaust the network 
resource to its limit. Possible examples include ICMP Nukes, Teardrop, 
Land Attack, the ping of death, and playing with the configuration of a 
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compromised router. While these attacks can be easily fixed by installing 
proper software patches, reloading correct configuration, and limit the access 
to resources, they impose a critical load on network administrators that 
increases with the number of attacks. Section 1.9.2 describes a popular attack 
in this class, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). 
User to Root (U2R) attack: Attackers with login access can bypass 
authentication to gain the higher privileges of another user in controlling and 
accessing the system. 
Remote to Local (R2L) attack: Attackers can bypass normal authentication 
and execute commands and programs on the target with local machine 
privileges. 
Probe/Scanning attacks: These attacks blueprint the network and its 
resources to discover vulnerability or entry points that the attacker can use to 
penetrate or attack network resources.  
Worm/virus: This attack is run by a malicious piece of code that spreads 
across a network and targets hosts or network resources to cause dysfunction, 
data loss, or data theft.  
Attacks against an information system can also be classified according to 
the number of involved computers. An attack that may involve even a large 
number of computers is the DDoS ones outlined in Section 1.9.2. Attacks 
can also be classified into network or host ones according to the mechanism 
or the type of vulnerabilities they exploit. 
 [45] presents classification criteria based on attack surfaces of the cloud 
computing scenario participants as shown in Figure 1.10.  
 
Figure 1.10: A Taxonomy for attacks on cloud services 
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(a) Service-to-User: includes attacks in common client-server 
architectures, e.g. buffer overflow attacks, SQL injection, or privilege 
escalation.  
(b) User-to-Service: includes attacks in the common environment of client 
program, e.g. browser-based attacks, attacks on browser caches, or 
Phishing attacks on mail clients.  
(c) Cloud-to-Service: includes attacks of a service instance against its 
hosting cloud system, e.g. the resource exhaustion attacks, or attacks 
on the hypervisor.  
(d) Service-to-Cloud: incorporates attacks of a cloud provider against a 
service, e.g., availability reductions, privacy related attacks or even 
malicious interference. This category is by far the most critical one, as 
the provider can implement them in a rather simple way and attack 
impacts are tremendous.  
(e) Cloud-to-User: includes user attacks against the interface of the cloud 
system to control the provided services and that enables the customers 
to add new services or change the number of service instances.  
(f) User-to-Cloud: involves every kind of attack that targets a user and that 
originates from the cloud system. It is similar to the phishing attempts 
to trigger a user into manipulating cloud-provided services. 
1.9.1. Host and Network Attacks and Their Libraries 
We briefly classify attacks into network and host ones and describe the 
libraries that support their implementation. 
Network attacks exploit vulnerabilities in the communication protocols or 
in the interconnection structure to attack the integrity and confidentiality of 
communications. As an example, since most communications adopt an 
unsecured or clear text format, an attacker that can access network data paths 
can also read and interpreter the traffic these paths transmit. Some examples 
of these attacks are [43]: 
(1) Eavesdropping: it is also known as sniffing or snooping. This attack 
monitors the network traffic.  
(2) Data Modification: it modifies transmitted data in a way that cannot 
be detected by the sender or the receiver.  
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(3) Identity or IP Address Spoofing: it builds IP packets that appear to 
originate from valid addresses to modify, reroute, or delete some 
data. It is supported by specialized libraries. 
(4) Denial-of-Service Attack (DoS): It shuts down applications or 
network services by flooding them with invalid traffic. This can 
prevent legal user from accessing network resources.  
(5) Man-in-the-Middle Attack: This attack inserts a distinct entity 
between two communicating components to capture and modify their 
communications.  
Host based attacks are enabled by vulnerabilities in the host OS or in the 
applications. Some classes of these attacks are [Host-attack]:  
 Buffer overflow: It violates memory safety to overwrite adjacent 
memory positions. It exploits the lack of controls on the size of a 
parameter 
 Rootkit: It installs software components to hide a malicious processes 
running on the node and that grants to the attacker a privileged access 
to the system. 
 Format string: It can crash a program or execute harmful code. It 
exploits the lack of control on user inputs such as the format string in 
some C functions.  
Several libraries have been developed to support host and network 
attacks. As an example, Metasploit [46] is a consistent and reliable library of 
constantly updated exploits for network, OSs and applications. An exploit is 
a code fragment to automate, at least partially, an attack. Metasploit defines a 
complete environment to develop new tools and automate every aspect of an 
attack. It simplifies the development of attack vectors to extend its exploits, 
payloads, encoders to create and execute more advanced and specialized 
attacks against a target system. 
1.9.2. DDoS Attacks 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks [47] are a class of attacks 
that disrupt the service quality of a system. It is worth considering these 
attacks in relation with clouds because their effectiveness increases if an 
attacker can use the massive amount of resources in a cloud.  
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Figure.1.11: The DDoS Strategy. 
Figure 1.11 shows the four elements of DDoS attacks [48] namely:  
(1) The attacker machine. 
(2) The handlers: these are hosts controlled by the attacker as a result of a 
previous attack. They run some malware and act as an intermediate 
interfaces to control the agents and route to them the attacker 
commands. 
(3) The agents or zombie hosts: also these hosts are controlled by the 
attacker. They run some malware that either implements an attack on 
behalf of the attacker (botnets) or generates a stream of packets 
towards the target system. 
(4) The victim or target system. 
While several kinds of DDoS attacks exist, any implementation of these 
attacks includes the following stages: 
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(1) Search of vulnerable hosts to act as handlers and zombies. This step 
can exploit a standard vulnerability scanner such as Nessus [51].  
(2) Compromising the vulnerable hosts: The attacker exploits the 
vulnerabilities returned by the scanner to attack some vulnerable hosts 
and stealthy install some malware.  
(3) Communication, broadcasting, and flooding: The attacker 
communicates a command to one or more handlers. Then, the handler 
broadcasts any received commands to hundreds or even thousands of 
zombies that start flooding the network of the target system until the 
attacker sends a stop command. 
In the experiments, we implement DDoS attacks through the LOIC 
library [49]. LOIC is one of the most powerful free DOS and DDOS 
attacking tool, it attempts to open several connections to the same target host 
and continuously floods it with false TCP or UDP packets, or with HTTP 
requests that lead to a service disruption. A DDOS attack runs LOIC through 
multiple zombies. Another library we have used is the CPU Ping Death 
library [50]. It is a DDoS attacking tool that opens multiple floods to a large 
number of hosts and continuously floods them with fake packets and HTTP 
requests to reduce their bandwidth and their performance. 
1.9.3. Current DDoS Detection Techniques in Cloud systems. 
We briefly review some IDSs that have recently been proposed to detect 
DDoS attacks in clouds.  
[52] investigates the effect of DDoS on clouds and proposes an IDS 
based on the behavioral threshold. The IDS assumes that a user is attacking 
the system if the user requests are outside the normal user range. The 
threshold is automatically determined as a dynamic variable according to the 
network position and pressure traffic. To simplify the discovery of legal 
users, several solutions may be integrated with the IDS such as load 
balancing of the network traffic and a honeypot [53]. The latter discovers the 
attacker signatures by analyzing the collected data. The IDS does not 
correlate network events in distinct virtual zones of the cloud. Furthermore, 
no deployment in a real cloud system is described and the accuracy and the 
performance of the IDS are not evaluated.  
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
32 
[54] uses an IDS sensor such as the version of Snort [55] installed on 
VMware ESX [56] machine that sniffs both in-bound and out-bound traffic 
to detect DoS attacks. Snort analyzes in-bound packets and looks for several 
intrusion patterns. If at least one matches, it drops all the packets from the 
same IP address. The accuracy and performance of this solution is not 
evaluated. Furthermore, also this solution does not correlate network events 
to discover attacks against several virtual zones.  
[57] proposes a cooperative IDS that reduces the impact of DoS attack in 
each cloud regions. Several IDS components are distributed across these 
regions and a cooperative module receives their alert messages. Then, a 
majority vote determines the trustworthiness of these alerts. This system 
avoids any single point of failure but its accuracy is not satisfactory. 
Furthermore, it has not been evaluated against a DDoS attack. 
The analysis of current solutions confirms that a defense strategy for 
clouds against DDoS attacks introduces some further requirements with 
respect to those for traditional systems. To be adopted in clouds, a solution 
needs to:  
(1) Be distributed and scalable,  
(2) Avoid single points of failure,  
(3) Correlate the user behaviours in distinct environments. 
(4) Integrate different service models.  
1.10 Software Tools Used in the Thesis Work  
In the following, we highlight the software tools to build and deploy the 
proposed framework. 
A. Cloud Management Software 
In our practical deployments, we used Microsoft Private Cloud [13] in 
our CID-VERT framework and VMware system in CIDS framework to 
control the deployment of the VMs and applications and to manage the 
creation of the virtual networks. 
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1) Microsoft Private Cloud  
Microsoft private cloud [13] offers traditional IaaS services, such as VMs 
on demand and supports for deploying multi-tier applications, monitoring 
and updating those applications, and automation services. It relies on several 
different System Center 2012 components and supports multiple type-1 
hypervisors, see Figure 1.12, such as: Microsoft Hyper-V [13], VMware 
ESX/ESXi [56], and Citrix XenServer [58]. It also supports conventional 
compute, storage, and networking hardware along with pre-packaged 
hardware configurations that conform to the Hyper-V Cloud Fast Track 
specification. [59] 
 
 
Figure 1.12: The main components of Microsoft private cloud. [59] 
The components that Microsoft private cloud relies on are [59]:  
 System Center Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) 2012: it provides 
the fundamental services for creating and managing clouds as well 
as to deploy and update VMs and applications.  
 System Center App Controller 2012: it is a self-service portal for 
requests made directly to a private cloud created with VMM 2012. 
 System Center Service Manager 2012: it provides automated IT 
service management and an associated self-service portal.  
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 System Center Orchestrator 2012: it provides a way to automate 
interactions among other management tools such as VMM 2012 
and Service Manager.  
 System Center Operations Manager 2012: it monitors VMs, 
applications, and other aspects of a private cloud. Then, it fires 
actions to fix problems it detects.  
All these technologies depend on Windows Server 2012 and Active 
Directory. 
2) VMware Workstation 
VMware Workstation [60] is a type-2 hypervisor that enables users to set 
up multiple VMs that supports the following functions [60]: 
 Bridging existing host network adapters. 
 Share physical disk drives and USB devices with a virtual machine. 
 Simulate disk drives. 
 Save "snapshots" for the VMs which can later be restored to return 
the virtual machine to the saved state.  
B. Intrusion Detection Software 
In our deployment, we used some open source IDSs and tools to detect 
host, network, and DDoS attacks based on the signature based analysis 
techniques namely, OSSEC, Snort, and OSSIM.  
1) OSSEC 
OSSEC [61] is an Open Source Host-based Intrusion Detection System. 
It performs log analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, rootkit 
detection, real-time alerting and active response. It runs on most OSs and it 
has two types of installation, Local and Agent-Server. In the local 
installation, OSSEC only protect a local machine. Instead, the Agent-Server 
installation protects the machines of the network. The agents are installed in 
several hosts systems to report back to a central OSSEC server to aggregate 
the information from the agents, analyze it and fires alerts. 
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Figure 1.13: The Analysis flow chart of OSSEC 
 As shown in Figure 1.13, the analysis processes includes pre-decoding, 
decoding, rule matching, and alerting.  
 The Pre-decoding process extracts the static information such as the 
event message, the location or the program name.  
 The Decoding process extracts non static information such the attributes 
of the regular expression that defines each field.  
 The Rule Matching process applies the Rule Matching Engine to 
determine if the received event matches any stored rules to fire an alert. 
 The Alerting process determines where the rules should be sent. Alerts 
can be emailed to the user or logged into database.  
2) Snort 
Snort [55] is an open source network intrusion detection system that can 
log network packets. It uses a rule-based language that integrates signature, 
protocol, and anomaly inspection methods. Snort consists of five main 
components [55], see Figure 1.14, namely, Packet Decoder, Preprocessors, 
Detection Engine, Logging and Alerting, and the output module. 
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Figure 1.14: Snort Architecture 
The analysis processes of Snort are summarized below:  
(1) It captures packets from network using “LibPCap” component. 
(2) The packet decoder component receives packets from different types of 
network interfaces (Ethernet, SLIP, PPP…), prepares a packet for 
processing and fits it at the data structure.  
(3) The preprocessor component prepares data for the detection engine. It 
also handles defragmentation and TCP streams and detects anomalies 
in packet headers. 
(4) The detection engine, the most important component, detects if any 
intrusion activity exists in a packet by applying a rule-based string 
matching algorithm. The algorithm dissects the packet and applies rules 
on different parts of the packet. If a packet matches any rule, 
appropriate action is taken. Otherwise no action is taken. 
Finally, the Output Module processes alerts and logs and generates the 
final output according to the user policy and the packet content.  
3) OSSIM 
OSSIM [62] provides a common framework for the deployment, 
configuration, and management of security tools including IDS sensors. It 
offers event collection, normalization, correlation and incident response. We 
modified two modules from OSSIM, the normalization and correlation to 
integrate all alerts from different IDSs analyzers in the cloud i.e., OSSEC 
and Snort alerts by applying the IDMEF protocol. We detail the two 
modules in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 2 
Intrusion Detection and Related Works  
This chapter introduces the intrusion detection systems definition, 
architecture and techniques. Then, it reviews previous works on intrusion 
detection systems and masquerade detection. Finally, it discusses the current 
intrusion detection datasets and their deficiencies for cloud systems. 
2.1 Intrusion Detection Systems  
Intrusion detection [63] is the process of monitoring and analyzing the 
events occurring in an ICT system to detect signs of intrusions. Intrusions are 
defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability 
of a system component, or to bypass a security mechanism. They may be 
generated by attackers accessing the systems from the Internet or by 
authorized users who attempt to gain additional privileges or misuse their 
privileges.  
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are software or hardware 
components that automate the monitoring and the analysis. There are several 
compelling reasons to adopt IDSs [63]: 
 To prevent illegal behaviors by increasing the perceived risk of 
discovery and punishment. 
 To detect attacks and other security violations not prevented by other 
security measures.  
 To detect and deal with the preambles to attacks  
 To document existing threat to an organization.  
 To act as quality control for security design and administration.  
 To provide useful information about intrusions that do take place, 
allowing improved diagnosis, recovery, and correction of root causes. 
2.1.1 Intrusion Detection System Architecture 
At a very macroscopic level, an IDS can be described [64] as a detector 
that processes three kind of information from the system to be protected 
(Figure 2.1):  
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(1) Long-term information depending upon the technique to detect 
intrusions, e.g. a knowledge base of attacks. 
(2) Configuration information about the current system state.  
(3) Audit information describing the system events e.g., C2 audit trail, the 
syslog in the UNIX world, the event log in Windows NT.  
The detector removes unnecessary information from the audit trail and 
presents a synthetic view of security-related user actions. A decision is then 
made according to the probability that these actions are symptoms of an 
intrusion. 
 
Figure 2.1: Simple Intrusion Detection System 
The following three measures of the efficiency of an IDS have been 
highlighted in [68] 
(1) Accuracy. An inaccurate IDS flags as anomalous or intrusive a 
legitimate action in the environment.  
Any IDS has four possible outcomes defined by the IDS reaction 
matrix, see Table 2.1. The outcomes are known as. True negatives 
(TN) as well as true positives (TP) correspond to a correct IDS 
operation when events are successfully labeled as normal and attack, 
respectively. False positives (FP) refer to normal events predicted as 
attacks, while false negatives (FN) are attacks incorrectly predicted as 
normal events. [65, 66] 
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Table.2.1: Possible status for an IDS reaction [65, 66] 
 
The following equations compute the rate of these reactions to quantify the 
IDS performance [67]: 
 
 
(2) Performance. The performance of an IDS is the rate at which it 
processes audit events. A poor performance prevents real-time 
detection. 
(3) Completeness. An incomplete IDS fails to detect an attack. The 
evaluation of this measure is rather complex due to the lack of global 
knowledge of attacks.  
Two further properties are defined in [64]: 
(1) Fault tolerance or resilience. An IDS should resist to attacks, 
particularly to denial of service. This is important because most IDSs 
run on top of commercial OSs or hardware which are vulnerable to 
attacks. 
(2) Timeliness. The performance of an IDS should enable an early reaction 
to prevent the attacker from subverting the audit source or the IDS 
itself. The corresponding performance measure encompasses both the 
native performance of the IDS and the time to propagate the 
information and react to it. 
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2.1.2 Intrusion Detection Methods and Techniques  
There are two distinct approaches to detect an intrusion: 
A. The search for evidence of attacks based on knowledge accumulated 
from known attacks. 
B. The search for deviations from a model of normal behavior based 
upon observations of a system during a known normal state.  
The first approach is referred to as misuse detection or detection by 
appearance. The second trend is referred to as anomaly detection or detection 
by behavior. We denote the first approach as knowledge-based intrusion 
detection because it describes more precisely the adopted technique. The 
second approach is characterized as behavior-based intrusion detection. We 
highlight both approaches in the next sections with their relative techniques 
as in [64] 
A. Knowledge-based intrusion detection 
Knowledge-based intrusion detection techniques exploit the knowledge 
available about specific attacks and system vulnerabilities. The IDS stores 
and manages information about these vulnerabilities and looks for attempts 
to exploit them. When it detects an attempt, it triggers an alarm. In other 
words, any action that is not explicitly recognized as an attack is accepted. 
Therefore, knowledge-based intrusion detection systems may achieve a good 
accuracy. However, they achieve completeness only if their knowledge of 
attacks is updated regularly. 
Knowledge-based approaches have the potential for very low false alarm 
rates, and the IDS may implement a detailed contextual analysis that 
simplifies preventive or corrective actions. 
Drawbacks include the difficulty of gathering information on attacks and 
keeping it abreast with new vulnerabilities. Knowledge-based method uses 
different techniques namely: expert systems, signature analysis, and state 
transition analysis. 
 Expert systems. These IDSs contain set of rules that describe attacks 
[69]. Audit events are translated into facts carrying their semantic 
meaning in the expert system and the inference engine draws 
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conclusions using these rules and facts. This method increases the 
abstraction level of the audit data by attaching a semantic meaning to 
it. Rule-based languages [70] are a natural tool for modeling the 
knowledge about attacks. This approach allows a systematic 
browsing of the audit trail in search for evidence of attempts to 
exploit known vulnerabilities.  
 Signature analysis. Signature analysis follows the same knowledge- 
acquisition approach as expert systems. However, these IDSs exploit 
in a different way the knowledge because the method decreases the 
semantic level of the attack description by transforming it into 
information that can be found in the audit trail. For example, attack 
scenarios might be translated into the sequences of audit events they 
generate, or into patterns of data in the system audit trail. The 
implementation of this technique can be very efficient and it is 
therefore adopted by commercial IDSs. As in any knowledge-based 
approaches the main drawback is the update to keep up with the 
stream of new vulnerabilities and attacks. 
 State-transition analysis. This technique [71] was implemented first 
in UNIX and later in other environments. It is conceptually identical 
to model-based reasoning: it describes attacks as a set of goals and 
transitions, but represents them as state-transition diagrams. 
B.  Behavior-based intrusion detection 
Behavior-based intrusion detection techniques assume that an intrusion 
can be detected by observing a deviation from the normal or expected 
behavior of the system or the users. The model of normal or valid behavior is 
extracted from information collected by various means. Then, the IDS 
compares this model with the current system activity and raises an alarm 
when it observes a deviation In other words, anything that does not 
correspond to a previously learned behavior is considered intrusive. 
Therefore, the intrusion-detection system might be complete, but its accuracy 
poses complex issues. 
Behavior based approaches can detect attempts to exploit new and 
unforeseen vulnerabilities and they can even contribute to the (partially) 
automatic discovery of new attacks. They are less dependent on OS specific 
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mechanisms and can also help to detect "abuse of privileges" attacks that do 
not actually exploit any security vulnerability. A high false alarm rate is 
generally cited as their main drawback because the learning phase may not 
cover any possible behavior. Also, behavior can change over time, 
introducing the need for periodic on-line retraining, resulting either in the 
unavailability of the IDS or in false alarms. If the information system is 
under attack when the IDS is learning what is acceptable behavior, the 
behavior profile may contain intrusive behavior, which is then not detected 
as anomalous. The method uses different techniques namely: statistics, 
expert systems, neural network, and user intention identification. 
 Statistics. Statistics is the most widely used tool to build behavior-
based IDSs [72]. The user or system behavior is measured by a 
number of variables sampled over time. Examples include the login 
and logout time of each session, the resource duration, and the 
amount of processor-memory-disk resources consumed during the 
session. The time sampling period ranges from a few minutes to 
about one month. The original model keeps averages of all these 
variables and detects whether thresholds are exceeded based on 
standard deviations. 
 Expert systems. They are useful for policy-based usage profiles but 
less efficient than the statistical approach to process large amounts of 
audit information. 
 Neural networks. Knowledge-based intrusion detection use neural 
networks to learn attack traces and seek them in the audit stream. 
Currently, a neural network cannot propose an explanation of the 
attack because there is no reliable way to understand what triggered 
the association. Therefore, IDSs use neural networks to learn the 
behavior of actors in the system e.g. users, daemons. Experiments 
that used a neural network to predict user behaviors [73] have shown 
that the behavior of UNIX root users is extremely predictable because 
of the very regular activity generated by automatic system actions or 
daemons. Furthermore, the behavior of most users is also predictable 
but that of a very small fraction of users is unpredictable. 
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 User Intention Identification. User Intention Identification [74] is a 
technique [75] that models the normal behavior of users in terms of 
their high-level tasks. Then, these tasks are refined into actions 
related to the audit events observed on the system. The analyzer pairs 
each user with a set of tasks the user can perform. Whenever a user 
action does not fit the task pattern, an alarm is issued.  
2.1.3 Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) 
The Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) [76] is a 
XML standard format for messages exchanged among IDSs. This model is 
an object-oriented representation of the alert data that the intrusion detection 
analyzers transmit to the management systems. It provides a standard, 
coherent representation of alerts and it describes the relationship between 
simple and complex alerts.  
As shown in Figure 2.2, IDMEF Message is the top-level class and it has 
two subclasses, Alerts and Heartbeat. A heartbeat message signals the 
current status of the IDS analyzer to the central manager or the other way 
around and they are sent with a predefined frequency. The absence of a 
Heartbeat message denotes a failure of the analyzer or of its network 
connection. The Alert message is a response from an IDS analyzer and its 
information is used to integrate and correlate the alerts from different IDSs. 
The integration is based on the similarity of one or more of the data model 
subclasses as following:  
a) Attack name or signature given by the classification subclass. 
b) Times of creation and of analysis. The two times are based upon the 
characteristics of the firing IDS. Hence, two alerts might be 
considered similar even though their times of creation and of analysis 
differ. 
c) Source and target. The structures of the source and target subclasses 
are similar; they might be described by an IP address or a host or user 
name. 
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Figure 2.2: IDMEF Data model 
2.1.4 Related Work in Intrusion Detection Systems 
IDS technology has been proposed as an efficient security measure and is 
nowadays widely adopted for securing critical IT-Infrastructures. According 
to the protected objectives, IDSs can be categorized to three main categories 
namely [77]: 
(1) Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). 
(2) Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS). 
(3) Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS). 
The latter contains both types of sensors (i.e., HIDS and NIDS)  
Cloud based IDS is a new trend of researches which extends distributed 
IDSs. A few papers have proposed some IDSs frameworks for cloud 
systems. Some of these frameworks target SaaS service model, the others 
adapt some traditional techniques such as mobile agents. These papers do not 
discuss an implementation of the proposed frameworks or sometimes cover 
only one service model. This section describes all the previously mentioned 
categories of IDSs and reviews previous works on this theme. 
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(1) Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems  
A Network-based IDS (NIDS) detects attacks by capturing and analyzing 
network packets. By listening on a network segment or switch, a NIDS can 
monitor the network traffic among the hosts connected to the segment. 
NIDSs often consist of a set of single-purpose sensors or hosts at various 
points in a network. These components monitor network traffic, implement a 
local traffic analysis and reports attacks to a central management console 
[63].  
The best strategy to secure a large-scale network is to partition it into 
smaller networks using switches. Separate network segment are then 
protected through security technology such as firewalls and IDSs [78]. 
Figure 2.3 gives an example of NIDSs deployment. 
 
Figure 2.3: An example of network-based intrusion detection system 
The advantages of NIDSs are [63]: 
(1) A few well-placed NIDSs can monitor a large network. 
(2) Their deployment has little impact on an existing network.  
(3) They can be made very robust against attack and even made invisible 
to most attackers. 
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The disadvantages [63] are: 
(1) NIDSs cannot analyst all the packets in a large or busy network. 
Hence, they may fail to recognize an attack launched during periods 
of high traffic.  
(2) Several advantages of NIDSs do not apply to switch-based networks. 
While switches subdivide networks into many small segments, 
sometime they do not provide universal monitoring ports where all 
the traffic is mirrored. This limits the monitoring range of a NIDS 
sensor.  
(3) NIDSs cannot analyze encrypted information. This problem is 
increasing as more organizations (and attackers) use virtual private 
networks.  
(4) Most NIDSs can discover that attack is attempted but cannot tell 
whether or not it was successful. Hence, if a NIDS detects an attack, 
administrators have to manually investigate whether it was 
successful.  
(5) Some NIDSs become unstable and may crash if network-based 
attacks involve fragmenting packets. 
(2) Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems  
A Host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) is installed on a host to 
monitor suspicious events occurring within it. In other words, a HIDS resides 
on network end-points. Unlike NIDSs, HIDSs monitor not only malicious 
network traffic but also events within the protected host.  
An HIDS is rather powerful [78] because it is designed to operate on a 
specific host such as web or a mail server. Hence, it may be integrated with 
the software node and be designed to communicate with other network 
components and OSs.  
Furthermore, HIDSs can complement NIDSs because they can analyze 
packets at the application ends and inspect encrypted traffic [78]. Since an 
HIDS detects attacks inside its local host, it could not detect attacks from 
outside its boundaries. Figure 2.4 gives an example of HDS deployment and 
Table 2.2 summarizes advantages and disadvantages of HIDS and NIDS.  
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Figure 2.4: An example of Host-based intrusion detection system  
Table.2.2: Evaluation of HIDS and NIDS 
NIDS HIDS 
Better for detecting attacks from outside  Better for detecting attacks from inside that 
NIDS cannot analyze 
Examines packet headers & entire packet Does not see packet headers 
Host independent Host dependent 
Bandwidth dependent Bandwidth independent 
Slow down the networks that have IDS 
clients installed 
Slow down the hosts that have IDS clients 
installed 
Detects network attacks, as payload is 
analyzed 
Detects local attacks before they hit the 
network 
Not suitable for encrypted and switches 
network 
Well-suited for encrypted and switches 
network 
Does not perform normally detection of 
complex attacks 
Powerful for analyzing a possible attack 
because of relevant information in database 
High false positive rate Low false positive rate 
Examples: Snort [55], Cisco Guard XT 
[79] 
OSSEC[61], Samhain [80], Osiris[81], and 
eEye Retina [82] 
(3)  Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems  
A distributed IDS (DIDS) consists of multiple IDSs over a large network. 
The IDSs interact in a hierarchical architecture with either several servers or 
a unique central server [DIDS-Symantec]. Figure 2.5 shows the tree structure 
of a hierarchical architecture where circles represent network nodes and 
arrows denote the information flows between different types of nodes. The 
leaf nodes represent network-based or host-based collection points. They 
gather information that is transmitted to internal nodes, which aggregate 
information from multiple nodes. Further aggregation, abstraction and data 
reduction occurs at higher level nodes until reaching the root node. This node 
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is a command and control system that evaluates attack signatures, issues 
responses and reports to an operator console where an administrator can 
manually assess status and issue commands. The hierarchical structures 
make the IDS vulnerable to direct attacks. Several points of failure exist in 
the IDS that have no redundant communication lines or the capability to 
dynamically reconfigure relationships if a key component fails. The IDS may 
also still be vulnerable because current implementations do not apply 
survivability techniques such as redundancy, mobility, or dynamic recovery 
[84, 85]. Some known examples of DIDS are EMERALD [86], INBOUNDS 
[87]. Sometimes, see Figure 2.6, the IDS collector components over a large 
network communicate with a central server to simplify network monitoring, 
incident analysis, and instant attack data. The system works as a centralized 
IDS but with a collection of distributed collector components. 
  
Figure 2.5 Hierarchical DIDS  
  
Figure 2.6 Unique central server 
 The data collection component in Figure 2.6 receives information from 
the audit logs and the host internal interfaces or from the network packets. 
Then, it transmits information to a centralized analysis component in another 
machine (i.e., a server or a dedicated machine) that analyzes it [78]. This 
architecture is effective for small numbers of monitored nodes. The 
centralized analysis limits the system’s scalability: as more collection 
components are added, the processing load on the analysis component 
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increases with the overhead on the machine running this component. Also 
this architecture represents a single point of failure. Some known examples 
of this type of DIDS are NIDES [88], ARMD [89], Stalker [90], and 
UNICORN [91].  
DIDS can be categorized as Mobile Agent Intrusion Detection Systems 
(MAIDS), Grid based Intrusion Detection Systems (GIDS), and Cloud based 
Intrusion Detection Systems. We will review them below. 
(a) Mobile Agent Intrusion Detection Systems (MAIDS) 
The DIDS architecture does not scale well for large networks since any 
new component increases the load on the DIDS director, and the data 
flowing to the director can consume most of network bandwidth. MAIDS 
address these scalability problems by using Mobile Agents (MAs) for 
decentralized data analysis.  
A software agent is a software entity which functions continuously and 
autonomously in a given environment. It can execute activities in a flexible 
and intelligent manner that responds to changes in the environment, learns 
from its experience and cooperates with other agents [92]. MAs are a type of 
software agent with the capability to move from one host to another. For 
mobile agents to be useful for intrusion detection, a MA platform has to be 
installed on most, if not all, hosts and network devices. There are different 
functional and performance requirements [93] to enable the MAs to 
successfully detect intrusions. Figure 2.7 shows the movement of an agent 
among several platforms.  
 
Figure 2.7: An Agent System Model 
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The platform where an agent originates is referred to as the home 
platform. Normally, this is the most trusted environment for an agent. One or 
several hosts may comprise an agent platform that may support multiple 
locations or meeting places where agents can interact. The main advantages 
of mobile agent for IDS are reported in [93]. 
While MAs are a powerful tool, their implementation has been hindered 
by security considerations that are critical for IDSs, with the result that most 
security research in this field has concentrated upon the architecture to 
provide security for mobile agents [93]. The adoption of MAs for IDS poses 
several problems [93]: 
(1) The security issues related to MAs: there are different security threats 
for MAs namely, agent-to-agent, agent-to platform, platform-to-agent, 
and other-to-agent platform. The agent-to-agent category represents the 
set of attacks where agents attack other agents by exploiting their 
security weaknesses. The agent-to-platform category represents the 
attacks the agents launch against a platform. The platform-to-agent 
category represents the attacks where platforms compromise the 
security of agents. The other-to-agent platform category represents the 
set of attacks where external entities, including agent platforms, 
threaten the security of an agent platform.  
(2) The performance issue: MA software will generally hinder rather than 
help an IDS to rapidly process events and detect attacks. MA runtime 
environments implemented in slow interpreted languages may slow 
down MAIDS. 
(3) The code size issue: IDS services require a large amount of code. If 
agents have to implement specific tasks on multiple OSs then the code 
base may become extremely large. The code size may limit the MAID 
functionality because an agent transfer takes a long time and a large 
amount of computing and network resources.  
(4) Lack of a priori knowledge: Large enterprise networks include several 
distinct hardware platforms, running several OSs, each with different 
configurations and applications. It is not trivial for MAs to have a 
priori knowledge about a system and still remain lightweight. Hence, in 
a large enterprise, the required priori knowledge may prohibit a rapid 
agent transfer. 
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(5) Coding and Deployment Difficulties: MAs that are developed in-house 
or purchased from trusted vendors are likely to undergo the same 
software engineering methods as their non-mobile counterparts to 
assure the quality of code. This historically produces code with several 
faults. The capability of MA, such as moving and cloning, increase the 
complexity of design and development. Hence, MAIDS will be even 
more prone to faults than their non-MA counterparts.  
A comparison between previous related works for MAIDS is outlined in 
[94]. 
(b) Grid based Intrusion Detection System (GIDS) 
The heterogeneity of grid systems and their geographical spread over 
boundaries and organizational structures lead to potential security issues. The 
underlying network infrastructure of a grid can be the target of an attack. 
Attacks against any network or host in a grid can also be considered as 
attacks against the grid, because they affect its security aspects. Grid systems 
are susceptible to specific attacks because of their new protocols and 
services. Grid attacks mostly target to [96, 97]:  
 Processes running in kernel space e.g., OS daemons. 
 Processes running outside kernel space e.g. grid middleware, grid 
applications, and any non-grid applications running with either root 
or user privileges. 
 Grid protocols stack and network devices.  
Some works related to GIDS are outlined in the following. [98] describes 
a grid-based IDS architecture where agents located at grid nodes collect and 
transmit host audit data to storage and analysis servers. This centralized 
solution is not scalable. [99] proposes an efficient and scalable solution for 
storing and accessing audit data collected from grid nodes, but it does not 
discuss how to use the data to identify intrusions. [100] proposes a solution 
that integrates the grid system with an IDS to analyze data from the grid 
network. However, these approaches cannot detect grid-specific attacks, 
because they cannot capture high-level data to identify grid users. The Grid 
Intrusion Detection Architecture (GIDA) [101] solves the scalability problem 
by distributing the intrusion detection task among several analysis servers. 
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Both [98] and [101] focus on the detection of anomalies in the interaction of 
grid users with resource but neither architectures provide protection against 
the host and network attacks. [102] proposes a Performance based Grid 
Intrusion Detection System (PGHIDS). This IDS uses the abundant 
resources of a grid to detect intrusion packets, but it does not detect attacks 
to the grid itself and it acts as a NIDS, rather than a Grid-based IDS because 
it only looks for network attacks. GHIDS is an IDS [103] to defend 
computational grids against misusing of shared resource. It integrates a 
HIDS in a grid environment to protect against typical OS attacks, but it does 
not consider middleware vulnerabilities. [104] proposes a high-level Grid-
based IDS built on the functionality of lower-level HIDS and NIDS. 
However, both traditional HIDS and NIDS are not precisely suitable for grid 
specific-attacks. For example, traditional HIDS identifies an intruder not 
with grid user ID but with local user ID. Hence, this IDS cannot identify grid 
intruder precisely and the information without grid user ID is less useful for 
the behavior analysis of a grid user. Furthermore, some characteristic of grid-
specific attacks differ from those of traditional ones. Hence, the adoption of 
standard HIDS to detect grid attacks will results in high missing rate. The 
same authors have proposed another framework [105] for both grid and 
cloud systems. They increase the scalability by balancing among all nodes the 
load to analyze the intrusions and by removing the centralization deficiency 
from the IDS in [104].  
They also enhanced the coverage of attacks by applying both knowledge-
base and behaviour-base techniques, but their solution lacks several features 
related to the cloud system like virtualization, utilization, and deployment of 
cloud environments. Since the solution has been applied to a specific grid 
middleware, the proposed framework is more suitable to grid systems than to 
clouds. In [106] we proposed a new job analyzer component based on stack 
inspection methodology to work inside a GIDS that can be applied to 
different existing grid systems e.g., Condor [107], Globus [108] and our 
HIMAN system [8, 9]. The job analyzer component considers access 
permissions of submitted tasks. Its functionality is shown in Figure 2.8: 
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Figure.2.8: A flowchart for GIDS job analyzer component  
 The scheduler loads the submitted job to the host machine 
 Collects evidence from the assembly by host machine 
 Evaluates and tests evidence against the grid security policy. 
 Uses the output of the previous evaluation step to build the permission 
sets that enable the requests in next step. 
 Checks the requests for permission using the stack inspection 
methodology [109, 106]. 
 If the submitted job and its callers have been granted the requested 
permission then the operation can proceed otherwise, a security 
exception is raised. 
Table 2.3 summarizes previous proposals for GIDS  
Table.2.3: Comparing characteristic of previous related works for GIDS 
IDS 
Reference 
Knowledge-
based 
technique 
Behaviour 
based 
technique 
Data Source 
Host-
based 
IDS 
Network
-based 
IDS 
Valid for 
Grid 
GIDS2003 NO NO N/A No Yes No 
Grid-
wide2005 
Yes No Network No Yes Yes 
GIDA2005 No Yes Grid Network Yes No Yes 
GIDS2005 Yes No Network No Yes Yes 
GHIDS2006 Yes No Host Yes No Yes 
GIDS2008 No Yes Host, Network Yes Yes Yes 
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There are several reasons that make it difficult to apply solutions of grid 
based IDS to Cloud based IDS: 
(1) The different service models (SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS) with different 
types of threats and distinct kinds of users’ requirements.  
(2) The scalability issue, because most current GIDSs exploits either a 
hierarchical or a centralized architectures.  
(3) Most GIDSs do not integrate the knowledge base and the behaviour 
base techniques.  
(4) They use NIDS that cannot deal with the encrypted data while most 
data exchanged among cloud nodes is encrypted. 
(5) They do not correlate alerts from different nodes to analyze distributed 
attacks. 
(c) Cloud based intrusion detection system 
Intrusions in cloud systems are characterized by the potentially higher 
performance, consequences, and damages of cloud based intrusions. The 
deficiencies of current IDSs hinder their application to clouds. Here, we 
highlight the few papers discussing this topic. [94] proposes an IDS based on 
MAs technology to provide intrusion detection for cloud applications 
regardless of their locations and that handles attacks for cloud applications 
from the SaaS point of view. The proposed IDS tries to solve some of the 
security problems for MAs by isolating the agents inside VMs that provide 
secure sandboxes for the MAs. Figure.2.9 shows the proposed architecture.  
The proposed hybrid model introduces four main components, namely 
IDS Control Center (IDS CC), Agency, Application Specific Static Agent 
Detectors, and Specialized Investigative MA. Static Agents (SA) can 
implement packet filtering and look for intrusion signatures in the packets. 
SA generate an alert to IDS Control Center whenever they detect suspicious 
activities. Then, IDS Control Center will send investigative task-specific 
Mobile Agent to every agency that sent similar alerts (VM 1 and VM 2 in 
this example). 
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Figure.2.9: The proposed IDS architecture in a subnet 
As shown in Figure 2.9, MAs will visit and investigate all those VMs, 
collect information, correlate it and finally send or carry back the result to 
IDS Control Center. Consequently, the Alerting Console in IDS Control 
Center will analyze the incoming information to raise the alarm if it detects 
an intrusion. Names and identifications of suspected VMs will be black 
listed and sent to other VMs. This solution is flexible and cost-effective as it 
tries to further reduce network load by making each MA lighter as it is only 
responsible for detecting certain types of intrusions.  
Nevertheless, there are many deficiencies in this architecture: 
(1) The security issues related to MAs mentioned before.  
(2) The proposed IDS isolates the MAs from the host environment but it 
cannot protect them from their generator, i.e. the IDS Control Center 
environment. Obviously, it is impossible to keep agent private from a 
malicious runtime system executing the agent [95]. 
(3) Performance is critical because the MA runtime environments slow 
down MAIDS. The solution [93] uses MAIDS just for some functions 
and it implements core IDS by statically located systems: This 
restricts scalability and opens a single point of failure problem.  
(4) The central IDS control component restricts scalability. 
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(5) It does not correlate the host and network IDSs to handle the 
encrypted packets.  
(6) The proposed IDS does not handle other deficiencies for MA such as 
lack of a priori knowledge and the Coding and Deployment 
Difficulties.  
(7) It is applied to the cloud client only and it handles intrusions related to 
the SaaS service model and not the other service models.  
[77] proposes a theoretical framework targeting all existing service 
model. To simultaneously provide multiple benefits from various IDS 
sensors, they used the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format 
(IDMEF) [76] to enable interoperability among different approaches. They 
enable the end users to control and configure resources with distinct types of 
sensors, various configurations of the rule-sets and thresholds to efficiently 
monitor their virtualized components. Figure 2.10 shows the proposed IDS 
architecture 
 
Figure 2.10: The proposed IDS architecture 
The architecture includes several IDS Sensor VMs and an IDS 
Management Unit. An IDS Management Unit consists of four active 
components: Event Gatherer, Event Database, Analysis Component, and IDS 
Remote Controller. The Event Database records information about received 
events. It can be accessed through the Analysis Component. User controls 
the IDS management through direct interaction and configuration of the core 
components. The IDS Sensors on the VMs are connected to the Event 
Gatherer and identify malicious behavior and generates alerts that will be 
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processed by the Event Gatherer. A sensor can be configured through the 
IDS Remote Controller. The Event Gatherer collects events from sensors and 
standardizing the outputs. It also implements the communication between the 
sensor and the management unit. The Analysis Component represents and 
analyzes the gathered events [77]. The main deficiencies of this framework 
are: 
(1) It does not correlate alerts from the detectors. The correlation is 
essential for detecting attacks which leave their trails in distinct cloud 
locations.  
(2) It uses User-Mode-Linux, a type II VMM which only runs on Linux 
based systems.  
(3) The centralized ID unit that manages all other IDSs raises 
performance and scalability problems.  
(4) No component evaluates threats probabilities from the other nodes and 
compares them against a threshold to support the scheduler decision 
on the running tasks and their relevant users.  
The analysis of previous work confirms that, a proper defense strategy for 
clouds needs to:  
(1) Be distributed to avoid any single point of failure and increase 
robustness. 
(2) Protect the intrusion detection components from the intrusions. 
(3) Be scalable to not reduce elasticity. 
(4) Have a flexible architecture to be applied to distinct architectures. 
(5) Increase attack coverage by integrating both behaviour and knowledge 
base techniques.  
(6) Consider the utilization and deployment in cloud computing by 
handling different service models and user requirements. 
This is discussed in the next chapter with reference to the proposed 
framework.  
2.2 Masquerade Attacks and Detection Techniques 
A masquerader is an insider or outside attacker who authenticates as a 
legal user by stealing the user credentials or by attacking the authentication 
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service. To understand the masquerader actions, we consider alternative 
implementations of this attack [110]. Among them, we recall duplication or 
ex-filtration of user password, the installation of backdoors, eavesdropping 
and packet sniffing, spoofing and social engineering attacks. Some of these 
actions may leave some trail in log files that, after the fact, can be linked to 
some user actions. Here a log analysis by a host-based IDS remains the state-
of-the art to detect these actions. Attacks that do not leave an audit trail in the 
target system may be discovered by analyzing the user behaviors through 
masquerade detection. Traditional security technologies such as firewalls, 
IDSs, or authentication protocols are useless because, an attacker can access 
all the user privileges.  
Masquerade detection gathers user information and builds a profile for 
each user through information such as login time, location, session duration, 
and commands issued. Then, user logs are compared against the profiles and 
a mismatching behavior is designated as an attack. The detection of 
masquerade attacks is quite difficult because even the legitimate daily 
activities can easily become malicious according to its context. This 
increases the false positive rate [111]. Masquerade detection is more 
challenging in cloud systems, since they include a massive amount of 
resources and users can have different activities in several VMs. Hence, to 
build a profile, we have to correlate these activities. All the approaches 
reported in Section 2.2.3 analyze user behaviors according to the sequences 
of actions in distinct environments i.e., UNIX, Windows, or Network. 
Possible actions include user command, system calls, a network operation 
and the name of a window or of a file. To evaluate the detection techniques, 
we highlight some concepts such as ROC curve and Maxion Townsend Cost 
[112]. After that, we review current masquerade detection approaches.  
2.2.1. The Receiver Operator Characteristic Curve 
The Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve [113] graphically 
represents a classification system as its discrimination threshold is varied. 
The ROC is also known as a Relative Operating Characteristic curve, 
because it compares two operating characteristics, True Positive Rate (TPR), 
accuracy or Hit ratio and the False Positive Rate (FPR) as the criterion 
changes. We use this curve to evaluate attack detection accuracy against false 
positive rate. The plot is obtained by varying the detection threshold and 
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other detection parameters. Figure 2.11 shows how the ROC curve measures 
the tradeoff between false positives rates and correct detections. 
 
Figure 2.11: Examples for three ROC curves 
2.2.2. The Maxion Townsend Cost 
Maxion and Townsend [112] created a scoring formulation to rate a 
masquerade detection algorithm. The formula evaluates the cost of the 
detection algorithm in terms of a relation between the false alarms and 
misses, where the miss rate is equals to (100 – Hit Ratio). The overall 
“goodness” of each of several detection methods can be ranked by this 
function. While there is a wide consensus in the literature that a false alarm 
should be more expensive than a miss, it is difficult to determine how much 
more expensive. According to the experiments that the authors did using the 
seven masquerade detection approaches detailed in section 2.2.3, a rigorous 
evaluation requires that the cost of a false alarm to be 6 times that of a miss. 
Hence, the final cost function is given in Equation 2.7: 
Percentage Cost = 6 × False-Positive-Rate + Miss Rate      (2.7)  
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2.2.3. A literature Study for Masquerade Detection  
None of the current proposals to detect masquerade attacks has achieved 
the level of accuracy for a practical deployment. This review highlights 
masquerade detection techniques based on the analysis of user audits. These 
audits have been collected by several profiling methods from different 
environments e.g. UNIX, Windows and/or Network environments. We will 
see later in Chapter 3, how our dataset, CIDD, is collected using different 
profiling methods so that its data can be used with different detection 
techniques. 
1) Masquerade Detection in UNIX Environments 
In UNIX environment, the sources of audit data to build signature 
patterns are user commands, programs, and system calls. In this review, we 
highlight and compare several masquerade detection approaches based on 
UNIX commands in the user dataset called “SEA” described in Section 
2.3.1. The considered approaches are: Uniqueness, Naïve Bayes One-step 
Markov, Hybrid Multi-Step Markov, compression, Incremental Probabilistic 
Action Modeling (IPAM), sequence-match, Support vector machine (SVM), 
Recursive Data Mining with SVM, Naïve Bayes classifier, Episode based 
Naïve Bayes, Naïve Bayes and Weighted Radial Basis Function, Adaptive 
Naïve Bayes and sequence alignment algorithms.  
 Uniqueness: This approach [114] assumes that commands not previously 
seen in the training data may indicate a masquerade. Moreover, the fewer 
users that are known to use that command, the more indicative that 
command is of a masquerade. Uniqueness is a relatively poor performer 
in terms of detection, but it is the only method able to approach the target 
false alarm rate of 1%. 
 Naïve Bayes One-step Markov: This approach [115] builds transition 
matrices from one command to the next for each user’s training and 
testing data. It raises an alarm when there is a considerable difference 
between the training data transition matrix and the testing data one. It 
achieves a good performance in terms of correct detections, but failed to 
get close to the desired false alarm rate. 
 Hybrid Multi-Step Markov: This method [116] is based on Markov 
chains. If the test data contain too many commands that did not appear in 
the training data, a Markov model may be useless and a simple 
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independence model with probabilities estimated from a contingency 
table of users versus commands may be more appropriate. [114] toggled 
between a Markov model and the simple independence one. This method 
has one of the best performances. 
 Compression: the main underlying idea [114] is that new data from a 
user compresses at about the same ratio as old one from the same user. 
Instead, data from a masquerading user will compress at a different ratio. 
This approach is the worst performer.  
 The Incremental Probabilistic Action Modeling (IPAM):It predicts the 
sequence of user commands according to [117] the one-step command 
transition probabilities estimated from the training data. Too many wrong 
predictions signal a masquerade. IPAM’s performance ranks with the 
lowest ones. 
 Sequence-match: It computes a similarity match between the user 
profiles and the corresponding sequence of commands. Any score lower 
than a threshold indicates a masquerader [118]. Its performance on the 
SEA dataset is not very high. 
 Support vector machine (SVM): Support vector machine refers to a 
collection of machine learning algorithms designed for binary 
classification. SVM classifies data by determining a set of support 
vectors, the training inputs that outline a hyper plane in feature space 
[119]. SVM has shown a good performance, it is relatively easy to use 
and is relatively insensitive to the number of data points and can 
potentially learn a large set of patterns. However, it has a high false alarm 
rate and a low detection rate. Furthermore, it has to update user behavior 
model when a user profile changes. 
 Recursive Data Mining with SVM: Szymanski et al [120] proposed a 
recursive mining approach that finds the frequent patterns in the 
sequence of user commands, encodes them with unique symbols and 
rewrites the sequence using the new coding. This approach uses a one-
class SVM classifier for masquerade detection but it has to mix user data 
that may be complex in real-world.  
 Naïve Bayes classifier: Maxion and Townsend [112] applied a Naïve 
Bayes classifier widely used in text classification tasks and that classifies 
sequences of user-command data into either legitimate or masquerader. 
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The method has not yet achieved the level of accuracy required for 
practical deployment.  
 Episode based Naïve Bayes: Dash et al [121] introduced an episode 
based Naïve Bayes technique that extracts meaningful episodes from a 
long sequence of commands. The Naïve Bayes algorithm identifies these 
episodes either as masquerade or normal according to the number of 
commands in masquerade blocks. The proposed technique significantly 
improves the hit ratio but it still has high false positive rates and it does 
not update the user profile.  
 Naïve Bayes and Weighted Radial Basis Function (NB-WRBF): Alok 
et al [122] integrates a Naïve Bayes approach with one based on a 
weighted radial basis function, WRBF, similarity. The Naïve Bayes 
algorithm includes information related to the probabilities of commands 
entered by one user over the other users. Instead, the WRBF similarity 
takes into account the similarity measure based on the frequency of 
commands, f, and the weight associated with the frequency vectors. Here, 
f is a similarity score between an input frequency vector and a frequency 
vector from the training dataset. The experiments confirm that NB-
WRBF significantly improves the hit ratio but, as the previous approach, 
it suffers from the high false positive rates. Furthermore, it computes 
both the Naïve Bayes and the WRBF and integrates their results and this 
increases the overall overhead. Lastly, it does not update the user profile 
and neglects the low level representation of user commands.  
 Adaptive Naïve Bayes: Dash et al [123] introduced an adaptive Naïve 
Bayes approach based on the premise that both the commands of a 
legitimate user and those of an attacker may differ from the trained 
signature but the deviation of the legitimate user is momentary, whereas 
the attacker one persists longer. 
 Sequence alignment: The ability of sequence alignment algorithms to 
find areas of similarity can be used to differentiate legitimate usage from 
masquerade attacks. To do so, a signature of the normal behavior for a 
given user should be aligned with audit data from monitored sessions to 
find areas of similarity. Areas that do not align properly can be assumed 
to be anomalous, and the presence of several anomalous areas is a strong 
indicator of masquerade attacks [124]. Among possible algorithms such 
as global, local and semi-global alignments the most efficient is semi-
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global alignment. The proposed approaches has several shortcomings and 
to address them. [125] modifies the Smith-Waterman alignment 
algorithm [133] to a semi-global alignment algorithm (SGA), along with 
a new scoring systems and signature updating scheme. SGA offers 
several advantages such as:  
1) Better accurate and efficiency than current approaches. It achieves 
a low false positive rates and high hit ratio.  
2) It can work with different kinds of audit data. This simplifies its 
adoption in heterogeneous environments such as grids and clouds.  
3) The detection performance reduces the survival of the 
masquerader inside the system.  
4) It can tolerate the few deviations in the legitimate user behaviors.  
Figure 2.12 compares all the previous mentioned techniques against the 
SGA algorithm detailed in Section 2.2.4 in terms of the ROC curves based 
on SEA dataset. The SGA algorithm with its update scheme achieves a 
higher hit ratio with a corresponding lower false positive rate.  
 
Figure 2.12: ROC curves for some detection techniques [124]. 
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2) Masquerade detection in Windows Environments 
In general, Windows security log files contain records of login/logout 
activity and/or other security-related events as specified by the system audit 
policy. As mentioned in Section 1.5, there are three log sources in Windows 
system namely: system, application and security. System and application log 
are used, respectively, by the operating system and by the applications. Only 
the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (lsass.exe) can directly write 
to the Security log. Several categories of the events that can be logged [33]. 
Less research work has considered the Windows environments than the 
UNIX one.  
[126] introduced a new framework to create a unique feature set for user 
behavior on GUI based systems. They collected real user behavior data from 
live systems and extracted parameters to construct feature vectors. These 
vectors contain information such as mouse speed, distance, angles and 
amount of clicks during a user session. They modeled their technique of user 
identification and masquerade detection as a binary classification problem 
and used a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to learn and classify the feature 
vectors.  
[127] considers the interaction of the current user with the graphical user 
interface. Rather than mouse movements or keystroke dynamics, it profiles 
how the user manipulates windows, icons, menus, and pointers. The method 
shows potential for use in real-time systems, because it requires less data 
than other GUI interaction-based masquerade detection techniques while 
using a much simpler classification engine. Another user profiling method 
monitors system calls by analyzing the audit logs and program execution 
traces [128, 129]. 
3) Masquerade detection in Network Environments 
The previous host profiling methods handle only user audits inside a host 
machine. Other approaches detect masquerade attacks through the user 
network behavior.  
[130] uses basic network statistics. It does not consider host audits at all, 
because sometimes this data is not accessible or legal/ethical restrictions 
apply. The approach tags network events in the server log with the associated 
user and build user network profiles through anonymized summary data. 
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This limits the privacy impact and avoids the data accessibility issues of 
host-based approaches.  
[131] adopts the well-known Interval Algebra network [132]. The 
underlying idea is that the signature captures detectable patterns in a user 
command sequence. A user is modeled as a binary constraint network where 
each node represents an episode of commands. A binary relationship between 
a pair of episodes is encoded as the disjunction of the Allens interval 
relations [132]. Any new subsequence of commands should be consistent 
with at least one user network. 
2.2.4. Masquerade detection using SGA and Enhanced-SGA 
The SGA [124] is more accurate and efficient than current approaches. It 
has low false positive and missing alarm rates and high hit ratio. It can be 
adopted in heterogeneous environment with distinct operating system 
because it can be applied to distinct audit data such as command line entries, 
mouse movements, system calls, registry events, file and folder names, 
sequence of opened windows titles and network access audit data. SGA 
aligns large sequence areas as in global alignments, while preserving the 
nature of local alignments. It can ignore both prefixes and suffixes and it 
only aligns the conserved area with the maximal similarity. Figure 2 shows 
an application of SGA and the influential parameters of an alignment 
namely: match score, mismatch score, test_gap penalty, signature_gap 
penalty, and detection threshold. 
 
Figure 2.13: An alignment example using SGA algorithm 
To discover the optimal alignment, SGA exploits dynamic programming. 
To this purpose, it initializes an m+1 by n+1 score matrix, M, and then 
determines the value of each position of M by one of three transitions, see 
Figure 2.14: 
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1. Diagonal transition: it aligns the i−1 symbol in the signature 
sequence with the j−1 symbol in the test sequence. The alignment 
score depends upon the lexical match of the symbols being aligned 
and it is added to M(i−1, j−1).  
2. Vertical transition: A gap is inserted into the signature sequence and 
it is aligned with the j−1 symbol in the test sequence. The gap penalty 
is added to M(i, j−1).  
3. Horizontal transition: A gap is inserted into the test sequence and 
aligned with the i−1 symbol in the signature sequence. The gap 
penalty is added to M(i−1, j).  
 
Figure 2.14: The three transitions to fill each cell in the transition-matrix 
The SGA scoring system determines the gap penalties in transitions 2 and 
3. The actual alignment depends upon the maximum value of the three 
transitions and its value is assigned to M(i, j). M(i, j) is the score of the 
optimal alignment of all symbols up to location i−1 in the signature sequence 
and j−1 in the test one. Hence, M(m, n) gives the score of the optimal 
alignment of the two sequences returned by the scoring system. We can 
rebuild this alignment by tracing back the transitions that have produced the 
score. The final score at M(m, n) measures the similarity of the two 
sequences according to the scoring system used and it is an indicator of 
masquerade attacks. The SGA algorithm is shown below [125]: 
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Algorithm 2.1: The SGA algorithm 
 
The Enhanced-SGA: 
Coull et al [125] modified the SGA algorithm to handle the problems of 
the traditional Smith-Waterman alignment algorithm from two perspectives. 
The first one considers that the usage patterns of legal users may change due 
to changes in their role or to new software. A static user signature is therefore 
prone to label as attacks some variations of legal users. To avoid these false 
positives, the signature is updated as new behaviour is encountered by 
exploiting the ability of SGA of discovering areas of similarity. Furthermore, 
as outlined in Section 5.2.3, they defined two scoring systems, the command 
grouping and binary scoring systems, to set the alignment scores and the gap 
insertion penalties.  
Align (test_subseq of length n, sig_subseq of length m, match_score, mismatch_score, 
sig_gap_penalty, tes_gap_penalty) 
01: Begin  
02: for i=0 to m step 1 do 
03:   for j=0 to n step 1 do 
04:     if (i=0 or j=0) then 
05:    M(i, j)=0 
06:     else 
07:    if ( i=m or j=n ) then 
08:      top = M(i, j-1) 
09:      left = M(i-1, j) 
10:    else 
11:      top = max (0, M(i, j-1) – sig_gap_penalty)  
12:      left = max (0, M(i-1, j) – test_gap_penalty) 
13:    end if 
14:    if (sig_subseq(i-1) = test_subseq(j-1) ) then 
15:      diagonal = M(i-1, j-1) + match_score 
16:    else 
17:       diagonal = M(i-1, j-1) + mismatch_score  
18:    end if 
19:    M(i, j)= max(top, left, diagonal) 
20:     end if 
21:   end for 
22: end for 
23: return (M(m, n)) 
24: End 
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The problem with Enhanced-SGA algorithm lies in determining the best 
scoring system. Till now, the penalties for gap insertion to the signature and 
test sequences (-3 and -2 respectively) are fixed and equal for all the users. 
Since distinct users behave in a different way, this reduces the efficiency of 
detection, because the alignment cannot tolerate slight changes in the user 
behaviour over time. Distinct scoring parameters improve the Enhanced-
SGA algorithm and strongly reduce the number of false negatives and false 
positives. Instead of forcing the same scoring parameters for all users, Data 
Driven Semi-Global Alignment approach (DDSGA) [DDSGA], see Chapter 
5, computes the best scoring parameters for each user separately based on 
user data and improves the computational performance and the security 
efficiency of the Enhanced-SGA algorithm. 
The signature update scheme is applied with the binary scoring, their most 
efficient system. This scheme augments both the current signature sequence 
with information on the new behaviours and the user lexicon with the new 
commands the user invokes. The scheme also introduces a threshold for each 
user profile to ensure that both the signature sequence and user lexicon 
remain free of tainted commands from masquerade attacks. The threshold is 
used in both detection and update processes, and it is built through a 
snapshot of the user signatures.  
The other perspective considers that the Smith-Waterman algorithm is 
computationally expensive and impractical to detect masquerade attacks on 
multi-user systems. By selectively aligning only the portions of the user 
signature with the highest success probability, the Heuristic Aligning 
approach [125] can significantly reduce the computational overhead with 
almost no loss of accuracy in detection. These modifications have been 
tested on the SEA dataset to simplify the comparison with other approaches.  
2.3 Intrusion Detection Dataset 
A dataset is a profile of training and testing signature patterns to train and 
evaluate a behaviour based IDS. In the following, we highlight the current 
masquerade datasets and the deficiencies arising when adopting them to 
evaluate cloud IDSs.  
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2.3.1 Existing Masquerade Datasets and Their Deficiencies 
We briefly describe [134, 135] the four datasets that are currently used to 
evaluate masquerade detection techniques namely, SEA [136] Greenberg 
[137], Purdue [138], and RUU [139].  
1) SEA dataset 
Most papers about masquerader detection use the SEA dataset [136] with 
its associated configurations, SEA-I and 1v49. This dataset consists of 
commands collected from UNIX acct audit data. Only the username and the 
command were taken among all the fields of audit data. The data describe 50 
users each issuing 15000 commands. The first 5000 commands are 
considered genuine. The remaining 10000 commands of each user are 
partitioned into 100 blocks of 100 commands each. These blocks are seeded 
with masquerade users, i.e. with data of further users. A block is a 
masquerader with a probability of 1%. If a block is a masquerader, then there 
is an 80% probability that the following one is a masquerader too. As a 
result, about 5% of the test data contain masquerades. One of most critical 
defects of this dataset is that commands have neither arguments nor any 
parameters. Due to the way acct collects audit data, it is impossible to tell 
commands typed by human users from those run from shell scripts. This can 
lead to pair some users with a very regular pattern of few commands. 
1v49 Configuration: [112] propose an alternative configuration to the SEA 
dataset to address some methodological shortcomings in the original 
configuration. As an example, different masqueraders were injected into 
different users and some users did not even get any masquerader. This 
increases the complexity of evaluation and error analysis. In 1v49 
configuration, for each user, the first 5000 commands of the other 49 users 
are used as masquerader data for testing purposes. Despite its 
methodological advantages, this configuration has not been widely used as it 
does not simulate masqueraders that are expected in real world. 
SEA-I: It is a variation on the original SEA dataset. It was proposed in 
[140], where the masquerader blocks are replaced by synthetic blocks 
created according to the command frequency of each user. This is an attempt 
to model the behavior of an intruder who tries to act like the legitimate user. 
As a result, more complex techniques are required to detect masqueraders. 
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2) Greenberg dataset 
This dataset [137] contains data from 168 UNIX users using csh (C shell) 
as command line shell. Users are classified into four groups: novice 
programmers, experienced programmers, computer scientists and non-
programmers. Collected data is stored in plain text files that record : session 
start time, session end time, the command line entered by the user, the 
current working directory, the alias expansion of the previous command, an 
indication whether the line entered has a history expansion or not, and any 
error detected in the command line. This dataset was first used for 
masquerader detection purposes in [141]. In contrast with SEA, its main 
advantage is the availability of additional information for each command 
which may help to improve detection effectiveness. 
3) Purdue University dataset 
Purdue, or PU dataset [138] consists of the UNIX shell command 
histories of 4 users of the Purdue Millennium Lab, collected in a four month 
period. The number of collected commands per user goes from 7769 to 
22530, with an average of about 16500 commands. Command names, 
arguments and options are preserved but filenames are omitted. This is due to 
the intuition that the behavior of a user is more significant than content for 
profiling. The very low number of works that use this dataset is probably due 
to the low number of users. 
4) RUU dataset: 
This dataset was collected by Columbia IDS group [139] from Windows 
environments. To this purpose, they built a Windows host sensor to audit 
process registry behavior and user window touches. Three types of records 
were created by the audit program: registry actions, process execution, and 
window touches. The registry actions that are recorded are open, close and 
update of specific registry keys by running programs. The records specifying 
user window touches include the actions of clicking on a window, of 
switching between two or more windows, and of updating the title of a 
window. The group has built and published only a Windows dataset even if 
they have also built a Linux sensor to collect information about the name of 
the process, path, command line parameters, and system level calls.  
The dataset was collected from 34 normal volunteer users and 14 
masquerade users who were paid to conduct a red team exercise. On average, 
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each normal user generated about 1 million records over about 4.5 days of 
computer use of Windows systems. They model how normal users typically 
search their computer file system and these models can be used to detect 
unusual searches that may be a warning of an illegal use of the machine. The 
masquerader data contains records from about 15 minutes of computer use 
by each masquerader. The red team users were asked to perform a specific 
task to find any data that could be used for financial gain on a target file 
system they had no prior access to. 
2.3.2 Deficiencies of Using Current Datasets for Cloud Systems 
The datasets previously described suffer partially or fully from several 
deficiencies which prevent their adoption to evaluate cloud IDSs. Their most 
significant weakness is the lack of real masquerade and attack data. No 
command sequences were issued by attackers, only the RUU dataset includes 
real masquerades but in a predefined scenario where masquerader users were 
asked to find any data useful for financial gain. Also the SEA dataset 
simulates masquerade attacks by randomly inserting excerpts of command 
sequence from one user into the command sequences issued by another user. 
Some other problems of the datasets are:  
(1) They neglect the heterogeneity of clouds systems where user audits 
may be distributed among different VMs running distinct OSs. 
Furthermore, cloud users normally use a larger set of applications than 
those considered by the datasets. The existing masquerade datasets are 
based on host-based user profiling parameters, and lack important 
network parameters.  
(2) The absence of command arguments and/or other useful audit details 
such as the time when the user commands were issued and the duration 
of each user's session.  
(3) Their size is very small. 
(4) They lack signature details. An efficient cloud dataset should include 
both behavior based and knowledge based audit data for better training 
and coverage for attacks in all cloud service models. 
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Chapter 3 
CIDS and CIDS-VERT Frameworks and Their 
Correlation Models 
This chapter introduces two frameworks for a Cloud based Intrusion 
Detection System, CIDS [142], and CIDS-VERT [143], its specialization 
version. The two frameworks deal with attacks like: masquerade, DDoS, 
host-based, and network-based attacks. This chapter details the architecture, 
testbed of both CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks. Furthermore, it 
describes some essential features of these frameworks to support the 
selection of the proper one for the cloud system of interest. Finally, it details 
the three correlation models, Audit Exchange, Independent, and Centralized-
Backup.  
3.1 CIDS Framework 
CIDS is a framework for intrusion detection that provides a defense 
strategy that deals with attacks against the most widely used cloud services: 
SaaS, PaaS and IaaS. It is an active IDS that stops the malicious action and 
raises an alarm.  
CIDS has a P2P architecture without a central coordinator to avoid a 
single point of failure. The architecture distributes the processing load at 
several cloud locations and executes the user tasks in a monitored VM to 
isolate them from the cloud. This helps in protecting CIDS components from 
threats that can control a task in the VM and that can modify CIDS 
components. To increase attack coverage, CIDS integrates knowledge 
techniques and behavior based ones. Furthermore, it collects events and 
audits from VMs to analyze them in the detector and correlator components. 
Each node also includes an audit system that monitors messages among 
nodes and the middleware logging system, and collects events and logs from 
the VMs.  
By sharing both the knowledge and behavior databases in each node 
among the audit components, CIDS can detect the masqueraders that access 
from several nodes and both host-based and network-based attacks. 
Furthermore, to take into account the large volume of data in a cloud that 
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prevents administrators from observing any action, a further CIDS 
component parses and summarizes a large number of alerts from a NIDS 
component in a physical or virtual switch in the cloud virtual network. A 
report for the administrators collects alert messages from all the IDS 
detectors in the cloud system. CIDS resides inside the cloud middleware 
which provides a homogeneous environment for accessing all nodes. The 
middleware sets the access control policies and supports a service-oriented 
environment. Since the middleware can be install inside distinct grid and 
cloud systems, CIDS can be applied to several Grid and cloud systems. 
3.1.1 CIDS Architecture 
In the proposed architecture, each node runs two IDSs detectors, CIDS 
and HIDS and it cooperates to intrusion detection by identifying the local 
events that could represent security violations and by exchanging its audit 
data with other nodes. Figure 3.1 shows the sharing of information among 
the following CIDS components: 
Cloud node: It is one cloud blade that hosts users VMs and resources 
homogeneously accessed through the cloud middleware.  
Guest task: it is a sequence of actions and commands submitted by a user to 
an instance of VM.  
Logs & audit collector: it acts as a sensor for both CIDS and HIDS 
detectors and collects logs, audit data, and sequence of user actions and 
commands. 
VM: it encapsulates the system to be monitored. The detection mechanisms 
are implemented outside the VM, i.e. out of reach of intruders. A single 
instance of a VM monitors can observe several VMs. 
Type II Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM): CIDS uses type II VMM 
implemented as a process of the OS of the host machine. Some properties of 
a VMM are useful in system security, among them: Isolation, Inspection, and 
Interposition as detailed in Section 1.3. VMM stores in the audit system the 
data collected by the logs and audit collector component and forwards them 
to both the CIDS and HIDS correlator components.  
The audit system: this component implements three main functions. First of 
all, it monitors message exchanges among nodes and deduces the behavior of 
the cloud user. Then, it monitors the middleware logging system in the node 
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itself. CIDS can collect all audit data and middleware events such as user 
login or logout from the cloud system or tasks submissions. The third 
function collects and stores events and logs from the VM system. A log entry 
is created for each node action with the action type, (e.g. error, alert, or 
warning), the event that generated it, and the message.  
CIDS correlator and detector: it correlates sequence of commands or 
actions, collected from several sources and analyzes them through our new 
Data Driven Semi-Global Alignment approach (DDSGA) detailed in Chapter 
5. 
HIDS correlator and detector: it correlates user logs and signatures 
collected from several sources. Then, it analyses them to detect known trails 
left by attacks or predefined sequences of user actions that might represent 
an attack. It is implemented by the OSSEC IDS tool detailed in Section 1.10 
that receives user logs and signatures and determines whether a rule in the 
knowledge based database is being broken. After that, it computes the 
probability that a user action represents an attack, and it communicates this 
to the alert system that alerts the other nodes if the probability is sufficiently 
high. 
Behavior-based database: it is a profile history database for the behavior of 
cloud users. It is important that all nodes share the same behaviour database 
of the same user because this helps in correlating the normal behaviors of a 
user to detect a suspected behavior distributed among user VMs in several 
nodes. Since a behavior deviation in one VM can be normal in another one, 
correlation reduces the false alarms rate and it is more suitable for the 
deployment and utilization of the cloud system, as a user task can be 
executed in several VMs. Access to all databases, including events collected 
by the VMM from the VMs, can be easily implemented by the middleware 
that transparently creates a virtual homogeneous environment and 
synchronizes the nodes. As an example, consider that the audit system can 
create a log entry such as: “User Roy only logs in for 2 to 3 hours and uses a 
specific sequence of UNIX commands”, only if the nodes know the behavior 
of the user in all VMs in these nodes.  
Knowledge-based database: it stores a set of rules and signatures for 
known attacks. It describes a malicious behavior with a rule to be matched 
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against those in the database. Like the behavior-based database, all nodes 
should share the same knowledge base. 
Alert System: it uses the middleware’s communication mechanisms to alert 
other nodes if the CIDS or HIDS correlator and detector components signal 
an attack. It also communicates its alerts to the report producer.  
Parser and summarizer: it parses and summarizes the alerts fired by a 
component in the cloud virtual network. We will briefly explain later the 
adopted algorithm.  
Report producer: it collects alerts from any IDS in the system and sends a 
report to the cloud scheduler. It helps service providers to discover if their 
infrastructure is exploited to penetrate other victims. 
 
Yellow components are CIDS components, Green ones are cloud system 
components, and Pink ones are NIDS components 
Figure 3.1: CIDS Architecture 
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3.1.2 CIDS-Testbed:  
The testbed consists of 3 nodes connected by a Gigabit Ethernet. Each 
node is a quad core clocked at 2.8 GHz with 16 GB RAM and a 80 GB Hard 
drive. To provide a full heterogeneous testbed, each node hosts 3 VMs with a 
distinct OS, namely: Windows XP Professional SP3, UNIX (Solaris) and 
Linux (Centos)). Each VM is assigned one core of the physical node and 3 
GB of RAM. Each node runs the VMware system that manages the 
communications among the VMs, and one 24 port Procurve Switch 
(10/100/1000 ports) for data networks and another 24 port Procurve Switch 
(10/100 ports) for console management.  
3.1.3 CIDS Parser and Summarizer Approach  
A clear, summarized, and readable alarm report is fundamental for the 
cloud administration. Since the high scalability of a cloud implies that a 
NIDS component produces an intensive number of alerts, this component 
reduces the number of alerts. Among the approaches to summarize and 
integrate NIDS alerts, we recall, [144, 145]. A more suitable and clear 
approach to store NIDS alerts is given in [146] that is based upon the alert 
parameters shown in Table 3.1.  
Table.3.1: An example for the alert description table. 
 
To summarize the alerts, CIDS exploits the idea that one alert suffices if 
several hosts are attacking the same machine using the same attack signature. 
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
77 
For this purpose, it merges all the alerts with the same combination 
(destination IP, attack signature) into one alert. Our implementation uses 
SNORT with MySQL. The summarization approach neglects the source IP 
address because it can be spoofed. However, the final summarized table 
would contain all information that describes the attack including the source 
IP address. Table 3.2 shows the final alerts produced by our summarization 
approach. 
Table.3.2: The final alerts summarization table. 
 
We note that alerts A1, A4, and A6 are summarized by S1 because they 
refer to the same signature, their attacks target the same machine and the 
attacker uses the same method three times. The alerts A2, A3, and A8 have 
the same signature but with different signature details. The attackers fired 
these attacks from two different host machines. These alerts are summarized 
to alert S2 in Table 3.2. Finally, the attacks related to the alerts A5 and A7 
have not been summarized because they target the same machine but their 
signatures differ. Algorithm 3.1 shows the parsing and summarization 
processes. 
Algorithm 3.1: The parsing and summarization processes 
 
01: Begin  
02: Build Table T with rows= n  //This table is similar to table 3.1.  
03: Define: 
 dest-ip=1, sig-id=2,  
 i=1,  // Index for rows of table T 
alert-dscrp-strct = T(1)(signature-name, signature-class-id, signature-priority, score-ip, 
ip-protocol, source-port, destination-port) // Is a structure contains one record of table T 
with 7 columns of alert description (from 4 to 10 of Table 3.1),  
summarized-T: // This table is similar to table 3.2.  
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3.2 CIDS-VERT, the Full Virtualization Framework of CIDS 
To define a defense strategy for several cloud deployment models i.e., 
private, public, and hybrid clouds, we have specialized the original 
framework. This results in two frameworks: the original CIDS and CIDS-
VERT, its specialization. CIDS-VERT has been defined to improve the 
scalability of CIDS because the experiments reported in Chapters 6 and 7 
show that the P2P architecture of CIDS may hinder both scalability and 
elasticity. Furthermore, while CIDS isolates task execution from the host OS, 
most of its components are exposed to attacks because they run in the host 
operating system. CIDS-VERT avoids all these shortcomings and achieves a 
reasonable performance even in large clouds. This may promote the adoption 
of CIDS in large systems such as hybrid or public clouds. 
3.2.1 CIDS-VERT Architecture 
While most CIDS-VERT components are similar to those of CIDS, See 
Figure 3.2, its architecture is centralized with full virtualization, backup, and 
04: While ( Length(T) >1  and   i < Length(T) ) 
05:     For j=i+1  to  Length(T) do        
06:       If (( T(i, dest-ip) = T(j, dest-ip)) And (T(i, sig-id) =T(j, sig-id))    
                And (T(i, alert-descrp-strct) = T(j, alert-descrp-strct)))Then 
07:            Add       the i
th
 record to table summarized-T 
08:            Delete   the i
th
 and the j
th
 records from table T,  set i=1 
09:       Else  
10:          If ((T(i, dest-ip)=T(j, dest-ip)) And (T(i, sig-id)=T(j, sig-id))   
                 And (T(i, alert-descrp-strct)!=T(j, alert-descrp-strct))) Then 
11: Merge  the i
th
 and the j
th
 records of table T and add the resultant   
merged record to table summarized-T 
12:   Delete  the i
th
 and the j
th
 records from table T,  set i=1 
13:          End If 
14:       End If 
15:    End For              
16:    i=i+1 
17: End While 
18: If (T is not Empty)  
19: Add   table T to table summarized-T        
20: End IF  
21: Return (summarized-T)              
22: End 
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task scheduling facilities. We now briefly describe the main components and 
facilities of the framework.  
 
Figure.3.2: CIDS-VERT Architecture 
Event collector: it collects logs, audit data, and sequence of user actions and 
commands from both HIDS sensor and the guest operating system. It also 
selects the most suitable management VM to analyze these audits and events. 
Event Correlator: it correlates the user logs and signatures collected from 
several sources according to the start and end time of the session and the 
source IP address of the user. Then, it sends a final list of network and VMs 
environments events to the event DB. This helps in detecting a suspected 
behavior of a user that is distributed among several VMs. Since a behavior 
deviation in one VM can be normal in another one, this also reduces the false 
alarms rate. 
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Behavior-based database: it is a profile history database for the behavior of 
cloud users. It enables both CIDS and HIDS analyzers to compare the user 
behaviour in the current session against the stored profile.  
Knowledge-based database: it stores a set of rules and signatures that 
describes known attacks. It describes a malicious behavior with a rule to be 
matched against those in the database. 
DDSGA Analyzer: it analyzes the user behaviors, e.g. sequence of 
commands or actions, collected from several sources by applying the 
DDSGA approach. Whenever it detects a masquerade attack, it alerts the 
summarizer and reporter component.  
HIDS Analyzer: it detects known trails left by attacks or predefined 
sequences of actions that might represent an attack in the user behavior. It is 
implemented by the OSSEC IDS tool that receives the user logs and 
signatures from all VMs in the cloud and determines whether a rule in the 
knowledge base is being broken. After that, it computes the probability that a 
user action represents an attack, and communicates it to the summarizer and 
reporter component. 
NIDS Analyzer: it implemented by the SNORT IDS tool that analyses the 
VM network traffic to detect known trails that might represent an attack. The 
IDS can detect both network and DDoS attacks among Cloud zones and it 
receives the network traffic among the cloud VMs by mirroring it from the 
virtual switch. At first, SNORT determines whether a rule in the signature 
database is being broken. Then, it communicates to the summarizer and 
reporter component the probability that a user action represents an attack. 
Summarizer & Reported component: It parses and summarizes the alerts 
fired by the HIDS and NIDS analyzers and correlates them. We use the 
IDMEF as a standard data format to summarize, integrate, and report the 
alerts about suspicious events. The most obvious solution is that the data 
channel from the intrusion detection analyzer to the manager that receives 
the alarms uses IDMEF. Chapter 8 details our integration and correlation 
approaches to integrate and summarize the alerts. 
Management VMs: These VMs are reserved for all the components 
previously described and only be accessed by the cloud administrators that 
can manage all these components from one place. This also help to isolate 
and protect the components provided that the management VMs themselves 
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are protected. To improve scalability and avoid a single point of failure, the 
cloud runs several management VMs with distinct OS. These VMs are fully 
interconnected to provide backup sources and to mutually exchange the 
detection task to avoid overloading the active one, see Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure.3.3: Data exchange among the management VMs. 
 
The solid arrows in Figure 3.3 represent the audits sent to the 
management VMs and the heartbeat message with two fields. The first one 
defines the status of the active management VM to determine whether or not 
it is live. If the event collector does not receive the heartbeat message from 
the active management VM, it assumes that this VM is failed or is 
overloaded and switches to another management VM. The second field 
describes available resources in the active management VM e.g. processor 
speed, cache, and main memory, to enable the event collector to choose a 
management VM with proper resources to run the detection task. The dot 
lines in Figure 3.3 represent the interactions that occur if the active 
management VM fails or it is highly overloaded. All the idle management 
VMs are frequently updated with the user audits from the active management 
VM.  
Hypervisor Layer: It manages the creation of virtual VMs, virtual 
networks, and virtual SAN driver. Furthermore, it provides system security 
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functions such as Isolation, Inspection, and Interposition. CIDS-VERT can 
work with different cloud environments, such as VMware cloud [56], 
Microsoft private cloud [13], Open Stack [147], Eucalyptus [12]. In CIDS-
VERT deployment, we use the Microsoft windows server 2012 with its 
Hypervisor and the Microsoft Private Cloud system.  
3.2.2 CIDS-VERT-Testbed:  
The testbed consists of HP c3000 Cloud blade with six nodes. The first 
node is the head node that works as a front side interface for the cloud blade 
and has a Quad core 2.3 GHz CPUs, 4 GB RAM, 80 GB Hard drive, and a 
SmartArray P400 Controller for Storage Connect. The other five computing 
nodes are configured as the CIDS-Testbed nodes and their VMs are 
configured as those in the CIDS-Testbed. The only difference is that all 
nodes run a Microsoft core windows server 2012 instead than a VMware 
system. The head node runs a Microsoft GUI windows server 2012 with 
Microsoft cloud services and Microsoft Hypervisor manager 2012. The 
testbed also includes one 24 port Procurve Switch (10/100/1000 ports) for 
data networks and another 24 port Procurve Switch (10/100 ports) for 
console management. 
3.3 Choosing the Proper Framework: 
The size and the deployment model of the cloud system are the important 
issues that help us to select the proper intrusion detection framework. 
The original CIDS framework is the ideal solution for a small cloud or 
private cloud behind the enterprise network firewall. Here, the management 
and deployment are taken care by the enterprise. The security of data in a 
private cloud is preserved by internal processes and data exchanged among 
the cloud nodes can be protected without violating the user security policies 
[148, 2]. This is actually what the CIDS framework needs. Private Cloud and 
the other deployment models use a distinct mechanism for data availability 
and service access. Most cloud deployment models leverage multiple copies 
of files on multiple nodes and consider each node as a failure domain so that 
server malfunctions do not crash the whole cloud nor result in data loss [148, 
2]. The architecture of CIDS allows for backing up the data to avoid a single 
point of failure and to match the cloud robustness requirements. 
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
83 
The CIDS-VERT framework offers a security solution for large cloud 
systems e.g., public and hybrid clouds because its scalability is much better 
than that of CIDS. Furthermore, CIDS–VERT can be configured and 
managed in a simpler way than CIDS, because the administrators can access 
a central system backed up to other servers. This is important in public and 
hybrid cloud where the providers need to deploy and monitor the security 
solutions in a flexible way due to the large number of users. Even if CIDS-
VERT works with any deployment model because of its scalability and 
controllability, it targets public and hybrid clouds while we use the original 
CIDS in private clouds. This strategy can achieve the performance and low 
network overhead of the Independent model that works with the original 
CIDS but not with CIDS-VERT that is centralized. Furthermore, CIDS-
VERT may not be acceptable in a small or private cloud because it does not 
optimize resource utilization due to the adoption of several management 
VMs. 
3.4 Attacks and Cloud Service Models Covered by CIDS 
CIDS and CIDS-VERT satisfy the cloud IDS requirements mentioned in 
Section 2.1.4 and deal with attacks against SaaS, PaaS and IaaS clouds.  
 
Figure.3.4: Attacks and cloud service models covered by CIDS. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, the proposed frameworks can deal with the 
following attacks: 
(1) Masquerading attacks: 
This is a PaaS attack that impersonates a legitimate user to use service 
resources maliciously. This is by far the most critical attack as its 
exploitation is rather easy. CIDS and CIDS-VERT detect it through 
DDSGA.  
(2) Host-based attacks: 
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Host based attacks may be a consequence of a masquerading attack. CIDS 
and CIDS-VERT detect several host based attacks using the current HIDS 
tools.  
(3) Network-based attacks:  
CIDS and CIDS-VERT detect network attacks by analyzing network packets 
using NIDS tools. 
(4) DDoS attacks:  
We have built two deployments for CIDS-VERT, the Centralized and 
Distributed, to detect the DDoS attacks. Chapter 8 describes the two 
deployments and their experimental results. 
3.5 The Correlation Models 
In the following, we describe the three alternative correlation models to 
correlate and exchange the audit and alerts between the IDS components in 
the cloud system. These models are [142, 143]:  
(A) Audit exchange. 
(B) Independent. 
(C) The Centralized-Backup. 
 The first two models work with CIDS framework, while the third one with 
CIDS-VERT. 
(A) Audit exchange model 
 In this model, nodes exchange their audit data so that each one has any 
audit data for its current users. The detection phase depends on two 
parameters:  
(1) The alignment score computed in the CIDS detector component,  
(2) Alerts fired by the HIDS component.  
In this way, the detection overhead is balanced among nodes with no 
single point of failure. The detection efficiency is high because the user audit 
is concentrated in one place and the masquerader surviving is very short. As 
a counterpart, this model introduces some overhead in the cloud network due 
to the periodic exchange of audit data. The processing steps are:  
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
85 
 
(B) The Independent Model  
 Each cloud node evaluates its own user audits without interacting with 
other nodes. The detection phase depends upon the same two parameters of 
model A. Login usage patterns for a user are evaluated using both CIDS and 
HIDS detectors inside a cloud node CN and by using the behavior-based and 
signature-based of CN only. If the HIDS detector of CN fires an alert, the 
algorithm will behave according to step 2 of model A for each user HIDS 
instance firing. If the CIDS detector of CN fires an alert, the algorithm 
checks the current login usage patterns against the audit data of the current 
user in the other nodes. The user is marked as a masquerader unless one node 
accepts the current pattern. Then, this model will behave according to step 2 
of model A for each user CIDS instance firing. Algorithm 3.2 shows the 
steps of model B.  
The model advantages are: 
 A very low overhead for the cloud network, as there is a data 
exchange only if the score iDS is less than the previous define 
threshold DSθ . The nodes exchange the test audit data (test_d) 
produced by the user during the login session.  
 A lower processing overhead for each cloud node than models A and 
C, because each node executes the DDSGA alignment of the current 
login session, only if iDS  is less than DSθ .  
If   user HIDS or CIDS instance fired   Then // If this condition is satisfied, this 
denotes that an attack has been detected (Host-based or masquerade attack). 
 Alert all nodes that have VM instance(s) for that user to stop exchanging his 
audit data. 
 Send alerts to the scheduler node to do the following tasks: 
a) Stop the current tasks related to this user from all his VMs. If the alert is 
coming from HIDS detector then, stop only this malicious VM.  
b) Prepare a summarized report to the cloud administrator contains some 
information about the masqueraded user, the malicious VMs, and the 
detected attack.  
c) Apply the administrator action against this user by re-initializing his 
malicious VM(s) or by Blocking or suspending his account. 
 End if   
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The disadvantages are:  
(1) A longer masquerader surviving than both models A and C because 
the analysis requires a long time to check the audit data (test_d) in all 
nodes.  
(2) A lower hit rate and a higher false alarm rate than model C. Instead, 
its hit and false alarm rates are similar to those of model A. 
Algorithm 3.2: The analysis algorithm for the Independent model 
 
(C) The Centralized-Backup Correlation Model  
This model works with the CIDS-VERT framework where, users VMs 
send their audit data to a reserved management VM that has a complete view 
of audit data for all users to analyze and report the final alerts. The 
management VM is backed up to some other VMs as explained in Section 
3.2.1 to balance the detection overhead among the management VMs with no 
single point of failure. This model achieves the best detection efficiency 
because the user audit is concentrated in one place and there is not loss of the 
audit data. The masquerader surviving is shorter than that in both model A 
and B. The detection time is inversely proportional to the number of 
01: Begin 
02: Inputs: test audit data (test_d) produced by user (i) during the current login 
session, behavior-base(behavr_d) stored for user (i) during the training phase 
inside the current login cloud node, iDS  is the DDSGA alignment Score for user i, 
DSθ  is the alignment threshold defined for user i, Not-Masq-flag = False. 
 
03: Use DDSGA to compute iDS  by aligning (test_d) against (behavr_d). 
04:   If iDS  < DSθ  Then 
05:       For each cloud node (CN) contains (behavr_d) of user i, do: 
06:                Use DDSGA to compute iDS  for the i
th
 user in CN 
07:                If    i DSDS     Then 
08:          Not-Masq-flag = True 
09:               Exit the loop; 
10:               End if   
11:       End for 
12:   End If 
13:   If  Not-Masq-flag = false  or  HIDS instance is fired  Then 
14:          Run step 2 of model A for each user i IDS instance firing. 
15:   End If 
16: End 
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management VMs because it reduces the processing overhead in the active 
management VM. This speeds up the detection phase and protects the IDS 
components from tampering by any attackers. On the other hand, the 
network overhead increases with the number of management VMs. 
Furthermore, the model requires several resources as it reserves some 
management VMs for detection.  
The experimental evaluation of the two frameworks and their 
corresponding correlation models are detailed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 4 
Cloud Intrusion Detection Dataset (CIDD) 
This chapter introduces the Cloud Intrusion Detection Dataset, CIDD 
[149], the dataset we have defined to test and train an IDS and that will be 
used in the thesis. The chapter discusses the major challenges to build a 
cloud intrusion dataset. Furthermore, it introduces the Log Analyzer and 
Correlator System (LACS) that has supported the building of CIDD by 
parsing and analyzing user’s binary log files and correlating user audits data. 
Finally, the chapter describes the distribution of attacks and masquerades in 
CIDD and compares CIDD against other publicly available datasets. 
4.1. Challenges to build a cloud dataset 
We have detailed in Chapter 2, the deficiencies of current publically 
available datasets which hinder their adoption to evaluate cloud IDSs. 
Building a real intrusion dataset for the cloud systems is a complex task, 
because it takes a long time to collect the training audits and to prepare the 
scenarios for both training and testing phases. Furthermore, data collection 
requires special tools to access and monitor the cloud infrastructure and 
system that require proper authorization to preserve privacy and 
confidentiality. These are major challenges in cloud systems for several 
reasons: 
(1) Lack of real data to study available solutions and models. Data are out 
of reach and controlled under the rules of evidence, rather than being a 
source of valuable information for research purposes. Most cloud 
systems are commercial and the control of their infrastructures is very 
difficult if it is not impossible. Private cloud systems cannot be 
accessed by external users and this hinders the building and the 
analysis of complete attack scenarios.  
(2) It is difficult to collect real data about a malicious or a legal user if 
audits are distributed across different environments. The heterogeneity 
of the audit parameters increases the complexity of audit correlation. 
The complexity is even larger for low level formats. It is also difficult 
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to build a summarized statistical profile for each user, because 
categorizing a set of UNIX commands differs from categorizing 
Windows events and applications. 
(3) The huge size of the audit data for cloud systems (more than 20GB for 
CIDD dataset) and the high number of users require huge computing 
resources. 
4.2 Cloud Intrusion Detection Dataset (CIDD) 
To overcome the problems previously outlined, we have developed a Log 
Analyzer and Correlator System (LACS) to parse and correlate user audits 
from low level log files. We have applied LACS to logs from the DARPA 
Intrusion Detection Evaluation Group of MIT Lincoln Laboratory [150]. The 
logs and the TCP dump data are from the Eyrie Air Force Base network that 
consists of two segments, representing the inside and outside of a 
government installation. The outside segment consists of 10 machines 
running Solaris, Linux, and SunOS, 1 SNMP monitor, 1 gateway, and 1 web 
server. The inside segment consists of 35 machines with Windows NT, 
Solaris, Linux, and SunOS, 1 inside gateway, and 1 inside sniffer. The 
network has also 2 routers and 2 hubs. The log files focus mainly on the 
network audit data. However, we have extracted the host and network audits 
by parsing the log files collected from, respectively, one Windows NT 
machine, one Unix Solaris machine, and the raw packet data collected 
through TCP-dump so that CIDD considers both network and host audit 
data. These data are correlated according to user IP address and audit times. 
The following section describes the architecture of LACS.  
4.2.1 LACS System 
LACS parses the binary log files collected by Unix Basic Security 
Module (BSM), the security, application and service log files of the 
Windows event log system, and data in raw packets. In the following, we 
briefly describe the component of LACS in Figure 4.1:  
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of LACS system 
A. Parsers components: LACS has 3 parser components for each 
independent environment:  
1- Solaris parser: The Solaris C2 audit daemon, e.g. the auditing capability 
of BSM, writes binary event data to the local file system. Our parser converts 
the audit events of this file into a readable text format and stores its output in 
a local file while preserving the ordering of events. This file can be analyzed 
by the log analyzer and correlator component. The parser extracts the 
parameters shown in Figure 4.2: user id, user name, day, time, system calls, 
path (for processes or files), login source (IP address or URL), session id, 
login period, audit part, VM name, and return value (success or fail). 
 
Figure 4.2: An example of CIDD Solaris auditing data 
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2- Windows parser: It converts into a human readable format the primary 
binary/encoded Windows security event, the application, and the service log 
files. It stores its output in a local file to be analyzed by the log analyzer and 
correlator component. The parser extracts from the security event log files 
the parameters in Figure 4.3: type (audit success or fail), date, time, event id, 
source (security log in this case), audit category (e.g., system event, object 
access, detailed tracking, privilege use, logon/logoff, account management), 
user id, user name, VM name, audit action, and audit parameters (e.g., object 
name, handle id, privileges). The parser extracts form the application and 
service log files the information in Figure 4.4: source machine (IP address or 
URL), user name, date, time, service or application name, source and 
destination port, target.  
 
Figure 4.3: An example of CIDD Windows auditing data 
 
Figure 4.4: Examples of training data (sequences of mails and web services) 
3- Network parser: It extracts user audits from the raw packets data files 
collected by TCP-dump that contains information on the activities of the user 
source machine. The parser extracts from the TCP-dump files the values in 
Figure 4.5: date, time, duration, service/protocol name, source port, 
destination port, source IP, destination IP. If the packet is contaminated by 
an attack, then also the attack name is extracted.  
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Figure 4.5: A snapshot of TCPdump data with labeled attacks 
B. Log analyzer and correlator component: This is the core component 
and its analysis includes the following steps : 
(1) It correlates the user audits in host and network environments using user 
IP and audit time. Then it links each audit to the corresponding user.  
(2) It pairs user audits with a set of VMs according to their login sessions 
time and the characteristic of the user task. During audit collection, each 
user logs into the network in one or two different time shifts, one in the 
morning and the other in afternoon or evening and sometimes both. It 
also assigns user morning sessions to one VM and the other sessions to 
another VM. Section.4.2.2 describes the distribution of users to the VMs. 
(3) It marks malicious audit records according to attacks and masquerades 
tables given by MIT group [150]. The marking is done according to 
attack time, date, destination IP/URL and the name of victim user. It also 
marks some audit records in a session with different time and/or different 
source IP than the training audit data stored for the user.  
(4) It produces the final tables with the marked audits for each individual 
user with its assigned VMs. This step produces three tables namely, 
Solaris, Windows, and network audit tables. Both the Solaris table and 
the Windows one contain a sequence of user actions. The Network table 
records the sequence of machines, network services and protocols 
accessed by the user, and normal times and dates of accesses. These 
tables enable any IDS to deduce the sequence of user audits in different 
environments. Equation 4.1 correlates the audits of the three tables:  
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        (4.1) 
 
Where:  
 PCmasq(Ui): Probability that Ui is a masquerader according to Ui 
 behaviors in any cloud node. It considers the probability that 
 the masquerader can be detected by the login IP(s). 
 P(Ui): Probability that Ui is a masquerader according to Ui behaviors  in 
any cloud node. It does not include user IP behaviors. 
 m: Number of IP(s) that Ui uses to login to the cloud. 
 n: Number of cloud users who share the same IPj of Ui 
 P(IPj): Probability that IPj reveals to be a masquerader. 
Consider, as an example, a simple case where U1, U2 and U3 share IPs, IP1 
and IP2. Also suppose that the probabilities that IP1, and IP2 could be used by 
a masquerader are: P(IP1) = 0.4, and P(IP2) = 0.5, and U1, U2, and U3 reveal 
to be masqueraders according to their behaviors in all the cloud nodes with 
the following probabilities: P(U1)=0.4, P(U2)=0.3, and P(U3)= 0.6, and the 
detection threshold θ =0.75. We apply the previous equation for each Ui. We 
have that only U3 is a masquerader because: 
PCmasq(U1)= 0.6769 < θ  (not masquerader) 
PCmasq(U2)= 0.5076 < θ  (not masquerader) 
PCmasq(U3)= 1.0153 > θ  (masquerader) 
C. The statistical component: It uses the previous tables to build host and 
network based statistics. Host based statistics include: number of login 
failures, logging times (morning, afternoon, evening, and nights), logging 
source address(es), a list with:  
(a) common commands and system calls used by the user (in case of 
Unix Solaris system),  
(b) a list of common services, applications, and security actions(in case 
of Windows NT),  
(c) VMs names used by each user.  
1
1
( )* ( )
( ) ( )
( )
P U P IPm i j
P U P Uni iCmasq j P U
kk
 
 
  
   
 
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Network based statistics are based on the IP address and include: 
network services and protocols used, machines accessed, hours and days 
when the IP becomes active, and list of failures. 
4.2.2 CIDD Architecture  
CIDD audit data consists of two parts. The first one is a collection of 
Unix Solaris audits and their corresponding TCP dump data. The second part 
includes Windows NT audits and their corresponding TCP dump data. As 
any intrusion dataset, CIDD includes training and testing data for both parts 
1 and 2. In training data of part 1, CIDD has 7 weeks (35 days) of Unix 
Solaris audits and TCP dump data with labeled attacks which can be used to 
train any IDS with a set of attack signatures. Figure 4.6 shows the 
distribution of these labeled attacks. The UNIX audits of week 6 contains 21 
real masquerade attacks that can be used to test any anomaly detection based 
IDS. Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of these masquerade attacks in week 6 
data.  
 
Figure.4.6: Attacks distribution in the training data (Solaris BSM, Windows 
Audits and TCP-dump data) 
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Figure 4.7: Masquerade attacks in week 6 of Part1 and the two testing weeks 
of part2 
Most of audits of CIDD users are distributed across several VMs. Users 
with less than 5 login sessions have been deleted. CIDD has 84 Solaris users 
distributed into 4 VMs. Users are categorized according to the applications 
of their host machines, see Figure 4.8, into:  
 2 programmers sharing VM1 and VM2, 
 1 secretary using VM3 and VM4, 
 1 system administrator using VM3 and VM4, 
 56 normal users using VM3 and VM4 to issue UNIX commands, 
exchange mails, and internet navigation,  
 22 advanced users that access VM1 and VM2 to run advanced 
applications for some special tasks.  
 
The testing data of part 1 includes 2 weeks (10 days) of Unix Solaris 
audits and their corresponding TCP dump data for testing purpose. The data 
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include more than one hundred instances of attacks that are classified into 
distinct categories such as Denial of Service (DoS), User to Root (U2R), 
remote to user, surveillance probing and anomaly attacks, see Figure 4.9. 
Figure 4.10 shows the distribution of these attacks in part1 testing data. 
 
Figure 4.8: Users distribution in CIDD training part 
 
Figure 4.9: Attacks distribution in CIDD testing part 
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Figure 4.10: Attacks distribution in testing data of part1 (Solaris BSM and 
TCP-dump data) 
The training data of part 2 includes 3 weeks (15 days) of Windows NT 
audits and their corresponding TCP dump data with labeled attacks only in 
the second week. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of these labeled attacks.  
CIDD describes 44 Windows NT users with a complete windows audit 
data. Some of these users exist in part1 audits with the same names. Users 
are distributed among VMs as in Figure 4.8: 5 in VM1, 32 in VM2, and 7 
that share both VM1 and VM2. 
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The testing data of part 2, describes 2 weeks (10 days) of Windows NT 
audits and their corresponding TCP dump data for testing purpose. Part 2 
testing data contains 38 real masquerade attacks in Windows NT audits. 
Some of these attacks result from one or several U2R attacks, while others 
are implemented through human masquerader action, see Figure 4.9. One 
user of the inside network segment implements masquerade attacks, while 
“outsider” are due to either users of the outside network or outside the 
network that is considered. Figure 4.7 shows the distribution of these 
masquerade attacks. Part 2 testing data has the same attack categories of part 
1 and a further category, data attacks. Figure 4.11 shows the distribution of 
these attacks in part2 testing data. 
 
Figure 4.11: Attacks distribution in testing data of part2 (Windows audits 
and TCP-dump data) 
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The CIDD webpage [149] describes further details such as user statistic 
tables, masquerade distributions, the simulated network of the auditing 
experiments, attacks database and their categories, and snapshots for both 
training and testing data. Table 4.1 compares CIDD against publicly 
available datasets. 
Table 4.1: Comparison of publicly available datasets 
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Chapter 5 
Data-Driven Semi Global Alignment (DDSGA) 
A masquerade attacker authenticates as a legal user after stealing or 
cracking the user credentials or attacking the authentication service. Even it 
does not leave trails in the target system, this attack may be discovered 
through a masquerade detection process that matches the user active session 
against a profile of the previous behaviour of the same user and that signals 
any mismatching as an attack. Current profiling methods consider several 
features such as command line commands, system calls, security events, 
mouse movements, opened files names, opened windows title, and network 
actions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, masquerade detection has not yet 
achieved the level of accuracy and performance for practical deployment. 
Accuracy may be even lower in systems with a massive amount of resources, 
like grids and cloud systems, where a profile can be built only by correlating 
several user activities in distinct VMs. 
This chapter introduces the Data-Driven Semi Global Alignment, 
DDSGA, the approach we adopt to efficiently detect masquerade attacks and 
anomalous actions. It also describes the three main phases of DDSGA 
namely, configuration, detection, and update. Then, it explains the 
implementation and the experimental results of each phase. Lastly, it 
compares DDSGA against other approaches, and highlights its 
computational performance and detection accuracy. 
5.1 DDSGA Approach Overview 
DDSGA is a masquerade detection approach based upon the Enhanced-
SGA algorithm [125] described in Section 2.2.4. It aligns the user active 
session sequence to the previous ones of the same user and it labels the 
misalignment areas as anomalous. A masquerade attack is signaled if the 
percentage of anomalous areas is larger than a dynamic, user dependent 
threshold. DDSGA can tolerate small mutations in the user sequences with 
small changes in the low level representation of user commands and it is 
decomposed into a configuration phase, a detection phase and an update one. 
The configuration phase, computes, for each user, the alignment parameters 
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to be used by both the detection and update phases. The detection phase 
aligns the user current session to the signature sequence. The computational 
performance of this phase is improved by two approaches namely the Top-
Matching Based Overlapping (TMBO) and the parallelized approach. In the 
update phase, DDSGA extends both the user signatures and user lexicon list 
with the new patterns to reconfigure the system parameters. Figure 5.1 shows 
these phases and the modules that implement them that we discuss in the 
following. 
 
Figure 5.1: DDSGA Phases and modules 
DDSGA Main Features and Improvements: 
DDSGA improves both the computational and the security efficiency of 
the Enhanced-SGA.  
From a computational perspective, DDSGA improves the performance of 
both the detection and the update through a parallel multithreading scheme 
and a new Top-Matching Based Overlapping (TMBO) approach that 
improves the Heuristic Aligning and saves computational resources. While 
the Heuristic Aligning splits the signature sequence into a fixed overlapped 
subsequences of size 2n, where n is the size of the test sequence, TMBO 
simplifies the alignment through shorter overlapped subsequences. Besides 
saving computational resources, this speeds up the detection and update 
phases and consequently reduces the masquerader live time inside the 
system.  
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With respect to the accuracy of masquerade detection, DDSA introduces 
distinct scoring parameters for each user, namely the gap penalties and the 
overlapping length. The adoption of distinct scoring parameters for each user 
improves the detection accuracy, the false positive and false negative rates 
and increase the detection hit ratio with respect to the traditional and 
enhanced SGA that use the same parameters for any user. This neglects 
differences among the behaviours of distinct users and reduces the accuracy 
of detection, because the alignment cannot tolerate even slight changes in the 
user behaviour over time. Starting from the data of each user, the 
configuration phase of DDSGA computes the scoring parameters that result 
in the maximum alignment score for the considered user.  
Furthermore, to improve the accuracy of the alignment, DDSGA 
integrates binary and command group, two scoring systems suggested by 
Coull et al., into two other scoring systems, restricted and free permutation. 
The resulting systems tolerate permutations of previously observed patterns 
with a low reduction of the score. To tolerate changes in the low-level 
representation of commands with the same functionality, the scoring systems 
classify user commands into several groups and align two commands in the 
same group without reducing the alignment score. The DDSGA 
configuration phase also creates a dynamic threshold for each user to be used 
by both the detection phase and the update one. While Enhanced-SGA builds 
this threshold through a snapshot of a user profile, DDSGA builds a more 
sensitive and dynamic threshold by considering any data in the profile.  
Furthermore, DDSGA runs two update modules: the inline and long term 
modules. The inline module updates the user signature patterns, the user 
lexicon list, and their corresponding command categories in a 
reconfiguration phase. The long-term module updates the system with the 
latest changes in the alignment parameters. It also updates the dynamic 
threshold values, scoring parameters, and the overlapping length i.e., the 
length of the overlapped signature subsequence according to maximum 
number of inserted test gaps. The dynamic threshold, the scoring systems, 
and the two update modules enable DDSGA to tolerate slight changes in the 
user behaviour overtime. Table 5.1 briefly compares DDSGA and Enhanced-
SGA.  
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Table 5.1: A comparison between DDSGA and Enhanced-SGA 
 Enhanced-SGA DDSGA 
Accuracy 1. Command grouping 
and binary scoring 
systems 
2. Fixed and equal gab 
insertion penalties for 
all the users. 
3. Compute the 
threshold for each 
user using snapshots 
of user date. 
4. Signature Update. 
1. Free and restricted 
permutation scoring 
systems. 
2. Define gab insertion 
penalties for each user 
independently, based on 
user previous data. 
3. Compute an optimal 
threshold for each user. 
4. Signature Update (inline 
and long term). 
Computational 
Performance 
Heuristic Aligning. 1. TMBO Approach. 
2. Parallel computation. 
In the following sections we detail the current implementation of DDSGA. 
5.2 The Configuration Phase:  
We briefly define the parameters that this phase computes for each user 
and that are used by the following phases. The detailed calculation of each 
parameter is described in the remainder of this section. 
 Optimal gap penalties: 
The optimal test gap penalty and the optimal signature gap penalty are paid 
when inserting a gap into the test sequence and the signature one 
respectively. While in Enhanced-SGA all the users share the same fixed 
penalties, DDSGA computes two distinct penalties for each user according to 
distinct user behaviours. In this way, DDSGA determines the smallest 
penalties corresponding to the maximum alignment score. 
 Mismatch Score: 
DDSGA evaluates the mismatch score through the restricted permutation 
scoring system and the free permutation one. These systems integrate the 
command grouping and binary scoring systems defined in [125]. 
 Average optimal threshold : 
DDSGA computes a distinct threshold value for each user according to the 
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changes in the user behavior. The threshold is used in both the detection and 
update phases and its sensitivity affects the accuracy of both phases, as 
discussed in the average threshold module. 
 Maximum factor of test gaps (mftg): 
This parameter relates the largest number of gaps inserted into the user test 
sequences to the length of these sequences. DDSGA computes a distinct 
parameter for each user and updates it in the update phase. The detection 
phase uses the parameter to evaluate the maximum length of the overlapped 
signature subsequences in the TMBO. 
The configuration phase is implemented using the following five modules: 
5.2.1 DDSGA Initialization Module: 
To provide an independent set of test and signature sequences for the 
configuration phase of each user, we split the user signatures into nt non-
overlapped-blocks each of length n and use them as test sequences to the 
user. These sequences represent all given combinations of users signature 
sequences and all the modules in the configuration phase use them to 
compute the user alignment parameters. To define the signature sequences, 
we divide the user signature sequence into a set of overlapped groups of 
length m = 2n. In this way, the last n symbols of a block also appear as the 
first n of the next one. ns, the number of signature subsequences is equal to 
nt-1 groups to consider all possible adjacent pairs of the signature sequences 
of size n. We have chosen a length 2n to overlap the signature sequence 
because any particular alignment uses subsequences with a length that is, at 
most, 2n. Any longer subsequence necessary scores poorly, because of the 
number of gaps to be inserted. In fact, since the scoring alignment depends 
upon the match between the test and the signature subsequences, the former 
should be shorter than the latter. As a consequence, the signature sequence 
for this phase consists of 2n command produced by overlapping the signature 
sequence. Hence, there are nt-1 groups that are created as in Figure 5.2.  
In the case of SEA, ns = 49 subsequences and a tested block consists of 
100 commands because SEA marks each 100 command block as an intrusion 
or a non-intrusion. Since SEA does not supply any information on which 
commands in a block correspond to the intrusion, the correctness of larger or 
smaller blocks cannot be checked. The dynamic average threshold for both 
the detection and update phases is the average score of all the alignments 
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between each test sequence of length 100-command and the 49 overlapped 
2n signature subsequences. A test sequence is not aligned with the signature 
subsequence that contains the test sequence itself because this returns a 
100% alignment score. We will detail this step in the average threshold 
module.  
 
Figure 5.2: The non-overlapped test sequences and the overlapped signature 
subsequences 
5.2.2 User’s Lexicon Categorization Module: 
This module builds a lexicon for each user, i.e. list of lexical patterns 
classified according to their functionality and that is used to tolerate changes 
in the low level representation of a pattern. In the SEA dataset, these patterns 
are UNIX commands. This module combines the user lexicon list and 
command grouping approach introduced in [125].  
Table 5.2: User 1 Lexicon List 
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Table 5.2 shows an example of a classification of user commands into 
several categories according to their functionalities e.g., since a user can use 
either cat or vi to write a file, the two commands can be aligned because both 
belong to the same group, “Text processing". In the same way, grep can be 
aligned with find because they both belong to "searching". 
5.2.3 Scoring parameters module. 
Starting from the test and signature subsequences of each user, this 
module returns three parameters: optimal test gap penalty, optimal signature 
gap penalty, and mismatch score. At first, the module inserts into the list 
top_match_list all the test sequences with the top match score. This list 
enables DDSGA to align the top match test sequences only rather than all the 
nt sequences. To build the top_match_list, we select the highest match scores 
for all the nt sequences. The match score MS of a test sequence is computed 
as in Equation 5.1. Then, the top_match_list sequences are aligned to the ns 
overlapped signature subsequences using any possible gap penalty, i.e. the 
test gap penalty ranges from 1 to n, while the signature gap penalty ranges 
from 1 to n. The mismatch score is 0 and the match score is +2.  
11
ntn
MS Min( Noccur _ Itself ( p ),Noccur _ Seq ( p ))
i k i
ki
 
         
(5.1) 
Where: 
 n is the length of the test sequence.  
 nt is number of test sequences. 
 Noccur_Itself( ip ) is number of occurrence of pattern i in the current 
evaluated sequence. 
 Noccur_Seq k ( ip ) is number of occurrence of pattern i in test sequence k. 
 
By computing each alignment separately, we produce several alignment 
scores for each combination of the scoring parameters and select as the 
optimal parameters those resulting in the maximum score. If several 
alignments result in this score, we select the one with the smallest penalties 
of inserting a gap into the signature subsequence and test one, respectively. 
To justify this solution, consider that the highest alignment score denotes a 
high level of alignment between the test and the signature subsequences and 
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SGA normally subtracts these penalties from the score. We have applied the 
previous steps to each user in SEA dataset to define the corresponding 
optimal penalties. Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3 show the penalties for user 1. 
 
Figure 5.3: The best alignment score that corresponds to the optimal 
combinations of gap penalties for user 1 in SEA Dataset 
Table 5.3: Example of the Top Match Scores of User 1 
The Mismatch-Score Evaluation Algorithm: 
This algorithm computes the mismatch score parameter using the 
restricted and the free permutation scoring systems as shown in Figures 5.4 
and 5.5. Both systems integrate command grouping and binary scoring [125] 
and are based on distinct assumption about mutations in the audit data. 
Command grouping assumes that sequences of audit data mutate by 
replacing some original symbols with functionally similar ones. Command 
grouping assigns a static reward of +2 to exact matches and scores a 
Max 
alignment 
score 
Test sequence 
index (i) 
Signature gap  
penalty 
Test gap  
penalty 
Optimal 
combination 
154 2 99 95 - 
154 5 100 95 - 
154 8 97 100 - 
154 13 97 99 ok 
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mismatch through the functional groups of the two commands. If a command 
in the signature aligns with a mismatched command in the test sequence but 
that belongs to the same group, the mismatch score is set to +1 rather than to 
-1. The assumption on mutation of the binary scoring system follows the 
results in [151] where mutation does not replace base symbols in the user 
lexicon. In fact, these symbols are a strong indicator of a legal use, but the 
original base symbols can be permuted in some fashion [125]. The binary 
scoring system rewards exact matches by adding +2 to the alignment score. 
A mismatch is scored to +1 if the mismatched command has previously 
occurred in the user lexicon and to -1 otherwise. Both scoring systems 
penalize the insertion of a gap into the signature sequence and into the test 
one by, respectively, -3 and -2.  
 (A) Restricted Permutation Scoring System:  
It rewards a mismatched command in the test sequence if the two 
commands belong to the same group. These groups are manually created 
from a set of common UNIX commands in the signature sequences. 
Furthermore, the mismatched command of the test sequence should have 
previously occurred in the user lexicon. This tolerates various permutations 
of previously observed patterns without reducing the score significantly.  
 
Figure 5.4: The restricted permutation scoring system. 
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(B) Free Permutation Scoring System: 
This system is more tolerant than the previous one because it does not 
require that the mismatched commands belong to the same group and it even 
rewards a mismatched command provided that it belongs to the user lexicon. 
This tolerates a larger number of permutations of the signature patterns 
without reducing the score significantly.  
 
Figure 5.5: The Free Permutation Scoring System. 
5.2.4 Average Threshold Module. 
This module computes a dynamic average threshold for each user to be 
used in the detection phase and that may be updated in the update phase. In 
the detection phase, if the alignment score is lower than the threshold, then 
the behavior is classified as a masquerade attack. With respect to Enhanced-
SGA, this module considers all the user data to improve the sensitivity of the 
threshold that, in turns, determines the one of the detection. The module uses 
the same test and signature subsequences of the initialization module and it 
can works with a test sequence of any length because, in practical 
deployment user test session can be of any length.  
At first, the module builds a trace-matrix, to record all alignment details 
of the current user. We align each test sequence to all ns overlapped 
signature subsequences and run the module twice, one for each scoring 
systems to select the one to be used. The detection phase uses the output of 
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
110 
this module to compare the two scoring systems. These alignments use the 
optimal scoring parameters for the current user. The module applies 
Equation 5.2 to compute the average alignment of test sequence i, 
avg_align_i, and the sub_average score for all previous alignment scores, 
score_align_i, of test sequence i. In the equation, max_score_align_i is the 
largest alignment score resulting from the alignment of sequence i to all ns 
signature subsequences. Then, the module applies Equation 5.3 to compute 
the detection_update_threshold, the overall average of the nt sub average 
scores.  
100
1
ns
avg _align_i (( score_ align_i / ns ) / max_score_align_i )*
j
j
 

   (5.2)  
1
nt
detection_update_threshold ( avg _ align _ i ) / nt
k
k
 

             (5.3) 
To compute the optimal alignment path and number of test gaps (ntg) to 
be inserted into test sequence i, we apply the trace backward algorithm 
(TBA) to trace back the transitions to derive each optimal score. An example 
is shown in Table 5.4.  
Table 5.4: An Example for the Trace-Matrix 
Test  
Seq. ID 
Length of Test 
Seq. (lts) 
Signature 
Subseq. ID 
Optimal 
alignment 
Number of 
Test Gaps 
(ntg) 
Avg-align of 
test Seq. i 
(%) 
1 100 1 27 65  
1 100 2 33 60  
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
1 100 49 77 22 70.31 
2 100 1 37 57  
2 100 2 53 43  
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
2 100 49 67 31 69.72 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
50 100 1 122 9  
50 100 2 134 7  
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
50 100 49 102 11 73.75 
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The Trace Backward Algorithm (TBA): 
Any dynamic programming algorithm can select the optimal alignment 
path by tracing back through the optimal scores computed by SGA. We 
implemented the TBA to build the backward-transition-matrix, see Figure 
5.6, in a way that helps in filling the trace-matrix in Table 5.4 as previously 
discussed. The alignment process also applies the TBA to extract the final 
alignment path. The TBA traces back the transition-matrix according to the 
labels that the alignment has inserted into this matrix. One of four labels may 
be inserted: "M" if a match has occurred, "!M" if a mismatch has occurred, 
"GS" or “GT” if a gap has been inserted into a signature subsequence or into 
the test one. Figure 5.6 outlines the TBA and shows the transition-matrix and 
the corresponding backward-transition-matrix to align the test sequence 
"AWGHE" to the signature sequence "PAWHE". 
 Test sequence:           A W G H E 
Signature sequence:   A W  -  H E 
 
 
Figure 5.6: The Transition and Backward-Transition matrices respectively 
The thick arrows show the optimal path that leads to the maximum alignment score, the 
thin ones show other proper paths that do not lead to the maximum alignment score. 
5.2.5 Maximum Test Gap Module 
We recall that the Enhanced-SGA Heuristic Aligning decomposes the 
signature subsequence into 2n overlapped subsequences because if 
subsequences of length n are aligned, the maximum number of gaps that can 
be inserted into the test sequence is n for all users. By tracing the SGA 
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algorithm, we have noticed that the maximum number of gaps is much lower 
than n, the length of the test sequence, and it differs for each user according 
to the level of similarity among the subsequences in the user signature and to 
the length of the test sequence. Even if the test sequence is long enough, the 
number of gaps is at most half of the sequence length. This means that by 
partitioning the signature sequence into 2n overlapped subsequences, the 
Maximum Test Gap module can divide it as in Equation 5.4 to compute mftg, 
the largest number of test gaps inserted into the user test sequences by the 
average threshold module.  
The Computational Enhancement (CE) for the session alignment of a 
user can be computed according to Equation 5.5. We refer to the detection 
phase for an example that explains this section.  
 
5.3 The Detection Phase 
We have run a complete alignment experiment based upon the test and 
signature blocks of the SEA dataset to evaluate the alignment parameters and 
the two scoring systems. The test blocks are the actual SEA testing data and 
they differ from those described in the initialization module. To simplify a 
nt
ntg
kL n Max *n
lts
kk
  
   
           
                             (5.4) 
Where: 
 ntg is number of test gaps inserted to each test sequence,  
 lts is the length of the test sequence,  
 nt is number of the test sequences of the user, fifty in case of SEA, 
CE =    - * 100/(2* ) %n mftg n                                                (5.5)       
Where, Maximum Factor of Test Gaps inserted into all user test sequences  
(mftg) =
nt
ntg
kMax
lts
kk
 
  
  
   
 
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comparison with other approaches, we use the ROC curve and the Maxion-
Townsend cost function [112] defined in Section 2.2.2.  
Our experimentation focuses on the effects of the alignment parameters 
on the false positive and false negative rates and on the hit ratio. This 
experiment did not apply the maximum test gap module. False positives, 
false negatives and hits are computed for each user, transformed into the 
corresponding rates that are then summed and averaged over all 50 users. 
Equations 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show the DDSGA metrics.  
100
1
/ / *
nu
TotalFalsePositive fp n nu
k k
k
  
   
    
           
(5.6) 
Where: 
 fp = No. of false positive alarms,  
 n = No. of non-intrusion command sequence blocks,  
 nu = No. of users (50 in our case) 
100
1
/ / *
nui
TotalFalseNegative fn ni nui
k k
k
  
   
    
         
 (5.7) 
Where: 
 fn = No. of false negatives,  
 ni = No. of intrusion command sequence blocks,  
 nui = No. of users who have at least one intrusion block  
100TotalHitRatio TotalFalseNegative               (5.8) 
To plot the ROC curve, the experiment with the traditional SGA 
algorithm have used distinct values of the alignment parameters to obtain 
different false positive rates in the x-axis and the corresponding hit ratios in 
y-axis. We also repeat the experiment with distinct values of some alignment 
parameters such as reward for matches and rewards or penalties for 
mismatches computed by the two scoring systems. Figure 5.7 shows the 
ROC curve for the two scoring systems, the Enhanced-SGA scoring systems, 
and other detection approaches, based upon the previous metrics.  
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     Figure 5.7: ROC curve for our two scoring systems, SGA ones, and other 
detection approaches 
According to this figure, the restricted permutation system results in 
higher hit ratio with corresponding low false positive rates. As the false 
positives rate increases, the free permutation system achieves a higher hit 
ratio than the restricted one because it can tolerate a large number of 
mutations and deviations in user behaviours. According to this experiment, 
we have adopted the restricted permutation system as a suitable scoring 
system for all the phases of DDSGA.  
Table 5.5 compares DDSGA using the restricted and the free permutation 
scoring systems against the current masquerade detection approaches sorted 
by Maxion-Townsend cost. The results for the various detection approaches, 
including all ROC curve values, are published in the references shown in 
Table 5.5 and are sorted by “Maxion Townsend cost” that is used to simplify 
the comparison by considering both the false positive and hit ratio. We re-
implemented all Coull et all works in [124, 125] to compare it against 
DDSGA.  
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Table 5.5: A Comparison between Our Two Scoring Systems and the 
Current Detection Approaches 
Approach Name 
Hit Ratio 
% 
False 
Positive % 
Maxion 
T. Cost 
DDSGA (Restricted Permutation) 83.3 3.4 37.1 
DDSGA (Free Permutation) 80.5 3.8 42.3 
SGA (Signature updating) [125] 68.6 1.9 42.8 
SGA (Signature updating + Heuristic 
Aligning) [125] 
66.5 1.8 44.3 
Naïve Bayes (With Update) [112] 61.5 1.3 46.3 
SGA (Binary Scoring)[ 125] 60.3 2.9 57.1 
Adaptive Naïve Bayes [123] 87.8 7.7   58.4 
Recursive Data Mining [120] 62.3 3.7 59.9 
Naïve Bayes (No Update) [112] 66.2 4.6 61.4 
WRBF-NB [122] 83.1   7.7         63.1 
Episode based Naïve Bayes [121] 77.6 7.7     68.6 
Uniqueness [138] 39.4 1.4 69.0 
Hybrid Markov [116] 49.3 3.2 69.9 
SGA (Previous Scoring) [124] 75.8 7.7 70.4 
Bayes 1-Step Markov [115] 69.3 6.7 70.9 
IPAM [117] 41.1 2.7 75.1 
SGA (Command Grouping) [125] 42.2 3.5 78.8 
Sequence Matching [118] 36.8 3.7 85.4 
Compression [114] 34.2 5.0 95.8 
The Computational Enhancement Modules:  
The computational complexity of SGA is rather large. As an example, it 
requires about 500,000 operations to test one user session for masquerade 
attacks in the SEA dataset, because the length of the signature sequence is 
5000 while that of the test sequence is 100. The resulting overhead is 
unacceptable in multiuser environments like cloud systems or in 
computationally limited devices like wireless systems. To reduce this 
overhead, we introduce two computational enhancements that concern, 
respectively, the Top-Matching Based Overlapping (TMBO) module and the 
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parallelized detection module that are executed in each alignment session.  In 
the following, we outline in details these two modules. 
5.3.1 The Top-Matching Based Overlapping Module 
To align the session patterns to a set of overlapped subsequences of the 
user signatures, this module uses the restricted permutation scoring system, 
Maximum Factor of Test Gaps (mftg) in Equation 5.9, and the scoring 
parameters of each user. As explained in Section 5.1, the TMBO improves 
the Heuristic Aligning of the Enhanced-SGA. After splitting the signature 
sequence into a set of overlapped blocks of length L, see Equation 5.4, it 
chooses the subsequence with the highest match to be used in the alignment 
process. In the worst case, all overlapped subsequences should be aligned as 
they have the same highest match value. We have verified that on average, 
the number of alignments is rather smaller because of the variation between 
the overlapped signature subsequences. The evaluation of the proposed 
TMBO approach mainly depends upon two parameters: (a) Number of 
average alignments for the detection process, (b) The effect of the TMBO on 
false alarm rates and hit ratio.  
To evaluate our approach with respect to (a) we show through an 
example how it reduces the alignment computations. As far as concerns (b), 
we use the ROC curve and Maxion-Townsend. To evaluate TMBO, Figure 
5.8 shows the user session patterns to be aligned to the signature patterns. 
The configuration phase returns these values: signature_gap_penalty = 9, 
test_gap_penalty = 5, optimal_score_sys = “Restricted Permutation”, 
detection_update_threshold = 82.2%, and mftg (maximum factor of 
test_gaps) = 33%.  
The first step of TMBO computes the following length of the overlapped 
subsequences according to Equation 5.9: 
   * 10 33 /100 * 10 10 3.3 10 4 14L n mftg  n                           (5.9) 
With respect to the one in the initialization module, the current 
overlapping runs with length L rather than 2n. Figure 5.8 shows the resulting 
overlapped signature subsequences of size L = 14. The last subsequence, i.e. 
subsequence 15, may be shorter than L, but it is still longer than the test 
sequence.  
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The second step computes the match corresponding to each subsequence 
as shown in the front of each subsequence in Figure 5.8. We only consider 
the matching of subsequence 1 because those for other subsequences are 
similar. If we denote by Match(X, s), the minimum between the occurrences 
of X in, respectively, a user session and in a subsequence, then Match 
(subseq.1) = 
(X in {A, B, C, D, E, F} (Match(X, subseq.1)) = (Min(3,1), Min(2,2), Min(1,2), 
Min(1,2), Min(2,2), Min(1,2))= (1,2,1,1,2,1)=8 
 
Figure 5.8: Overlapped Signature Subsequences of Size 14 
The third step chooses the top match subsequences, e.g. subsequences 2 
and 15 in the example, as the best signature subsequences to be aligned 
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against the test session patterns of the user. To evaluate the reduction of the 
workload due to TMBO, consider the Number of Asymptotic Computations 
(NAC) computed by Equation 5.10. In the previous example, TMBO reduces 
the number of alignments from 3000 to 280 with a saving of 90.66%. 
NAC =  Avg_n_align  *  Sig_len  *  Test_len              (5.10) 
Where:  
 Avg_n_align is the average number of alignments required for one 
detection session over all existing users.  
 Sig_len is the length of the overlapped signature subsequence.  
 Test_len is the length of the test sequence). 
To determine if the session patterns of the current user contain a 
masquerader, the final step compares the highest scores of the previous two 
alignments against a detection_update_threshold. As explained in the update 
phase, if at least one of the previous eight alignments has a score larger than 
or equal to the detection_update_threshold, then an inline update process 
should be executed for the signature subsequence and the user lexicon. 
The evaluation using the SEA dataset shows that TMBO reduces the 
maximum number of alignments from 49 to an average of 5.13 alignments 
per detection, a substantial improvement in detection scenarios. Table 5.6 
shows the asymptotic computations for three detection approaches. The first 
is our TMBO without the inline update module. The second one is the 
Heuristic Aligning with signature update [125]. Finally, the third one is the 
traditional SGA algorithm without the Heuristic Aligning or update feature. 
The NAC per one detection session can be computed as in Equation 5.10. If 
we considered that each of the fifty users in SEA dataset has one active 
session in a multi users system, then Total_NAC = NAC * 50. 
Table 5.6: TMBO approach in three detection approaches 
Approach Name  Avg-n-align NAC per 1 user  NAC per 50 
user  
DDSGA with L = 145.73 
5. 13 
5. 13 * 145.73 * 
100 = 74759.49  
74759.49 * 50 
= 3737974.5  
SGA with Signature 
length = 200 
4.5 
4.5 * 200 * 100 = 
90000  
90000 * 50 = 
4500000  
Traditional SGA with 
Signature length = 200 
49 
49 * 200 * 100 = 
980000  
980000 * 50 = 
49000000  
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To evaluate false alarm rates and hit ratios, we have tested TMBO using 
the ROC curve and Maxion-Townsend score. Figure 5.9 and Table 5.7 show 
that TMBO has a lower impact on the overall accuracy than other 
approaches. 
 
Figure 5.9: The impact of our TMBO approach on the system accuracy 
Table 5.7: The Masquerade Detection Approaches against DDSGA with its 
Two Scoring Systems 
Approach Name Hit 
Ratio % 
False 
Positive % 
Maxion-T 
Cost 
DDSGA (Restricted Permutation, 
Without Updating) 83.3 3.4 37.1 
DDSGA (Restricted Permutation, 
Without Updating) + TMBO 81.5 3.3 38.3 
DDSGA (Free Permutation) 80.5 3.8 42.3 
SGA (Signature updating) 68.6 1.9 42.8 
SGA (Signature updating) + Heuristic 66.5 1.8 44.3 
Naïve Bayes (With Updating) 61.5 1.3 46.3 
SGA (Binary Scoring, No Updating) 60.3 2.9 57.1 
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5.3.2 The parallelized Detection Module 
Since TMBO partitions the user signature into a set of overlapped 
subsequences, we can parallelize the detection algorithm because it can align 
the commands in the user test session to each top match signature 
subsequence separately. In the example of Section 5.3.1, we can run in 
parallel the threads to align subsequences 2 and 15. If a thread returns a 
computed alignment score at least equal to detection_update_threshold, then 
it sends a "No Masquerader" message and then runs an inline update of both 
its signature subsequence and the lexicon of the current user. Instead, if the 
alignment score is lower than the detection_update_threshold, the thread 
raises a "Masquerader Detected" alert. Figure 5.10 shows the parallelized 
detection module processes. 
 
Figure 5.10: The processes of the parallelized detection module 
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We have run several experiments using the SEA dataset to evaluate how 
the parallel version of the module influences the overall performance of 
detection. The experiments have used an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor E4500 
(2M Cache, 2.20 GHz) with 4 GB of memory and running Windows 7 SP1, 
Machine “A”. Machine “B” is Intel Core i3-2330M (3M Cache, 2.30 GHz) 
with 6 GB of memory and running Windows 7 SP1.  
The results show that there are two operational modes of the module: 
Full Parallelization Mode (FPM) and Semi Parallelization (SPM) one. The 
module selects the most appropriate one according to the capabilities of the 
underlying machine and to n_aligns, the number of alignments per detection. 
It selects the FPM mode if the machine capabilities match n_aligns so that 
the module achieves the best performance. This is the most common mode in 
our experiments. An example is the detection sessions of user 7 where 
n_aligns = 5, Figure 5.11 shows that if five thread are used then each thread 
runs a distinct alignment and this minimizes the detection time.  
The SPM mode is selected if the machine capabilities do not match the 
required n_aligns. This results in a small performance degradation due to 
inactive threads. The SPM mode is rarely selected in our experiments 
because the fifty users of the SEA dataset results in a value of Avg_n_align, 
equals to 5.13. Hence, on average, the parallelized detection module uses 6 
threads to run a detection session. A SPM mode example is the detection 
sessions of user 23 where n_aligns =9. Figure 5.12 shows that the shortest 
detection time is reached when running 6 threads in machine “A” and 8 
threads in machine “B”. In this case, 3 threads are idle in machine “A” and 1 
in machine “B”.  
5.4 The Update Phase 
The update of the user signature patterns is critical because any IDS 
should be automatically updated to the new legal behaviours of a user. This 
update is implemented by two modules: the inline update module and the 
long term update one.  
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Figure 5.11: FPM and SPM modes for user 7 in Machines “A” and “B” 
 
Figure 5.12: FPM and SPM modes for user 23 in Machines “A” and “B” 
5.4.1 The inline update module  
This module has two main tasks:  
1) Finding areas in user signature subsequences to be updated and 
augmented with the new user behavior patterns. 
2) Update the user lexicon by inserting new commands. 
In the detection phase, after each alignment, each parallel thread may 
update both the user signature subsequences and the user lexicon. Three 
cases are possible in the TBA, see Figure 5.13:  
a) The test sequence pattern matches the corresponding signature 
subsequence pattern, 
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b) A gap is inserted into either or both sequences  
c) There is at least a mismatch between the patterns in the two sequences.  
In case (a), no update is required because the alignment has properly 
used the symbol in the proper subsequence to find the optimal alignment. 
Also case (b) does not require an update because symbols that are aligned 
with gaps are not similar and should be neglected. In case (c), we consider all 
the mismatches within the current test sequence. Then, both the signature 
subsequence and the user lexicon are updated under two conditions.  
The first one states that we can insert into the user signatures only those 
patterns that are free of masquerading records. This happens anytime the 
overall_alignment_score for the current test sequence is larger than or equal 
to the detection_update_threshold.  
The second condition states that the current test pattern should have 
previously appeared in the user lexicon or belongs to the same functional 
group of the corresponding signature pattern.  
The two conditions imply that the inline module updates the user lexicon 
with the new pattern if it does not belong to the lexicon. It also extends the 
pattern with the current signature subsequence and adds the resulting 
subsequence to the user signatures without changing the original one. In 
other words, if a pattern in the user lexicon or in the same functional group 
of its corresponding signature pattern has participated in a conserved 
alignment, then a new permutation of the behavior of the user has been 
created. For instance, if the alignment score of the test sequence in Figure 
5.13 is larger than or equal to the detection_update_threshold, then the 
pattern 'E' at the end of this test sequence has a mismatch with 'A' at the end 
of the signature subsequence. If ‘E’ exists in the user lexicon or belongs to 
the same functional group of 'A', the signature subsequence is augmented so 
that the position with 'A' matches with both 'A' or 'E'. If ’E’ does not belong 
to the lexicon, it is also inserted into it. This simply embeds observed 
variations in the signature sequence without destroying any information it 
encodes. In this case, a new augmented subsequence (HEE) is inserted into 
the user signature subsequences. If only the first condition is satisfied, only 
the user lexicon is updated so that the following checks use the new pattern. 
In fact, it is highly likely that a pattern that has appeared within a conserved, 
high scoring alignment has been created by the legitimate user.  
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Figure 5.13: The inline update steps 
Besides improving the computational performance of system update, the 
module also improves the signature update scheme of the Enhanced-SGA 
[125] as following: 
1) It uses the parameters, the threshold, and the scoring system returned 
by the configuration phase.  
2) It runs in parallel with the detection phase and starts as soon as the 
alignment score is computed. Instead, the signature update scheme 
runs independently after each detection process and it repeats the 
backward tracing step. 
3) It improves flexibility in the signature update by considering any 
occurrence of commands permutations or functionality matching.  
To evaluate how the inline update module reduces the false alarm rates 
and improves the hit ratio, we have used the ROC curve and the Maxion-
Townsend score after applying the inline update module. Figure 5.14 and 
Table 5.8 show that the inline update module reduces the false alarm rates 
and increases the hit ratio. Therefore, it significantly improves the accuracy 
with respect to other approaches. 
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Figure 5.14: The impact of the inline update on the system accuracy 
Table 5.8: Masquerade Detection Approaches against DDSGA with Its 
Inline Update Module. 
Approach Name Hit 
Ratio % 
False 
Positive % 
Maxion-
T Cost 
DDSGA (Inline Update + TMBO 
+ Restricted Permutation) 88.4 1.7 21.8 
DDSGA (Restricted Permutation, 
Without Updating)  83.3 3.4 37.1 
DDSGA (Restricted Permutation, 
Without Updating) + TMBO 81.5 3.3 38.3 
DDSGA (Free Permutation) 80.5 3.8 42.3 
SGA (Signature updating) 68.6 1.9 42.8 
SGA (Signature updating) + 
Heuristic 
66.5 1.8 44.3 
Naïve Bayes (With Updating) 61.5 1.3 46.3 
SGA (Binary Scoring, No Updating) 60.3 2.9 57.1 
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5.4.2 The long term update module 
This module reconfigures the system parameters through the outputs of 
the inline update module. There are three strategies to run the module: 
periodic, idle time, and threshold. The proper one is selected according to the 
characteristic and requirements of the monitored system.  
The periodic strategy runs the reconfiguration step with a fixed 
frequency, i.e. 3 days or 1 week. To reduce the overhead, the idle time 
strategy runs the reconfiguration step anytime the system is idle. This 
solution is appropriate in highly overloaded systems that require an efficient 
use of the network and computational resources. The threshold strategy runs 
the reconfiguration step as soon as the number of test patterns inserted into 
the signature sequences reaches a threshold that is distinct for each user and 
frequently updated. This approach is highly efficient because it runs the 
module only if the signature sequence is changed. 
The DDSGA webpage [152] describes further details on, among others, 
analysis results for each user in SEA dataset, output charts, and pseudo 
algorithms. Chapter 6 and 7 describe an implementation of DDSGA to detect 
masquerade attacks in the cloud systems using different auditing profiles. 
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Chapter 6 
Detecting Masqueraders through System Calls and 
NetFlow Data 
Masquerade attacks become a big challenge in cloud systems because, the 
massive amount of system resources, alternative deployment models, and the 
distribution of user audits and activities across several VMs with distinct 
environments, strongly increase the complexity of their detection. Most of 
the current approaches to detect these attacks suffer from severe limitations 
when applied to cloud systems. As an example, they analyze user behaviors 
just in one environment without correlating all activities of the same user in 
host and network environments. Furthermore, they are not applicable to 
alternative deployment models such as private, hybrid, and public clouds. 
This chapter discusses three detection strategies [143]. The first strategy 
analyzes sequences of correlated system calls audits from the operating 
systems of the VMs, the second considers data from the network 
environment and the last one integrates the first two strategies. To simplify 
the testing and the evaluation of the three strategies, we used our CIDD 
dataset introduced in Chapter 4 as a source for cloud audits data. Finally, the 
chapter details our experiments to determine the optimal parameters for the 
various strategies and describe the experiments we have implemented to 
evaluate the computational performance and the detection accuracy of these 
strategies. 
6.1 Overview 
All the three detection methods described in the following analyze the 
audit data through DDSGA. The first method applies DDSGA to sequences 
of user system calls from the host environment. The second one uses 
NetFlow audits collected from the network environment. The third method 
integrates the outputs of the first two methods through a neural network and 
uses statistical information associated with active session e.g., the login 
period, user’s source IP address, and login failure actions. To tune and 
evaluate the three methods we have used the system calls and NetFlow data 
in the CIDD dataset. DDSGA is applied to the user audits in CIDD in a fully 
functional cloud system according to the distributed architecture of CIDD.  
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Any approach that analyses the system calls result in a high degree of 
information assurance because these calls reflect all system activities and 
their monitoring is tightly integrated with the OS. This makes the monitoring 
process more tamper-resistant to malicious updates of the information of 
interest. As a counterpart, an analysis that considers all the system call 
categories may result in a slow detection process and a high false alarm rates 
with a low hit ratio. This is the reason why our analysis extracts specific 
features from the system calls through our “Behaviours Triangle Model” that 
is focused on calls related to file access and to process activities because they 
are essential and unavoidable for any user. This simplifies the labeling of 
abnormal behavior because these calls reflect any regularity of the user 
behaviour in audit data more than other calls.  
In the network environment, a NetFlow profile is built not for each user 
but for each source IP address. This profile is based upon sequences of 
network actions captured by sniffing tools. For each action, we record the 
sequence of destination IPs that have been accessed successfully together 
with the protocols used.  
The three alternative implementation models described in Chapter 3, 
Audit Exchange, Independent, and Centralized-Backup, are evaluated using 
their corresponding CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks. These models help 
in analyzing the behavior of the same user in distinct cloud nodes. 
Furthermore, they improve the functionality of their frameworks to 
efficiently cover attacks in distinct cloud deployment models. 
6.2. Detecting Masquerades in Host Environment 
This section describes masquerade detection based on the anomalous 
analysis of system calls sequences and evaluates this strategy through the 
UNIX audits of the CIDD dataset.  
6.2.1 System Calls Feature Extraction 
Several monitoring and audit strategies of OS activities are focused on 
system calls. These calls can be roughly grouped into five major categories: 
process control, file management, device management, information 
maintenance, and communication [153]. 
While current IDSs analyze calls in all categories, our solution only 
monitors two categories: file access and process activities. To explain this 
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decision, we briefly discuss the disadvantage of considering all categories of 
system calls. First, an analysis that considers any call with its full parameters 
and features often results in a slow detection process that produces very high 
false alarm rates with low hit ratio. This is due to the large number of system 
calls parameters and the large number of possible permutations of the calls. 
Another problem is that the training patterns for most calls are specific to the 
program versions so that the accuracy of detection changes anytime the 
version changes. Another important reason is that the basic premise for 
anomaly detection is the intrinsic regularity in the audit data that is 
consistent with the normal behavior and distinct from the abnormal one. In 
other words, the more regular the data, the better the performance of 
anomaly detection [154]. We have focused on file access and process 
execution because they are essential and unavoidable for any user and can 
strongly reflect the user behaviour with more intrinsic regularity than other 
activities. To analyze file access and process execution, our Behaviours 
Triangle Model, builds a profile of system activity of each user and reflects 
user behaviors in terms of three relationships, see Figure 6.1:  
(a) User access a file,  
(b) Process accesses a file, 
(c) User invokes a process. 
 
Figure 6.1: The Behaviours Triangle Model 
The Behaviours Triangle Model classifies users into human and system 
users. In turns, it partitions human users into local and server users according 
to their nature. Local user activities are more complex and dynamic than 
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those of server users and include database administration, word processing, 
web browsing, and miscellaneous activities such as command-prompt and 
window manager interaction. The activities of server users are more related 
to email services, file transfer, and web browsing. Unlike human users, 
system users are dedicated to a few tasks and have specific privileges and are 
likely to behave statically. These limited activities and privileges simplify the 
detection of attempts to masquerade as a system user. DDSGA detects these 
attempts through a lexical list with common files and processes accessed or 
invoked by system users. Any pattern outside this list is a strong indication 
of a masquerader. We separate human user activities from system user 
processes and then check each user separately.  
In multi user systems like cloud systems, activities of distinct users are 
recognized in traces through the user ID paired with each system call. Using 
these IDs, we can easily define the activities of each human user. Instead, 
system users activities may interact with local and server users, but they 
usually do not refer to a specific user. Hence, we can detect a masquerader 
that is misusing the system user but without any information about the legal 
user that originated the misuse. To this purpose a further detection process 
should be run for all human users.  
Figure 6.1 shows three training sessions for the three kinds of users, 
according to the features extracted from the CIDD dataset. The uucp system 
user can access to the /uccp directory, whereas the root user can access the 
/ufs and /etc files. As soon as a masquerader compromises them, the program 
tries to access files in other system directories such as /lib or /user. By 
exploiting the interactions between system users and human processes, a 
masquerader can escalate his/her access privileges to acquire some human 
user privileges. Both users uccp and root execute the last two masquerades in 
the sessions in Figure 6.2 but it is not known if they affected one or more of 
the human users, e.g., users 2060 or 2140. DDSGA detects these 
masquerades by checking the system users’ profiles. If the detection rate is 
smaller than the detection threshold, DDSGA checks all the human users to 
discover if any of them were impersonated by that masquerader to use the 
privileges of the system users. The next section details how DDSGA detects 
masquerade attacks in UNIX system call traces.  
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Figure 6.2: Three training sessions with the extracted features for three 
types of users 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show that we build a user profile based on the 
sequence of patterns of the files the user has accessed and of the process 
being invoked. The arcs of the triangle define three relationships:  
(a) A user accesses a file: it includes the file access patterns that 
correspond to a given task. These access patterns represent a profile of 
the normal user behavior. Therefore, any deviation in the current 
pattern with respect to this profile will be considered as an anomalous.  
(b) A process accesses a file: this relationship defines how the process 
accesses a file, a masquerader may use the user process privileges to 
access important files. The analysis of the sequences of the files that 
the process accesses may result in a highly accurate detection with 
respect to the files the user accesses, because this relationship involves 
a fixed and well defined list of the files each process can access.  
(c) A user invokes a process: while the previous analyses of system calls 
[sys-call-model, Behav-Monitor, and Detect-Buffer] consider the list 
of all the processes that each program forks or executes, our analysis 
focuses on the sequence of processes the user has invoked and the 
Local User 
= = = = = = 
Session Head: Session-ID, User-ID, SourceIP, Period, LoginFailure?, Real-Masquerade? 
368-VM2 , 2140, 194.007.248.153, Evening, 0, 1 
Session Contents: (Path, Return-Value) 
 (/export/home/janes/.hushlogin, 0), (/opt/local/bin/tcsh, 0), (/usr/lib/fs/ufs/quota, 0), 
(/usr/bin/cat, 0), (/usr/bin/rm, 1), (/usr/bin/vi, 0), (/usr/bin/su, 1), (/usr/ucb/whoami, 0), 
(/usr/bin/hostname, 0), (/opt/local/lib/solaris/specs, 1) …... 
 
Server user 
= = = = = = 
102-VM4, 2060, 172.016.112.207, Afternoon, 0, 0   
(/opt/local/bin/tcsh, 0), (/usr/lib/fs/ufs/quota, 0), (/usr/bin/cat, 0, 0), (/var/mail/lucyj, 0), 
(/usr/bin/ftp, 0), (/usr/bin/lynx, 0), (/usr/lib/sendmail, 0) …..… 
 
System Users 
= = = = = = = = 
68-VM1, uucp, 127.0.0.1, Afternoon, 0, 1   
(/usr/bin/sh, 0), (/usr/bin/date, 0), (/usr/lib/uucp/uusched, 0), (/usr/lib/uuxqt, 1), (/usr/ 
bin/touch, 1), (/usr/bin/date, 0), (/usr/lib/uucp/uusched, 0), (/usr/lib/uucp/uuxqt, 0) ……  
 
73-VM1, root, 127.0.0.1, Morning, 0, 1   
(/usr/lib/fs/ufs/ufsdump, 0), (/etc/dumpdates, 0), (/usr/ucb/whoami, 1)........ 
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programs being executed. The main idea is that each user has a 
characteristic working set of accessed files and a list of favorite 
programs. We record the sequences of these programs and consider as 
anomalous the case where either the process does not follow the 
normal sequence or a test process or program does not appear in these 
sequences. The analysis neglects forked processes, because they are 
highly predictable and the HIDS component can easily detect a 
process that should not have been forked. 
  
Figures 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 show, respectively, the distributions of the 
access patterns and of the executed programs for the three user categories. 
 
Figure 6.3: The Local User with ID “2140” in CIDD. 
 
Figure 6.4: The Server User with ID “2060” in CIDD. 
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
133 
 
Figure 6.5: The System User with ID “UUCP” in CIDD. 
The previous figures show that both the behaviours of server and system 
users are highly predictable. Hence, any deviation in these behaviours may 
be more accurately detected than those for local users. We also notice that 
the programs that are executed can be more reliably predicted and the 
corresponding access patterns improve the detection process.  
6.2.2 Applying DDSGA to Correlated System Calls 
DDSGA [DDSGA] can work efficiently with any sequence of patterns 
regardless of the running environment. To detect masquerades in UNIX 
audits, DDSGA computes the best alignment score by aligning the active 
session sequence e.g., the access patterns and executed processes as in Figure 
6.2, to the previous sequences of the same user. The implementation of 
DDSGA is updated because originally it was applied to the simulated SEA 
dataset [136] with overlapped sessions of fixed length. Instead, the CIDD 
dataset is distributed among the cloud VMs and has non-overlapped non-
fixed length real time sessions. To this purpose, we have to discover the best 
Sliding Window Size (SWS) for each test session and to build a reasonable 
scoring system according to the extracted features of UNIX audits. Both the 
detection and update phases of DDSGA do not change if CIDD is 
considered, because they use the new parameters returned by the 
configuration phase. In the detection phase, we test three correlation models, 
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Independent, Audit Exchange and Centralized-Backup to correlate the 
behaviour of the same user in distinct cloud nodes. We detail these issues and 
discuss the effect of correlation in the following subsections.  
6.2.2.1 Choosing the Best Sliding Window Size (SWS) 
The dynamic or Sliding Window Size (SWS) determines the length of the 
test sequence in the active session or, in other words, it determines when the 
detection phase should start the detection process. The SWS affects this 
process and helps in improving the system call modeling methods. Previous 
work [154] has chosen the optimal size with reference to an information 
theoretic framework that applies one of two approaches based on the training 
data. The first one uses entropy modeling and it considers data regularity. 
The second approach fully exploits the context dependency of the optimal 
size and estimates it according to the speciﬁc system calls in the training 
subsequences. The latter approach models the complete set of system call 
traces and it is not suitable in our framework that is focused on a subset of 
call traces (access patterns and the invoked processes). Furthermore, it uses 
the sparse Markov transducers [155] while DDSGA uses a more flexible 
alignment technique. We have estimated the SWS factor using four 
approaches:  
(a) Minimum Conditional Entropy (MCE),  
(b) Test Session Length (TSL),  
(c) Test Session Length with Sensitive Action (TSLSA), 
(d) Average Signature Session Length (ASSL).  
 
We have evaluated each approach through two main measures, the 
detection accuracy using the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves 
[113] described in Chapter 2 and the masquerader live time length. After 
highlighting the four approaches, we detail their evaluation. 
(a) The Minimum Conditional Entropy (MCE):  
Conditional entropy, see Equation 6.1, measures the regularity of the 
training data for each user using alternative SWS values and choose the one 
with the lowest entropy that also corresponds to the most regular data. The 
definition of conditional entropy is recalled in Equation 6.1. 
 
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
135 
Where P(x, y) is the joint probability of x and y, and P(x|y) is the conditional 
probability of x given y.  
To apply the entropy to our model, we introduce the following definitions: 
 X= S: the set of system call patterns (access patterns and invoked 
processes). 
 Y= S SWS−1 : the set of system calls patterns sequences of length SWS-1. 
 S SWS : A sequence of length SWS. 
 A: the set of all sequences in the training data. 
 N (S SWS) : The number of times the sequence S SWS appears in A.  
 N(A): The total number of sequences in the training data. 
If we define the joint probability P(x,y) as following:  
  
The conditional entropy in Equation 6.1 for a window size SWS is: 
 
The conditional probability P(x|y) is the prediction of this entropy model 
and it means that the probability of system call ‘x’ at a position (SWS) in the 
training sequences is estimated from y, the previous (SWS-1) system calls. To 
compute the prediction for each user training data, we consider each (SWS-1) 
sequence of system call patterns in the training data of user U and keep 
counts of the following system calls.  
Then, P(x|y) the prediction for system call ‘x’ given a sequence ‘y’ that 
includes the (SWS-1) preceding system calls is simply p/t where, ‘p’ is the 
count of system call ‘x’ in the sequences such as ’y’ and t is the total count of 
system call ‘x’ in the sequences that consider even the calls after the SWS-1 
position.  
If a sequence S SWS  does not occur in the system call patterns sequences, 
P (SSWS)=0 . Therefore, we can set as in Equation 6.3 the conditional 
entropy of Equation 6.2 for a window size SWS to denote that at least 
one S SWS  sequence occurs in ‘A’, the set of all sequences in the training data. 
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Equation 6.3 computes the conditional entropy H SWS (x|y) for the system 
call patterns sequences of each user using a window size SWS. The most 
suitable windows size for each user is the one that corresponds to the 
minimum entropy and the more regular data.  
To compute the conditional entropy for each user data, we use the cross 
validation in [154] for the training sequences of each user extracted from the 
CIDD dataset. We train the prediction models with one part of the training 
data and apply Equation 6.3 to compute the entropy over the second part of 
this data. Then, we repeat the computation after swapping the two parts. The 
total entropy is the sum of both entropies. Figure 6.6 shows the conditional 
entropy for three users, each of a distinct kind.  
 
 
Figure 6.6: The conditional entropy under different SWS values for local user 
“2140”, server user “2060”, and system user “UUCP”. 
 
Notice that the curves for server and system users do not have a specific 
minimum due to the high data regularity for these users. We have noticed 
that the lower the entropy, the more regular the data and the better the 
performance of detection. The accuracy and masquerader live time resulting 
when adopting the conditional entropy model are acceptable for server and 
system users because of their highly regular data. This solution does not 
achieve the same performance for local users whose data are less regular. 
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(b) Test Session Length (TSL): 
It sets SWS to the length of the active test session. This approach achieves 
the best accuracy among all the approaches because the resulting size makes 
it possible to compare the active test session against the previous training 
sequences. However, the masquerader live time is longer than in the other 
approaches. 
(c) Test Session Length with Sensitive Action (TSLSA): 
The SWS is set to the length of the active test session but the detection 
process can start at any time a sensitive action occurs. Sensitive actions are a 
set of sensitive file access patterns or of invocation to programs predefined in 
the DDSGA database. An attacker exploits these patterns or these 
invocations to misuse cloud resources. Table 6.1 shows some sensitive files 
and programs in the DDSGA database. The approach achieves suitable 
detection accuracy and a shortest masquerader live time for all user 
categories except the system users. This may due to the fact that usually 
these users access sensitive files and execute sensitive commands to support 
operating system functionalities. As an example, when a user logs in, the 
operating system checks the /etc/passwd file.  
Table 6.1: Examples for sensitive files and programs 
File/Program Pattern Pattern task 
File /etc/passwd Records users encrypted password 
File /usr/adm/saveacct Records accounting information 
File /usr/adm/wtmp Records all logins and logouts 
File /etc/hosts List of IP hosts and host names 
Program /bin/passwd Changes user password 
Program /bin/yppasswd Changes NIS password 
Program /etc/ttymon Monitors terminal ports 
Program /sbin/fdisk Formats hard disk 
Program /bin/chmod Changes file permissions 
(d) Average Signature Session Length (ASSL):  
The SWS is set to the average length of training sessions or to the length 
of the current session if it is shorter than the average one. ASSL increases 
both the accuracy and the masquerader live time for users with close training 
session lengths. 
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We evaluate and compare the detection accuracy of each of the four 
approaches for local, server, and system users through the ROC curves in 
Figures 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 respectively. Each curve graphs the false positive 
rate versus the detection rate. We have also built the chart of the masquerader 
live time that shows some masqueraded sessions from the training data for 
the three users. To get distinct false positive rates in the ROC curve, we have 
changed some of the DDSGA parameters such as the detection threshold and 
the scoring parameters.  
 
Figure 6.7: The ROC for the three sliding window selection methods for 
local user "2140" in CIDD. 
 
Figure 6.8: The ROC for the three sliding window selection methods for 
server user "2060" in CIDD. 
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Figure 6.9: The ROC curve for the three SWS approaches for system user 
"UUCP" in CIDD. 
We have applied DDSGA using the Centralized-Backup model with the 
lexical and return checks as detailed in the next section. Other correlation 
models result in the same conclusions. In the ROC curves, the best detection 
achieves the highest detection rate, minimum false positive rate, and smallest 
Maxion-Townsend cost [112]. Table 6.2 summarizes the comparison. 
Table 6.2: A comparison between the best detection outputs for the previous 
four SWS approaches sorted by user category and Maxion-Townsend cost 
SWS 
Approach 
User 
Category 
False 
Positive % 
Hit % Maxion-
Town Cost 
TSL Local 2.2 92.24 20.96 
TSLSA Local 3.1 90.49 28.11 
ASSL Local 3.2 84.01 35.19 
MCE Local 3.4 80.83 39.57 
TSL Server 2.2 95.74 17.46 
MCE Server 2.6 94.61 20.99 
TSLSA Server 2.73 90.71 25.67 
ASSL Server 2.8 88.98 27.82 
TSL System 0.6 98.94 4.66 
MCE System 0.8 97.31 7.49 
ASSL System 0.8 96.27 8.53 
TSLSA System 1.05 91.62 14.68 
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As shown in Figure 6.10 shows that both the SWS and the characteristic 
of the user activities affect the masquerader live time. As an example, system 
user sessions are the longest one, because they reflect some operating system 
activities. Instead, server user sessions are among the shortest ones, because 
each reflects a small set of activities e.g., sending an email or transferring a 
file. The length of a local user session changes according to the user 
behaviour. 
 
Figure 6.10: The masquerader live time in seconds for local, server, and 
system users in some attached sessions 
 
 According to the output of our comparison, we use TSLSA for local 
users, because of the low regularity of their data and MCE for both server 
and system users that have highly regular data. 
 
6.2.2.2 Scoring System 
The input of the DDSGA is a tuple with n+1 fields where “n” is the 
length of the session 
{X (U, S, P, F, M, T), y1(r1), y2(r2 )... yn(rn)}  
Where,  
 yi is the input parameter, a file or process name.  
 ri: the return parameter of the executed pattern, is zero if the 
pattern was successfully and one otherwise 
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 X is the session ID followed by its input parameters,  
 U: the current user id.  
 S: the login source IP address.  
 P: the login period,  
 F: a Boolean value to define whether there is a login failure in 
the session. 
 M: a Boolean value to define if the session has a masquerade 
or not.  
 T: the detection threshold for the session user.  
S, P, and F are the input of the neural network described in Section 6.4 
 
For example, a valid tuple is:  
{713-VM1 (2143, 135.013.216.191,”Afternoon”, 0, 0, 0.72), 
/usr/lib/fs/ufs/(0), /usr/ucb/whoami(1), …..}.  
  
DDSGA computes the detection score for the session and compares it 
against the threshold to determine whether the session is a masquerade. 
Then, it compares this score against “M” to compute the false alarms and hit 
ratio.  
We have modified the DDSGA scoring system to work with the extracted 
features of the “Behaviours Triangle Model”, see Figure 6.11. The system 
rewards a mismatched pattern in the test sequence in two cases: If the test 
pattern has previously appeared in the user lexicon or if the access or 
executed pattern was successful.  
The first case tolerates various permutations of previously observed 
patterns without reducing the detection score significantly. In the second case 
the scoring system rewards successful action and penalizes failed one, 
because we noticed that most of masqueraded patterns include failure 
attempts since a masquerader usually lacks some knowledge of the victim 
file system. The next section highlights the evaluation of the scoring system 
in terms of security and complexity for the three correlation models. 
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Figure 6.11: A flowchart for the modified DDSGA scoring system. 
6.2.3 The Independent, Audit Exchange, and Centralized-Backup 
Models 
We have developed three correlation models of a user behavior for 
different deployment models namely, Audit Exchange, Independent, and 
Centralized-Backup. The first two models work with the original CIDS 
framework and both are detailed in [142]. The third one works with the 
improved framework, CIDS-VERT. Section 6.2.4 discusses the experimental 
results of the first two models using the CIDS-Testbed and of the third model 
using the CIDS-VERT-Testbed. In the following, we outline the three models 
and refer to [142] for further details. 
(A) Audit Exchange Model 
Here nodes exchange their audit data so that each one stores any audit 
data for any of its current users. Nodes also exchange:  
(1) The alignment score computed by the CIDS detector component.  
(2) The alerts fired by the HIDS component.  
This balances the detection overhead among nodes with no single point 
of failure. The detection efficiency is high because the user audit is 
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concentrated in one node and the masquerader surviving is much shorter than 
in model B, see Figures 6.13 and 6.14. As a counterpart, the model needs a 
fast periodic update and the exchange of the audit data that increases the 
cloud network overhead and hinders scalability. Furthermore, in highly 
overloaded networks some audit data may be lost in the exchange see Figure 
6.15.  
(B) The Independent Model: The detection phase of this model uses the 
same two parameters of model A. A cloud node CN evaluates login usage 
patterns of a user U using both CIDS and HIDS detectors and by using the 
behavior-based and signature-based of CN without interacting with other 
nodes. If the CIDS detector of CN fires an alert, the current login usage 
patterns are checked against the audit data of U in the other nodes until one 
of them accepts the current pattern. If no node related to U accepts the 
pattern, the current login session is marked as a masquerade attack. The 
model advantages are:  
(1) It does not require a periodic update of user audit data in each node. 
The regular periodic backup for VMs data is similar to that of other 
models, 
(2) A very low overhead for the cloud network, as data is exchanged only 
if the detection score is less than the threshold. In this case, nodes 
exchange the test audit data of the login session, see Figure 6.15,  
(3) High detection efficiency in terms of hit and the false alarm rates 
close to that of model A, see Figure 6.13. 
(4) A lower processing overhead than the other models, because each 
node executes the DDSGA alignment only if the detection score is 
less than the threshold. The detection time is directly proportional to 
NN, the number of nodes that have audits for user U. See Figure 6.16.  
As a counterpart, the surviving of a masquerader is longer than in models 
A and C because as CN increases it also increases the time to analyze the 
audit data in all nodes, see Figure 6.14. Hence, this model does not scale to 
large clouds.  
(C) The Centralized-Backup Correlation Model  
In this model, users VMs send their audit data to a reserved management 
VM that has a complete view of any user audit data to analyze and report the 
final alerts. The management VM is backed up to some other VMs as 
explained in Section 3.2.1 to balance the detection overhead among the 
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management VMs with no single point of failure. This model achieves the 
best detection efficiency because the user audit is concentrated in one place 
and no audit data may be lost. The masquerader surviving is very short 
comparing to model A and B, see Figures 6.13 and 6.14 with low network 
overhead. The detection time is inversely proportional to the number of 
management VMs that reduce the processing overhead in the active 
management VM. This speeds up the detection phase and protects the IDS 
components from tampering by any attacker. On the other hand, the network 
overhead increases with the number of management VMs, see Figures 6.15 
and 6.16. Furthermore, the model requires several resources as it reserves 
some management VMs for detection.  
6.2.4 A Comparison of the Three Models  
We have applied DDSGA to all users in the CIDD dataset and focused 
our evaluation on local users with a large deviation in their behaviours. The 
experiments compare the three models in terms of four values:  
A. Accuracy and efficiency using both the ROC curve and Maxion-
Townsend cost.  
B. Average masquerader live time per session,  
C. Average transmitted data per session during the detection time, 
D. Average detection time per session. 
(A) The accuracy and efficiency 
To evaluate the accuracy and efficiency of the models, we focus on the 
effects of the two DDSGA alignment parameters computed for each user i.e., 
the detection threshold and the scoring system rewards and penalties, on the 
detection accuracy. The false positives, false negatives and hit ratios are 
computed for each user and then transformed into the corresponding rates 
that are summed and averaged over all users. Equations 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 
show the metrics used by DDSGA.  
                   (6.4) 
Where: 
 fp = No. of false positive alarms,  
 n = No. of non-intrusion sessions, 
 nu = No. of users in CIDD dataset (84 in our case) 
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               (6.5) 
Where: 
 fn = No. of false negatives,  
 ni = No. of intrusion command sequence blocks, 
 nui = No. of users who have at least one intrusion block  
 
                    (6.6)
  
Figure 6.12 shows the masquerades distribution in the test sessions for 
some CIDD users and the detection threshold that DDSGA computes for 
each user in the training phase. 
 
Figure 6.12: DDSGA threshold and masquerades distribution in test sessions 
of CIDD users 2139 and 2142  
To plot the ROC curve, we use distinct values of the alignment 
parameters that result in false positive rates in the x-axis and the 
corresponding hit ratios in y-axis. Figure 6.13 shows the ROC curves for 
each model with the scoring system, the Centralized-Backup model without 
the scoring system, and the No-Correlation model with the scoring system. 
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Figure 6.13: The ROC curve for the three correlation models with and 
without the scoring system. 
Table 6.3: The best accuracy of the three Correlation Models sorted by 
Maxion-Townsend cost 
Correlation Model False Positive 
% 
Hit % Maxion-Town 
Cost 
Centralized-Backup model with return 
and Lexical Check 
2.32 94.24 19.68 
Independent model with return and 
lexical check 2.42 92.44 22.08 
Audit Exchange model with return and 
lexical check 
2.49 92.09 22.85 
Centralized-Backup model without the 
scoring system (without check) 2.61 88.99 26.67 
No Correlation Centralized-Backup 
model with return and lexical check 2.92 74. 60 42.92 
Figure 6.13 and Table 6.3 show that the Centralized-Backup model with 
the scoring system results in the highest hit ratio with the corresponding 
lowest false positive rates. The ability of the scoring system in tolerating a 
large number of mutations and deviations in user behaviours increases the hit 
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ratio by about 5.25% and reduces Maxion-Townsend cost by 6.99. The 
correlation of the user audits in all the cloud VMs is mandatory to build a 
consistent profile and it improves the hit ratio by about 19.64% and reduces 
Maxion-Townsend cost by 23.24%. 
(B) Average Masquerader live Time  
We compute the average masquerader live time over all sessions for the 
three correlation models. In the Centralized-Backup model, a larger number 
of management VMs reduces the computational overhead and, consequently 
the live time as well. As a counterpart, it increases the cloud network 
overhead. Therefore, we experimentally determined the optimal number of 
management VMs. Figure 6.14 shows that the shortest live time is achieved 
if two management VMs are used. 
 
Figure 6.14: Average Masquerader live Time per session in the three 
correlation models 
(C) Average Network Overload per session. 
We compute the overhead on the cloud network in terms of the average 
amount of data that each model transmits in a session. According to the 
considered model, the VM(s) that runs the detection task can send user audits 
or current active session to the other VMs. Figure 6.15 confirms that the 
Independent model is the most lightweight one and that the network 
overhead of the Centralized-Backup model is directly proportional to the 
number of management VMs.  
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Figure 6.15: Average transmitted data per session in bytes in the three 
implementation models 
(D) Average detection time per session 
The average detection time is affected by the machine capabilities and 
available processing resources. The size of the test session, the 
corresponding training sessions, and number of user VMs in the cloud 
system are further important factors. Figure 6.16 shows that the detection 
time of the Independent model for a user who has audits distributed among 
three VMs depends upon NN, the number of cloud nodes running these VMs. 
In this way, the Independent model distributes the training audits among the 
cloud nodes and each node independently runs the detection process using 
some training records. The shortest detection time is achieved if the detection 
score in the first node is larger than the detection threshold, and this time 
increases as NN increases. The 3VMs audits label of the independent model 
in Figure 6.16 means that user audits are distributed across three nodes, each 
with one VM for that user. By comparing the 3-VM columns against the 
other models, we notice that the improvement due to the Independent 
decreases as NN increases. If NN is equal to 3, this model results in the worst 
detection time. Therefore, this model is ideal with a small number of users 
and VMs and it cannot be adopted in large cloud such as public or hybrid 
ones. On the other hand, the Centralized-Backup model has a reasonable 
detection time that may be reduced by increasing the number of management 
VMs. Hence, the model is more elastic and scalable and it may be adopted in 
large clouds.  
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
149 
 
Figure 6.16: Average detection time per session in milliseconds in the 
three models 
The previous experiments show that in the CIDS framework, the 
Independent model outperforms the Audit Exchange. The performance and 
the accuracy of the Independent model are acceptable in small and private 
cloud networks. Instead, the Centralized-Backup model works efficiently 
with CIDS-VERT in large clouds such as public and hybrid ones.  
6.3. Detecting Masquerade in Network Environment Based on 
NetFlow Data Analysis 
 While current detection strategies directly monitor the hosts and IDS 
components to gather and process host data, a cloud system being massively 
distributed and interconnected requires a network centric approach to 
masquerade detection [130]. This approach preserves the privacy as it only 
needs statistical information on the network traffic and it can replace user 
identifiers, source and destination IP addresses with encrypted or anonymous 
values. A NetFlow analysis, e.g., an analysis of the network activities of a 
user, can generate a unique and useful user network profile to detect potential 
masqueraders whenever the host data is not accessible or legal/ethical 
restrictions related to the user privacy apply [130, 35]. Furthermore, while 
some organizations do not routinely collect host audits on all users, by 
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default any organization collects statistical information on network traffic for 
network administration, monitoring and troubleshooting. As a counterpart, a 
NetFlow analysis classifies network activities through their source IP 
address. Therefore, if several users share the same address e.g., users log to 
the same VM or remotely access their cloud VMs through the same server, 
the network activity profile will reflect the activity of the server or of the VM 
connected to this source IP address rather than the activity of a single user. 
This is the reason why our analysis detects the masquerade IP source 
address.  
We propose three approaches to capture the NetFlow data namely, the log 
server, the inside-outside workstations, and the physical\virtual switch 
monitoring. The data of the log server approach consist of mail or FTP server 
logs. The log server pairs the source IP address with its NetFlow traffic 
captured by the sniffer tool and it determines the start and end of user 
sessions. The inside-outside workstations approach considers two nodes 
located, respectively, on the inside and on the outside of a router and uses a 
sniffer tool to capture data that crosses the router through any TCP/IP 
connection between the two nodes. In the physical\virtual switch monitoring, 
a network IDS sensor like Snort is installed in one physical node or in a VM 
that is connected to a physical switch port or to a promiscuous port on a 
virtual switch where all traffic is mirrored. In our CID-VERT framework, 
virtual network traffic is forwarded to a management VM(s) where Snort 
analyzes it and gets the required NetFlow data. In the CIDS framework, 
network traffic is forwarded to one physical host that runs SNORT and it is 
attached to the auditor system to capture the network audits for user sessions 
as in Chapter 3.  
6.3.1 Feature Extraction from NetFlow data in the cloud Network. 
Our goal is to use sequences of the destination IP addresses of the 
machines a user accesses and the name of the corresponding protocol in the 
same way host-based masquerade detection uses system call access patterns. 
The correlator component of both CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks 
defines the start and the end of user sessions as in the log server approach. 
After that, the auditor system in CIDS or the event correlator in CIDS-VERT 
filters the NetFlow data of the user host session according to the user source 
IP address. The NetFlow session length is equal to the host session length 
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computed by one of the four SWS approaches in Section 6.2.2.1. Figures 
6.17 and 6.18 show the distribution of the destination IP addresses in the 
network activity profiles of two source IP addresses that correspond to local 
and server user sessions, respectively. In general, system users do not use the 
network environment because their activities are more related to some 
operating system tasks. These two figures show that server user sessions are 
more regular than local users ones because their destination IP addresses are 
more specific and consistent than the corresponding ones in local user 
sessions. In addition, server users implement their tasks through just a few 
protocols e.g., “FTP” to transfer files and “SMTP” to send emails, while the 
network activities of local users use a larger number of protocols. We also 
notice that NetFlow data is less regular than system call patterns because the 
consistency of user network activities is lower than that of host activities. In 
addition, a network activity profile reflects the behaviour of a source IP 
address that may be shared among several users. This may reduce both the 
regularity and the consistency of data in the network activity profile that in 
turn, reduces the accuracy of detection. Therefore, we modify the DDSGA 
scoring system, see Section 6.3.2, to be more flexible and take into account 
these features of NetFlow data.  
 
Figure 6.17: The distribution of NetFlow destination IP addresses in local 
user sessions (user ID 2143 in CIDD) 
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Figure 6.18: The distribution of NetFlow destination IP addresses in server 
user sessions (user ID 2059 in CIDD) 
DDSGA is applied to NetFlow data that are tuples of the form:  
{X (U, S, DT, M, T), y1(p1,d1), y2(p2,d2)... yn(pn, dn)}.  
Where “n” is number of content patterns in the session and X is the session 
ID with the following input parameters:  
 U: the current user id.  
 S: the user source IP address.  
 DT: the date and time of the session in the form (Week Day Time).  
 M: a Boolean that defines if the session has a masquerade or not.  
 T: the detection threshold for the session user.  
 yi: a session content pattern where pn is the protocol name and di the 
destination address. 
For example, a valid tuple is:  
{3112-VM3 (2143, 135.013.216.191, W4, D3, 8:56:47, 0, 0.64), (telnet, 
172.016.112.050), (domain/u, 172.016.112.020)}.  
Again, DDSGA computes the detection score and determines whether the 
session has a masquerade patterns. Then, it checks “M” to compute the false 
alarms and hit ratio. Figure 6.19 shows two training sessions with the 
extracted NetFlow features for a local user and a server one. 
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Figure 6.19: Two training sessions with the extracted NetFlow features 
for local user 2143 and server user 2059 
6.3.2 The NetFlow Scoring System 
 The scoring system for NetFlow data, see Figure 6.20, has been defined 
by modifying the DDSGA scoring system.  
 
Figure 6.20: A flowchart for the modified NetFlow scoring system. 
Local User 
= = = = = =  
Session Head:  
SessionID, UserID, SourceIP, Week, Day, Time, Real-Masquerade? 
3112-VM3, 2143, 135.013.216.191, W4, D3, 08:46:27, 0 
Session Contents: (Protocol Name, Destination IP)  
(telnet,172.016.112.050),(domain/u,172.016.112.020),(smtp,172.016.113.105), 
(smtp,172.016.112.194),(domain/u,172.016.112.020),(ftp,172.016.114.148), 
(smtp,172.016.113.084),(finger,172.016.114.168),(http,172.016.112.050),.......... 
 
Server user 
= = = = = =  
Session Head:  
SessionID, UserID, SourceIP, Week, Day, Time, Real-Masquerade? 
2702-VM3, 2059, 172.016.114.169, W5, D2, 11:37:22, 0 
Session Contents: (Protocol Name, Destination IP)  
(telnet, 195.073.151.050),(smtp, 196.227.033.189),(smtp, 208.225.121.198), 
(ftp, 187.187.187.187),(ftp, 209.001.120.050) ,(http, 198.068.020.079),............... 
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The system rewards a mismatched destination IP pattern in the test 
sequence in two cases: the protocol name has previously appeared in the 
protocol list of the source IP in the test sequence or the destination IP has 
previously appeared in destination-IP list of the source IP. The first case 
tolerates permutations of observed patterns of the combination (destination 
IP and protocol name) without reducing the detection score significantly. In 
fact, the destination IP and protocol name may be unrelated, because a user 
may access the same destination with distinct protocols for distinct tasks. 
Also the second case tolerates various permutations of previously observed 
patterns because a user may access a set of destinations in distinct orders. We 
have applied DDSGA to the NetFlow data for each source IP sessions in 
CIDD as described in Section 6.2.2 using the Centralized-Backup model of 
CIDS-VERT. Figure 6.21 and Table 6.4 show the detection accuracy of 
DDSGA in terms of both the ROC curve and Maxion-Townsend cost 
respectively.  
 
Figure 6.21: The ROC curve for the DDSGA approach on the NetFlow 
audits with and without the scoring system 
Table 6.4: The best accuracy of the DDSGA approach on the NetFlow audits 
with and without the scoring system sorted by Maxion-Townsend cost 
Approach False 
Positive % 
Hit % Maxion-
Town Cost 
DDSGA with NetFlow scoring system 6.05 83.05 53.253 
DDSGA without NetFlow scoring system 6.39 72.89 65.487 
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Figure 6.21 and Table 6.4 show that the NetFlow scoring system results 
in the highest hit ratio with corresponding lowest false positive rates. The 
scoring system increases the hit ratio by about 10.16% and reduces Maxion-
Townsend cost by 12.234. 
6.4. A Neural Network Model to Integrate the Host and 
Network Detection Outputs 
The integration of host and NetFlow detections through a Threshold 
Logic Unit (TLU) [42], see Figure 6.22, improves the accuracy and the 
efficiency of the detection. The TLU works for each user independently to be 
adapted to the consistency of the user behaviour. A Group of TLUs consist of 
a complete neural network model for all users in the CIDD dataset. The TLU 
has 3 layers: one input layer of dimension n= 4 inputs, an hidden layer with 1 
summing junction neuron, and an output layer with 1 neuron connected to an 
activation function that depends upon the TLU operational mode. The 
detection mode uses a threshold function which returns 0 if the sum of the 
input is less than a threshold (tj), i.e., if there is a masquerade attack in 
session s. Otherwise, the function returns 1. In learning mode, the neural 
network uses the sigmoid function to range the outputs between 0 and 1 to 
adapt with the training phase and the weight adjustments, see Section 6.4.2 
 
Figure 6.22: The neural network model in the training mode for one user 
6.4.1 The Detection Mode of the TLU. 
The mathematical model for the TLU output for a session s of user j is Y sj as 
defined in Equation 6.7: 
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Y sj=F (X sj) , X sj={DDSGANetScore , S , P , E }   (6.7) 
where F is a non-linear activation function implemented by the TLU. This 
function is denoted by φ(.) and it acts as a squashing function, such that the 
output of a TLU belongs to a given range. In detection mode, the neural 
network uses the Threshold Function as a transformation function. X sj is the 
TLU input parameters of session s of user j. The input parameters are: 
 DDSGANetScore : the overall detection score for the active user session 
according to user audits in both host and NetFlow data, 
 S: The login source IP address,  
 P: The login period,  
 E: A Boolean value to signal any login error/failure in the active 
session.  
The last three parameters are collect from the host audits as in Section 
6.2.2.2. An example of a valid input record is:  
{0.31, 172.016.114.169, Morning, 0}.  
 
We use Equations 6.8 and 6.9 to compute the DDSGANetScore  parameter. 
              (6.8) 
 =              (6.9) 
Where:  
 PCmasq(Uj): the probability that the current active session of Uj has a 
masquerade patterns according to Uj behaviors in all cloud VMs. It 
includes the probability that the masquerader can be detected by the 
behaviour of its login IP(s).  
 P(Uj): the probability that the current active host session of Uj has a 
masquerade behaviour according to Uj behaviors in all cloud VMs as 
computed as in Section 6.2.2. This probability does not include user 
IP behaviors.  
 m: the number of IP(s) that Uj uses to login to the cloud. 
 n: the number of cloud users who share the same IPa of Uj  
 k: an index for the current user who shares the same IP of Uj. 
 a: an index for the current IP address of Uj.  
 P(IPa): the probability that IPa reveals to be a masquerader as 
computed in Section 6.3. 
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Consider the case where U1, U2 and U3 share IP1 and IP2 and the 
probabilities that IP1 and IP2 could be used by a masquerader are: P(IP1) = 
0.4, and P(IP2) = 0.5. The probabilities that U1, U2, and U3 reveal to be 
masqueraders according to their behaviors in all the cloud VMs are: 
P(U1)=0.4, P(U2)=0.3, and P(U3)= 0.6, and the detection threshold θj = 0.75. 
We apply the previous equations to compute PCmasq(Uj) for each Uj to 
determine which one is a real masquerader according to both the 
corresponding host and network audits. 
= ((0.4*0.4) / (0.4+0.3+0.6) + (0.4*0.5) / (0.4+0.3+0.6)) + 0.4 = 
0.6769 < θj (not masquerader) 
= 0.75 - 0.6769 = 0.0731.  
= ((0.3*0.4) / (0.4+0.3+0.6) + (0.3*0.5) / (0.4+0.3+0.6)) + 0.3 = 
0.5076 < θj (not masquerader) 
= 0.75 - 0.5076= 0.2424.  
= ((0.6*0.4) / (0.4+0.3+0.6) + (0.6*0.5) / (0.4+0.3+0.6)) + 0.6 = 
1.0153 > θj (masquerader) 
= 0.75 - 1.0153 = - 0.2653.  
6.4.2 The Training Mode of the TLU. 
While DDSGA uses unsupervised learning, all TLUs are trained using a 
supervised learning algorithm. Since the TLU contains only one hidden layer 
with one neuron, a simple algorithm such as the Generalized Delta Procedure 
(GDP) [42], simplifies the learning process that occurs off-line during the 
training phase to compute the input weights for each user independently. 
The GDP computes the error i.e., the distance between the desired 
response and the actual one, and backward propagates a fraction of it through 
the network. Each neuron uses this fraction to tune its weights and threshold 
values to reduce the network error for the same input. This procedure is 
repeated until the individual or total errors in the responses become smaller 
than a specified value. At this point, the learning ends and we can use the 
neural network to produce responses to new input data. 
To find the weight change rule, we exploit that the sigmoid function is 
differentiable. If there is an error for the given input, the weights are adjusted 
according to Equation 6.10: 
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Wij ← Wij + C * ej * f(1-f) * Xij           (6.10) 
Where, 
 Wij: The weight of input i to the hidden neuron j. 
 C: A constant of learning. We take C to be universally 1. 
 ej: The error distance. ej = dj - f, dj is the desired result from the 
training set (0 or 1). 
 f: The actual result from the TLU with the sigmoid function, and 
f(input) = 1 / (1+e
-input
), f (1– f ) → 0, where f → 0 or f → 1. This 
means that the weight change can occur only within ‘fuzzy’ region 
surrounding the hyper plane near the point f = 0.5. 
 Xij: The input i to the hidden neuron j. 
The training also tunes the threshold parameter tj. By applying the 
concept of Augmented Vectors [156], we add a new input to the TLU, Tn+1, 
and a corresponding weight, Wn+1. Tn+1 always takes on a value 1 and Wn+1 is 
adjusted as the other weights. The threshold value tj is fixed at 0. After the 
training, we remove Tn+1 and set tj to the value of Wn+1.  
The weights and threshold values in the TLU are randomly initialized but 
the weight of DDSGANetScore is always the largest one because it mostly 
affects the TLU. The initial weight vector is: {0.85, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05}. Figure 
6.23 shows how the learning iterations affects the error distance for local 
user 2143 using 48 samples of training sessions. 
 
Figure 6.23: The effect of learning iterations on the error distance  
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6.4.3 Performance Evaluation of the Integrated Approach. 
We compare the accuracy and the average detection time per session for 
the three detection approaches: neural network, network, and host based 
using the Centralized-Backup model with two management VMs. Figure 
6.24 confirms that the neural network model results in the longest average 
detection time per session because, it integrates the outputs of other 
detections. However, it results in a better accuracy than the other models as 
shown in Figure 6.25 and Table 6.5.  
 
Figure 6.24: Average detection time per session in milliseconds in host, 
network, and the neural network models. 
 
 
Figure 6.25: The ROC curve for the DDSGA approach using network, host, 
and neural network approaches 
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Table 6.5: The best accuracy of the three detection approaches sorted by 
Maxion-Townsend cost 
Approach False Positive % Hit % Maxion-Town Cost 
Neural Network Model 1.59 98.07 11.49 
DDSGA within Host system 2.32 94.24 19.68 
DDSGA using NetFlow 6.05 83.04 53.25 
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Chapter 7 
Detecting Masqueraders through Security Events and 
NetFlow Data 
This chapter applies the detection strategies of Chapter 6 to different 
audit data and distinct operating system [157]. The experiments results that 
this chapter presents confirm those of Chapter 6. The chapter ends with a 
comparison between its strategies and the ones introduced in Chapter 6. 
7.1 Overview  
The modeling of user audits is a big challenge in clouds because they 
support distinct guest operating systems each with its own logging facilities 
that result in alternative users audits. As possible examples, we recall the 
Unix Syslog [158] process, the Windows System, Security, or Application 
event logs [33] and the open source OpenBSM [159] library in both 
FreeBSD and Mac OS X. Our solution focuses on those audits that almost 
any operating system produces, namely system calls and security events. 
While Chapter 6 has experimentally proved that DDSGA can achieve a high 
performance and accurate detection if applied to sequence of system call 
audits integrated with audits of a user network activity, this chapter evaluates 
the performance of strategies that apply DDSGA to sequence of security 
events audits from the host environment integrated with the NetFlow audits 
from the network environment based on CIDD dataset. We use the 
“Behaviours Triangle Model” introduced in Chapter 6 to model a consistent 
user profile in the host environment based on features extracted from the 
security events. Then, we build a NetFlow profile for each source IP address 
in terms of sequences of network actions captured by sniffing network 
communications as in Chapter 6. DDSGA computes two detection outputs by 
comparing the active log sessions in the host and the network environments 
against the corresponding profile. A neural network produces the final output 
as in Chapter 6. We also have considered the two intrusion detection 
frameworks, CIDS and CIDS-VERT. We evaluate the efficiency and the 
computational performance of the host based and of the network based 
detection in isolation and then the one of their integration.  
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7.2 Detecting Masquerades Based on Security Events Analysis 
This section considers the detection in the host environment based on the 
security events of the host OS.  
7.2.1 Feature Extraction from Security Events in Cloud VMs. 
The guest operating systems of the VMs offer an efficient and highly 
configurable auditing system. An analysis of the corresponding audit data 
can simplify the detection of several threats against clouds. Here we consider 
the Windows Event Log Service that records events with information about 
hardware, software and system components in three logs: application, system 
and security [33]. Events in the application log are logged by programs and 
selected by the developers of these programs. The system log contains events 
logged by Windows system components, e.g. by drivers. The security log 
records events on valid and invalid logon attempts and on resource usage, 
such as file operation and process invocation. This log stores most of the 
information that defines the user behaviours. We extract from the security 
log six types of audits namely, Privilege Use, Account Management, System 
Event, Logon/Logoff, Detailed Track, and Object Access. Each of these 
audits has a group of audit actions. Among them, we focus on the sequence 
of user actions; i.e., accessed objects and invoked processes.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Extracted feature from security events 
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As shown in Figure 7.1, we extract:  
(1) The sequence of files or directories opened by the user from the 
“Object Accessed” audit category. 
(2) The sequence of process created or invoked by the user from the 
“Detailed Track” audit category. 
(3) The name of the trusted login processes registered by the system from 
the “System Event” audit category. 
 
We record the beginning and the end of each user session using the time 
of each successful logon event as defined through both the “Logon/Logoff” 
and the “System Event” categories. The Logon/Logoff audit category helps 
in defining valid and invalid logon attempts to define masquerade attacks. As 
described in Section 7.2.2.1, the actions extracted from the “Privilege Use” 
and “Account Management” categories are sensitive actions and their 
execution fires the detection process.  
The feature extraction process is applied to the windows audits of CIDD, 
which is distributed among the operating systems of distinct cloud VMs. By 
extracting specific features rather than considering all those of security 
events, we achieve two advantages. First of all, this reduces the false alarm 
rates and improves the hit ratio because it reduces the number of log events 
and it focuses on those that characterize user behaviours. The reduced 
number of events and of their corresponding arguments also simplifies the 
DDSGA alignment as it reduces the permutations of these events. 
Furthermore, this solution speeds up the detection process and reduces the 
computational overhead by comparing the active session patterns to a few 
events. This is important in highly overloaded, multi user systems such as 
clouds. The regularity of the features extracted from the user audits and the 
consistency of the user normal behaviors help to distinguish normal 
behaviors from abnormal ones. Chapter 6 has introduced a “Behaviours 
Triangle Model” to build a distinct activity profile for each cloud user based 
on sequences of system calls for file\directory accesses and process 
execution activities. Using the same idea, we build a user profile in terms of 
three relationships based upon security events:  
 User accesses a file\directory. This relation includes the file\directory 
access patterns.  
 Process accesses a file\directory. This relation defines how process 
accesses a file\directory.  
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 User invokes a process. This relation defines the sequence of 
processes the user invokes. As in Chapter 6, we neglect forked 
processes.  
 
As in Chapter 6, we distinguish human users CIDD data from system 
users data. In turn, human users are categorized into local and server users. 
We separate human user activities from system users ones through the user 
ID and then we check each user separately. Figure 7.2 shows an example of 
the features extracted from the Windows security events in CIDD. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: A user session and its extracted features from Windows security 
events  
DDSGA detects if any legal user was impersonated by a masquerader as 
in Chapter 6. Section 7.2.2 details how DDSGA detects masquerade attacks 
through sequences of features extracted from the Windows security events. 
As shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.4, we build the user profile in terms of the 
sequence of files the user accesses and of invoked processes. Figures 7.3, 7.4 
and 7.5 show the distribution and regularity of the access patterns and of the 
invoked processes for, respectively, local, server, and system users. 
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Figure 7.3: The distribution of objects (files and directories) in local user 
with ID 500 in CIDD. 
 
 
Figure 7.4: The distribution of objects (files and directories) in server user 
with ID 1031 in CIDD. 
 
 
Figure 7.5: The distribution of objects (files and directories) in system user 
with ID “SYSTEM” in CIDD. 
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Figures 7.3 - 7.5 show that the behavior of server and system users are 
highly predictable. As a consequence, deviations in the behaviours of these 
users will be detected in a more accurate way than for local users. Since the 
invoked processes are more consistent and predictable than the access 
patterns, their integration with these patterns can improve detection. 
7.2.2 Detecting Masquerade in Windows VMs  
To adapt the three phases of DDSGA to Windows security audits in 
CIDD, Chapter 6 has defined three parameters, namely: the Sliding Window 
Size (SWS), the scoring system, and the correlation model. The detection 
phase applies either the Independent or the Centralized-Backup one, 
according to the characteristics of the cloud system.  
7.2.2.1 Choosing the Best Sliding Window Size  
In Chapter 6, we have estimated the SWS factor through four 
approaches. Among them, the most efficient ones are the MCE and the 
TSLSA. We apply MCE to compute the regularity of the training data using 
an entropy model described in Chapter 6. We adapt this approach for both 
server and system users because their training data are much regular than 
those of local users, while we use the TSLSA approach to adapt the dynamic 
activities of the local user. The two approaches are evaluated through the 
detection accuracy using the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves 
[113] and the masquerader live time. We highlight the two approaches in the 
following. 
(a) The Minimum Conditional Entropy (MCE):  
This approach is based upon conditional entropy [39] and it measures the 
regularity of the training data for each user using different SWS values to 
choose the one that results in more regular data with corresponding lower 
entropy. Figure 7.6 shows the conditional entropy, see Chapter 6, for three 
kinds of users in the CIDD dataset, i.e., local, server, and system users 
respectively. The server and system user curves in Figure 7.6 have more than 
one minimum due to the high data regularity for these users. A lower entropy 
indicates more regular data and a better detection performance. 
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Figure 7.6: Conditional entropy under different SWS for a local user, a server 
user and a system one. 
The results in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 confirm those of Chapter 6 where the 
accuracy and masquerader live time of the conditional entropy model are 
acceptable for server and system users due to their highly regular data. 
Instead, the performance of this model is not satisfactory for local users that 
have a much lower regularity. 
(b) Test Session Length with Sensitive Action (TSLSA): 
The TSLSA approach sets the SWS to the length of the active test session 
but detection can start anytime the user executes a sensitive action. These 
actions depend upon the OS and type of audits and include the privileged use 
of system resources and changes to the user account. We consider them 
because an attacker always tries to exploit critical resources to misuse system 
resources or to steal some details of a user account. Table 7.1 shows some 
examples of sensitive actions in Windows audits of CIDD.  
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Table 7.1: Examples of sensitive actions 
 
TSLSA achieves an acceptable accuracy and a shorter masquerade live 
time than MCE for all categories but for system users that usually trigger 
sensitive actions to carry out some operating system functions. We evaluate 
the performance of MCE and TSLSA for the three user categories through 
the ROC curve in Figure 7.7. We apply the DDSGA approach in the case of 
the Centralized-Backup model with the lexical and return checks of the 
scoring system detailed in Sections 7.2.2.2 and 7.2.2.3. However, the 
adoption of the Independent model results in the same conclusion.  
 
Figure 7.7: The ROC for the three sliding window selection methods for a 
local, a server, and a system user in CIDD. 
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The best detection results are those with the highest hit ratio, minimum 
false positive rate in the ROC curve and the smallest Maxion-Townsend cost 
[Maxion-Cost]. Table 7.2 summarizes the results. 
Table 7.2: A comparison of the two SWS approaches for local, server and 
system users 
SWS 
Approach 
User 
Category 
False 
Positive % 
Hit % Maxion-
Town Cost 
TSLSA Local 4.44 91.24 35.43 
MCE Local 5.14 86.04 44.83 
MCE Server 3.91 94.91 28.54 
TSLSA Server 4.13 92.42 32.36 
MCE System 3.19 96.54 22.60 
TSLSA System 3.97 91.24 32.58 
To evaluate the live time of a masquerader in the two approaches, can be 
evaluated through the chart in Figure 7.8 that show the time for some 
masquerade sessions in the training data of users in the three categories.  
 
Figure 7.8: Masquerader live times for local, server, and system users 
Figure 7.8 shows that the live time of a masquerader is related to both the 
approach to determine the SWS and the characteristic of the user activities; 
e.g., sessions of system users are longer than those of other users as they 
represent some operating system activities. The frequent sensitive actions 
triggered by system users reduce the accuracy of TSLSA. MCE reduces the 
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masquerade live time because of the highly predictable and regular data of 
system user sessions. Server users rarely trigger sensitive actions and their 
sessions are among the shortest ones. In this way, TSLSA results in a shorter 
live time of a masquerader than MCE. The length of a local user session 
changes according to the user behaviours and the regularity of these sessions 
is very low. This reduces the accuracy of MCE with respect to TSLSA. 
7.2.2.2 Scoring System 
The input record of DDSGA is similar to the one in Chapter 6: 
{X (U, S, P, F, M, T), y1(r1), y2(r2 )... yn(rn)}  
Where,  
 X: the session ID followed by its input parameters,  
 U: the current user id.  
 S: the login source IP address.  
 P: the login period,  
 F: a Boolean value to define whether there is a login  
 failure in the session. 
 M: a Boolean value to define if the session has a   
 masquerade or not.  
 T: the detection threshold for the session user.  
 yi: the input parameter i.e., a file or process name.  
 ri: the return parameter of the executed pattern, is zero if the 
pattern was successfully and one otherwise. 
 n: the number of patterns in the session. 
S, P, and F are the input of the neural network described in Section 7.4 
 
As an example, a valid record is:  
{253-VM1 (500, 172.16.12.1, ”Morning”, 0,0,0.62), \KnownDlls\user32.dll 
(0), \KnownDlls\ole32.dll (0), systray.exe(0), …..}.  
 
DDSGA computes the detection score for each session and compares it 
against “T” to determine whether it has a masquerade patterns. Then, it 
compares this decision against “M” to compute the false alarms and hit ratio. 
Figure 7.9 shows how the scoring system in Chapter 6 is modified according 
to the extracted features. 
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Figure 7.9: A flowchart for the modified DDSGA scoring system. 
As in Chapter 6, the scoring system may reward a mismatched pattern in 
the test sequence to tolerate some permutations of previously observed 
patterns without reducing the detection score significantly. The next section 
highlights the security and the computational evaluation of the scoring 
system in the two correlation models. 
7.2.2.3 The Independent and Centralized-Backup Models 
With reference to distinct cloud deployment models, Chapter 6 has 
defined and evaluated three correlation models namely, Audit Exchange, 
Independent, and Centralized-Backup. In [142, 143] we have proved 
experimentally that the last two models are the most efficient ones. The first 
two models work with the original CIDS framework while the third one 
works with CIDS-VERT. This section evaluates the Independent and 
Centralized-Backup models using the testbeds described in Chapter 3. 
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In the Independent model, detection achieves a satisfactory efficiency 
and both the processing and network overheads are lower than those in the 
Centralized Backup model. This results in a lower detection time, see 
Figures 7.10, 7.12, and 7.13. As a counterpart, a masquerader survives for a 
longer time than in Centralized-Backup because of the time to check the 
audit data in all cloud nodes, see Figure 7.11. Furthermore, the Independent 
model does not scale to clouds with a large number of VMs and users.  
Due to its centralized storage of user audits, the Centralized Backup 
achieves the best detection efficiency. Furthermore, no audit data is lost and 
the masquerader surviving is very short, see Figures 7.10 and 7.11. Figures 
7.12 and 7.13 show that, both the network overhead and detection time are 
acceptable. As a counterpart, this is a resource intensive model that speeds up 
the detection phase and protects the IDS components from attackers by 
reserving some management VMs. 
7.2.2.4 Evaluation of the Correlation Models 
We focus our evaluation on local users because, as previously noticed, 
the large deviation in their behaviours reduces the detection accuracy. We 
consider the four main factors mentioned in Chapter 6 namely: (A) The 
accuracy and efficiency using both the ROC curve and Maxion-Townsend 
cost, (B) Average live time of a masquerader session, (C) Average 
transmitted data per detection session, and (D) Average detection time per 
session. 
(A) The Accuracy and Efficiency 
Using the same approach of Chapter 6, we evaluate the accuracy and 
efficiency of the two correlation models. We focus on the effects of the 
alignment parameters that the DDSGA computes for each user, namely the 
detection threshold, the scoring system rewards and the penalties on the 
accuracy parameters i.e., false positive, false negative rates, and the hit ratio. 
Figure 7.10 shows the ROC curves for the two models in the cases of the 
scoring system, the Centralized-Backup model without the scoring system, 
and the No-Correlation model with the scoring system. 
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Figure 7.10: ROC curves for the three correlation models  
Table 7.3: The best accuracy of the three correlation Models  
Correlation Model False 
Positive % 
Hit % Maxion-
Town Cost 
Centralized-Backup model with 
return and Lexical Check 4.54 91.06 36.21 
Independent model with return and 
lexical check 5.11 90.03 40.63 
Centralized-Backup model without 
the scoring system (without check) 4.84 88.92 40.15 
No Correlation Centralized-Backup 
model with return and lexical check 6.01 82.99 53.07 
As shown in Figure 7.10 and Table 7.3, the Centralized-Backup model 
with the scoring system results in the best hit ratio with the corresponding 
lowest false positive rates. The scoring system increases the hit ratio by 
about 2.14% and reduces Maxion-Townsend cost by 3.94. The correlation 
among audits of the same user is the key element of detection in cloud 
systems as it improves the hit ratio by about 8.07% and reduces the Maxion-
Townsend cost by 16.86. 
(B) Average Masquerader Live Time  
We compute this time over all masquerade sessions for the two 
correlation models after determining in an experimental way the optimal 
number of management VMs in the Centralized Backup model. As shown in 
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Figure 7.11, this model achieves the shortest masquerader live time when 
using three management VMs. 
 
Figure 7.11: Average masquerader live time per session in the three 
correlation models 
 
(C) Average Network Overload per session. 
These experiments have evaluated the network overhead of the two 
correlation models in terms of the average data transmitted to analyze one 
session. According to the correlation model, the VM(s) that runs the 
detection task can send to the other VMs the user audits or the active session 
data. As shown in Figure 7.12, the Independent model is the lightest one. 
This figure also confirms that the network overhead of Centralized-Backup 
increases with the number of management VMs. 
 
Figure 7.12: Average transmitted data per session in the three models 
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(D) Average detection time per session 
The average DDSGA detection time is affected by the available 
processing resources, the size of the test session, the corresponding training 
sessions, and number of user VMs. Figure 7.13 shows that the average 
detection time of the Independent model when the user audits are distributed 
across three VMs depends upon NN, the number of cloud nodes running 
these VMs. In fact, the Independent model distributes the training audits 
across the nodes and each node independently runs the detection process 
using a few records. The detection time is minimized if the detection score in 
the first node is larger than the detection threshold, and this time increases as 
NN increases. The 3VMs audits label of the independent model in Figure 
7.13 means that user audits are distributed across three nodes, each running 
one user VM. Therefore, we can compare the 3-VM columns against the 
other correlation models and notice that the Independent model achieves a 
noticeable improvement. This improvement is reduced as the NN increases 
to 3 and becomes larger than in all other models. Therefore, this correlation 
model is ideal with a small number of users and VMs and it cannot be 
adopted in large cloud such as public or hybrid ones. On the other hand, the 
Centralized-Backup model has a reasonable detection time that may be 
reduced by increasing the number of management VMs. Hence, the model 
may be adopted in large cloud because it is more elastic and scalable.  
 
Figure 7.13: Average detection time per session in the three models 
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7.3 Detecting Masquerade Based on NetFlow Data Analysis  
Chapter 6 outlined the advantages of network centric approaches and 
proposed three approaches to capture the NetFlow data of interest. We 
describe how these approaches are applied to the cases of interest. 
7.3.1 Feature Extraction from NetFlow data.  
Chapter 6 has described how both CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks 
use the correlator components to define the beginning and the end of the user 
sessions outside the local system and to filter the NetFlow data 
corresponding to the user host session according to the source IP address. In 
the case of Windows audits, the distribution of NetFlow data for each of 
three CIDD user categories supports the same conclusion in Chapter 6 about 
the NetFlow features as summarized below: 
 System and server user sessions are more regular than those of local 
users because their destination IP addresses are more specific and 
consistent.  
 NetFlow data are less regular than security events, because user 
network activities have a lower consistency than user host ones. The 
sharing of the source IP among several users may further decrease 
data consistency and regularity in the network profile together with 
the accuracy of detection.  
The DDSGA scoring system takes into account all these features as 
detailed in both [143] and Section 6.3.2.  
7.3.2 The NetFlow Scoring System Evaluation 
We have evaluated the DDSGA approach through the NetFlow data 
corresponding to the sessions of each source IP in CIDD as in Section 7.2.2.2 
using the Centralized-Backup model of the CIDS-VERT framework.  
Figure 7.14 and Table 7.4 show the detection accuracy of DDSGA over the 
NetFlow data in terms of both the ROC curve and Maxion-Townsend cost.  
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Figure 7.14: ROC curve for DDSGA on the NetFlow audits 
Table 7.4: The best accuracy of the DDSGA approach on the NetFlow audits  
Approach False 
Positive % 
Hit % Maxion-Town 
Cost 
DDSGA with NetFlow scoring system 5.61 88.41 45.25 
DDSGA without NetFlow scoring system 5.7 82.51 51.69 
As shown in Figure 7.14 and Table 7.4, the NetFlow scoring system 
improves the hit ratio by 5.9% and reduces Maxion-Townsend cost by 6.44. 
7.4 Integrating Host and Network Detections using A Neural 
Network Model  
 To improve the accuracy and efficiency of detection, we implement an 
integrated approach that uses the neural network model of Chapter 6 and 
considers both host and NetFlow audits. The detection and training modes of 
the neural network model are adjusted as in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2 
respectively. 
We compare the accuracy and the average detection time per session of 
the three detection approaches: the host based, the network based, and the 
integrated one, i.e. the neural network, using the Centralized-Backup model 
with three management VMs. As shown in Figure 7.15 and Table 7.5, the 
integrated approach results in the highest accuracy. As counterpart, Figure 
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7.16 confirms that it also results in the longest average detection time per 
session because it needs the outputs of the other approaches.  
 
Figure 7.15: The ROC curve for the three approaches 
Table 7.5: The best accuracy of the three detection approaches 
Approach False Positive % Hit % Maxion-Town Cost 
Neural Network Model 3.35 96.08 24.02 
DDSGA within Host system 4.54 91.06 36.18 
DDSGA using NetFlow 5.61 88.41 45.25 
 
Figure 7.16: Average detection time per session for the three approaches. 
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7.5. A Comparison between the Two Detection Approaches  
In the following, we compare our proposed masquerade detection 
solution, denoted as Security Events (SE) and the one we introduced in 
Chapter 6 and that is based on the integration between the System Calls (SC) 
and the NetFlow. Since both SE and SC are among the most important audit 
sources to build a user profile to detect several kinds of attacks, a comparison 
can highlight some important issues in these approaches. In particular, we are 
interested in how parameters such as the number of training records and the 
consistency of both system calls and security events audit influence, among 
others, the detection accuracy and time, the masquerade live time, and the 
related overheads. Table 7.6 highlights the comparison between the proposed 
detection approaches through SE and SC for the local user category and 
using the Centralized-Backup model of CIDS-VERT framework. 
Table 7.6: Masquerade detection through system calls and security events 
 
Table 7.6 shows that the SC audits results in a better accuracy than the 
SE one. The reason is that SC audits have large number of training records, 6 
weeks of audits in CIDD. This helps in training both the update phase of 
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DDSGA and the neural network model. Instead, the SE audits have only 2 
weeks of training audits. The analysis of the SC audits results in a better 
accuracy than the SE one, because SC audits reflect all system activities. 
Furthermore, they provide some basic statistical information about user 
network activities that can be integrated with information on the user 
behaviours in the NetFlow audits. In turn, this simplifies the integration 
process. Furthermore, as shown by the conditional entropy in Table 7.6, SC 
audits are more regular than the SE one. This helps in recognizing a user 
normal behaviour and improves the accuracy of detection. 
Table 7.6 also shows that the session length corresponding to the SWS 
value is directly proportional to masquerade live time, network overhead, 
number of management VMs, and detection time. The SC audits have shorter 
session length than the SE one and, consequently, they may reduce 
masquerade live time, network overhead, management VMs, and detection 
time. Both NetFlow audits and the statistical information of the SE sessions 
are more consistent than the corresponding ones of the SC. This increases the 
accuracy of detection in the NetFlow of SE audits by 5.36% with respect to 
that of SC audits. As a result, the hit ratio of the neural network model 
increases from its corresponding host ratio by 5.02%, with respect to 3.83% 
of the SE. The False Positive rate is reduced by 1.19%, with respect to 0.72% 
of the SE. However, the SC NetFlow audits contain more training records 
than the SE one, but the consistency of these audits is much lower than in the 
SE NetFlow audits. This is due to the number of users that share the same IP 
addresses that is much larger in the SC NetFlow audits than in the SE 
NetFlow audits. 
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Chapter 8 
Efficient IDS Deployments through a Hierarchical 
Architecture  
 This chapter focuses on signature based analysis techniques that, in 
general may result in a best accuracy than behaviour based ones. The chapter 
introduces a hierarchical architecture [CIDS-2Deployments] of CIDS-VERT 
framework that supports two deployments, Distributed and Centralized, and 
it outlines their architectures, components, and relative advantages. 
Furthermore, it discusses how to correlate and summarize distinct HIDS and 
NIDS alerts. Finally, the chapter experimentally evaluates the accuracy of the 
proposed deployments to confirm the improvements with respect to current 
IDSs. 
8.1 THE HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE OF OUR CLOUD IDS 
As discussed in Section 1.9, a cloud defense strategy has to satisfy some 
further requirements with respect to traditional ones. In particular, it should: 
(1) Be distributed and scalable. 
(2) Avoid single points of failure.  
(3) Correlate the user behaviours in distinct environments.  
(4) Integrate different service models. 
This section briefly outlines the hierarchical structure of the proposed 
cloud IDS [CIDS-2Deployments] together with its implementation models. 
The IDS can detect attacks in several classes, e.g. masquerade, host, 
network, and DDoS against all cloud models through signature based 
techniques and behavior based ones.  
This chapter evaluates the detection accuracy of the IDS using two 
deployment models, Centralized and Distributed, based on the CIDS-VERT 
framework that provides high scalability and resilience for large clouds. 
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Figure.8.1: The hierarchical architecture of the proposed cloud IDS
Figure 8.1 shows the hierarchical architecture of the proposed IDS. The six 
layers are described in the following:  
1) Infrastructure Layer: 
It defines the cloud physical specifications. In the considered case, the 
CID-VERT testbed consists of an HP C3000 Cloud blade with six nodes. 
One head node works as a front side interface and has a Quad core 2.3 GHz 
CPUs, 4 GB RAM, 80 GB Hard drive, and a SmartArray P400 Controller for 
Storage Connect. Each of the remaining nodes consists of: Quad core 2.8 
GHz CPUs, 16 GB RAM, 80 GB Hard drive, and a Gigabit Ethernet. The 
head node runs Microsoft GUI windows server 2012 with Microsoft cloud 
services and Microsoft Hypervisor manager 2012, while each other node 
runs Microsoft core windows server 2012. CID-VERT also includes a 24 
port Procurve Switch (10/100/1000 ports) for data networks and another 24 
port Procurve Switch (10/100 ports) for console management. 
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2) The Hypervisor and Cloud Service Layer: 
Besides managing the virtual VMs, virtual switches, and virtual SAN 
driver, it provides system security functions such as Isolation, Inspection, 
and Interposition. The IDS can support different frameworks such as 
VMware cloud [56], Microsoft private cloud [13], Open Stack [147], 
Eucalyptus [12]. In the testbed, this layer contains several components such 
as Microsoft windows server 2012 with its Hypervisor and Microsoft cloud 
software and tools.  
3) Virtualization Layer: 
It maps the VMs onto the physical cores. To provide a full heterogeneous 
environment, each testbed node hosts 3 VMs that runs, respectively, 
Windows XP Professional SP3, UNIX (Solaris) and Linux (Centos). Each 
VM is assigned one core of the Quad core and 3 GB RAM. Each VM runs a 
HIDS sensor and an event collector component to collect events and logs 
from the VM operating system and forward them to a centralized 
management VM to analyze them through DDSGA [DDSGA] and HIDS 
analyzers. Some VMs run a NIDS component as a sensor or a server based 
on the applied deployment. One VM runs the CPU Death Ping [50], LOIC 
[49], and the Metasploit [46] library. Section 8.4.1 explains the attack 
scenario in our experiments. 
4) Intrusion Detection Layer: 
This layer runs the main three IDS components: the HIDS, the NIDS and 
DDSGA. In the experiments, the HIDS is OSSEC [61] and the NIDS is 
Snort. This layer also defines the Centralized deployment model and the 
Distributed one. Section 8.2 outlines the deployments of all the IDS 
components in the VMs.  
5) Alert Integration and Reporting Layer: 
It integrates and correlates the alerts from host and network IDSs. To 
provide a standard, coherent representation of alerts and describe the 
relationship between simple and complex alerts, it uses the IDMEF Message 
format [76] described in Section 2.1.3. To simplify the handling of attacks, it 
also highlights the critical alerts. Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 detail the 
integration and correlation processes. 
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6) Web Interface Layer: 
It offers a central location to admin and to manage the IDS components, 
as it runs the management VM and it handles the web pages to visualize the 
IDS charts and dashboards, see Section 8.4.3. 
8.2 THE DISTRIBUTED AND CENTRALIZED DEPLOYMENTS 
To evaluate our IDS in a realistic setting, we have partitioned the cloud 
into two virtual zones, VZ1 and VZ2, to distribute the DDoS Zombies into 
two distinct virtual cloud networks. The VMs are connected to virtual 
switches through virtual NIC cards, see Figures 8.2 and 8.4. In turn, virtual 
switches are connected to physical switch ports through the port mirroring 
facilities of the Hypervisor layer. Zone VZ1 includes node0 and node2, each 
running three VMs with distinct operating systems. A further VM on node2 
runs the Metasploit and LOIC attack libraries. Zone VZ2 includes node1, 
node3, and node4, each hosting 3 VMs as in VZ1. In the following, we 
describe the two proposed deployments and outline in Section 8.4 the 
experiments using the two deployment options. 
8.2.1 The Distributed Deployment 
As implied by its name, this model distributes the detection overhead 
among several cloud VMs. The final decision correlates the outputs of the 
IDS sensors in these VMs.  
In each virtual zone, the HIDS and NIDS components are distributed 
among the corresponding VMs. The HIDS consists of two main components, 
an agent and a server. The agent is a sensor that collects events from the VM 
operating system and forwards them to the server component in a VM in the 
zone. Agents are installed in all VMs except those running the HIDS servers. 
An HIDS server analyzes the collected events and exchanges its alerts with 
the server in the second zone so that the administrator can collect all the 
alerts from any server. The NIDS component works as a server that monitors 
the traffic through the virtual switch. It communicates its detection score to 
the NIDS server in the second zone that correlates the scores to take the final 
decision about network attacks. To avoid a single point of failure, the VM 
that hosts the HIDS and NIDS servers is backed up by a VM in another node 
in the same zone. This VM acts as a hot spare of the active one because a 
copy of the status of the active server is updated in the backup VM through 
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heartbeat messages. CIDS-VERT framework in Chapter 3 refers to the 
“Management VMs” that runs the NIDS and HIDS servers and its 
corresponding backup VMs.  
 
Figure 8.2: The distributed deployment 
As shown in Figure 8.2, VM0, hosted in cloud node0 of VZ1, is the active 
management VM that runs both the Snort and the OSSEC servers and it is 
backed up to VM6 in node2. The Snort server is connected to a promiscuous 
port on the virtual switch to mirror all traffic. The OSSIC server is connected 
to all OSSEC agents in the other VMs. In the same way, VM4, hosted in 
node1 of VZ2, runs the OSSEC and Snort servers and is backed up by VM10 
hosted in node2. The signature databases in both VM0 and VM4 are 
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simultaneously updated and the two VMs exchange the notification alarms. 
Furthermore, the final detection score correlates the scores of each Snort 
server. 
8.2.1.1 DDoS Detection scenario using the Distributed Deployment  
In an attack, several VMs in distinct virtual cloud zones may behave as 
DDoS zombies and generate a stream of packets towards victim machines.  
To detect DDoS attacks in the distributed deployment, each Snort server 
matches the incoming traffic in each zone against pre-defined rules to take 
appropriate responses, i.e., drop packet and trigger an alert. The Snort servers 
exchange three parameters through the CIDS-VERT communication facility 
namely: the detection scores, the notification alerts, and the new signature 
rules. An update of the signature database as in [49] may enable Snort to 
detect the DDoS attacks by the LOIC and CPU Death Ping libraries. As an 
example, the following rules detect specific behaviors for each protocol [49]:  
(a) The UDP traffic at specific ports is analyzed and the number of 
opened connections in a short time interval is compared against a 
threshold. While the UDP protocol is stateless, it is possible to define 
and track a UDP connection according to the change in the timeout 
field of each UDP packet [160, 49]. 
(b) The TCP rule checks whether an ACK TCP flag is set and check the 
packets size. 
(c) The HTTP rule is similar to the TCP one but it checks the packet 
contents, rather than the size. 
When each Snort server has computed its detection score, the Voting Score 
(VS), i.e. the final decision, integrates the scores as in Equation 8.1. 
 
 …………………………… (8.1) 
Where: 
 V(a): Voting of alert a. It is the percentage of IDSs that have sent this 
alert.  
 F: A flag to denote if c, the number of packets of a given type, a host 
may send in a given interval, is larger than a threshold t, 
 
F  
Figure 8.3 shows the DDoS detection scenario in this deployment. 
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Figure 8.3: The DDoS detection flowchart in distributed deployment 
 
8.2.1.2 Evaluation of the Distributed Deployment  
This deployment: 
(a) Distributes the computational overhead among several cloud VMs. 
(b) Reduces the network overhead because it does not forward events to a 
central location. 
(c) Avoid a single point of failure due to backup VM. 
As a counterpart, the integration of the outputs of several IDSs increases the 
detection time and reduces the accuracy with respect to a centralized 
deployment.  
8.2.2 The Centralized Deployment 
It uses the same components of the other model and it does not change 
the HIDS functionalities. Instead, it forwards all network packets to a 
centralized database to be analyzed by one Snort server. This changes both 
how the servers analyze and collect the packets and the handling of backups 
for both the centralized database and the Snort server. As far as concerns the 
first change, we recall that Snort can run in three modes: sniffer, packet 
logger, and detection. In the distributed deployment, all Snort servers run in 
the detection mode. Instead, in the centralized deployment, the servers run in 
packet logger mode and log the packets to a centralized database. The VM 
hosting this database is backed up by another VM in the other zone to avoid 
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a single point of failure. Each server is connected to the central database and 
to the backup VM and it runs in the detection mode to match the packets 
against Snort rules. Each server communicates its alerts to those in the other 
zone. 
 
Figure 8.4: The centralized deployment 
As shown in Figure 8.4, VMs 2 and 9 host, respectively, the centralized 
database and the backup one. VM0 runs the active Snort server in VZ1 while 
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VM7 runs the backup one. In the same way, VM4 runs the active Snort server 
in VZ2 and VM10 runs the backup one. Just one server analyzes the packets 
in the database and exchanges the heartbeat messages with its backup. The 
dashed and the solid lines in the figure connect the IDSs to, respectively, the 
active centralized database and the backup one.  
8.2.2.1 DDoS Detection scenario using the Distributed Deployment 
The centralized deployment can easily detect DDoS attacks, because it 
collects in a single location the packets and network events to match them 
against rules in the central database. This improves the detection accuracy 
and enables the administrator to monitor the cloud from a central 
management VM. Figure 8.5 shows the DDoS attack detection scenario in 
the centralized deployment option. 
 
Figure 8.5: The DDoS detection flowchart in centralized deployment 
8.2.2.2 Evaluation of the Centralized deployment  
This deployment is characterized by a central analysis that reduces the 
detection time and increases accuracy. Furthermore, backup VMs increase 
the overall reliability. The counterpart is the large overhead due to both the 
central VM and the cloud network that forwards all packets to this VM. 
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8.3 ALERTS INTEGRATION, CORRELATION, AND RISK ASSESSMENT  
8.3.1 Alerts Integration: 
This layer collects alerts from several detectors and integrates them 
through a normalization process and a prioritization one.  
 The normalization process:  
It formats any detector alert into the IDMEF protocol to simplify their 
analysis and correlation in the next layer. To this purpose, it extracts 
information from the alert fields with different names and data formats and 
represents this information in a consistent and common format. Further 
information may be added to the normalized alert based on details on the 
data source or on fields in the original alert, e.g., impact severity and sub-
event id. Examples of the formatted fields are: the source and target 
addresses, sub-event id (sid), analyzer, time, priority, classification, and some 
additional information. 
 The prioritization process:  
To handle the prioritization systems of distinct detectors, this process maps 
alert priorities into a single range from 0 to n, where n is defined by system 
administrators. Consider, as an example, that Snort alerts have a maximum 
priority of 3 while OSSEC alerts have maximum priority of 12.  
The following examples explain both processes in the cases of the “ICMP 
PING NMAP” attack and OSSEC with SSHD “brute force” attack. The 
original alert information is in bold font in the normalized alert:  
 
Snort Alert: 
1998-06-05:11:12.452605 [**] [122:5:0] (portscan) ICMP PING 
NMAP [**] [Classification: Attempted Information 
Leak][Priority: 3] {ICMP} 192.168.0.1 -> 192.168.0.10 
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Normalized OSSEC Alert in IDMEF format 
<?xml version="1.0" ?> <IDMEF-Message version="1.0"> <Alert 
ident="12773"> <Analyzer analyzerid="OSSEC00" model="OSSEC" 
</Analyzer> <CreateTime ntpstamp= "0xb9225b23. 
0x9113836a">1998-06-05T11:55:15Z</CreateTime> 
<Source><Node> <Address category= "ipv4-addr"> 
<address>192.168.137.1 </address></Address></Node></Source> 
<Target> <Node> <Address category="ipv4-
addr"><address>192.168.137.10 </address> </Address> 
</Node></Target> <Classification origin="vendor-specific"> 
<name>msg= SSHD brute force trying to get access to the 
system </name> </Classification> <Classification 
origin="vendor-specific"> <name>sid=5710 </name>  
</Classification> <Classification origin="vendor-specific"> 
<name>class= ssh-failed </name>  </Classification> 
<Classification origin="vendor-specific"> 
<name>priority=10</name> </Classification> <Assessment> 
<Impact severity="high" /> </Assessment> <AdditionalData 
meaning="sig_rev" type="string">5</AdditionalData> </Alert> 
</IDMEF-Message> 
Normalized Snort Alert in IDMEF format: 
<?xml version="1.0" ?> <IDMEF-Message version="1.0"> <Alert 
ident="12773"> <Analyzer analyzerid="snort00" model="snort" 
</Analyzer> <CreateTime ntpstamp="0xb9225b23. 
0x9113836a">1998-06-05T11:55:15Z</CreateTime> <Source><Node> 
<Address category="ipv4-addr"> <address>192.168.137.1 
</address></Address></Node></Source> <Target><Node> <Address 
category="ipv4-
addr"><address>192.168.137.10</address></Address> 
</Node></Target> <Classification origin="vendor-specific"> 
<name>msg=ICMP PING NMAP</name> </Classification> 
<Classification origin="vendor-specific"> <name> 
sid=384</name>  </Classification> <Classification 
origin="vendor-specific"> <name> class= Attempted 
Information Leak </name>  </Classification> <Classification 
origin= "vendor-specific"> <name>priority=3</name> 
</Classification> <Assessment> <Impact severity="high" /> 
</Assessment><AdditionalData meaning="sig_rev" type="string" 
>5</AdditionalData> <AdditionalData meaning="Packet Payload" 
type="string"> 
2A2A2020202000AAEA020097A4020075DA</AdditionalData> </Alert> 
</IDMEF-Message> OSSEC Alert: 
Received From: (csd-wiki) 141.142.234.100->/var/log/secure 
Rule: 5712 fired (level 10) -> "SSHD brute force trying to 
get access to the system." 
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8.3.2 Alerts Correlation and Summarization: 
It correlates a large number of normalized alerts from different detectors 
to highlight the few critical ones. It looks for evidences of an alert to 
discover if it signals a true attack and then it correlates the related alerts. 
Alerts are logically related if they denote the same attack signature, have the 
same source and destination addresses, and are close in time. These alerts 
may also denote a step of a multi-stage or compound attack [161] that 
consists of several steps by the same attacker. The correlation process:  
(a) Reduces false positives alerts. 
(b) Summarizes the huge number of alerts to the cloud administrator. 
(c) Deals efficiently with multi-stages attacks.  
The correlation engine is implemented by OSSIM [62] described in 
Section 1.10. OSSIM uses a tree of logical conditions (rules) or AND/OR 
tree, see Figure 8.6. 
 
Figure 8.6: An example for a correlation tree 
The correlation stops if the root parent rule at level 1 is not matched. 
Otherwise, the engine considers the various levels and repeats the matching 
till the end of the tree. The implementation performs ANDING between 
levels and ORING between level's nodes or Childs. Furthermore, it computes 
a reliability value in each level to determine the final risk as detailed in 
Section 8.3.3. 
We show now two correlation examples. In the first one, the correlation 
helps to detect a brute force attack against an SSH Server [62]. Here, the 
alerts are produced by several instances of the same analyzer, i.e., Snort. In 
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
193 
the second example, distinct analyzers, i.e., OSSEC and Snort, produce the 
alerts and the correlation helps to detect the Reverse Shell attack. 
 Example 1: The engine builds a four levels tree to detect the brute force 
attack against an SSH Server, see Figure 8.7. As an example of the childs 
of the tree, we show the rule that is the left child of level 2. 
 
Where: 
 plugin_id: A unique numerical identifier of the tool that provides 
these events.  
 plugin_sid: A numerical identifier of the sub-events within the tool 
(plugin). 
 type: type of the rule. 
 name: describes what the system expects to collect to satisfy this rule. 
 occurrence :Number of events matching rule conditions.  
 time_out: Waiting time before the rule expires.  
 from and to : Source IP and Destination IP.  
 sensor: the firing sensor of the event. 
 Reliability: is used to compute the risk value, see Section 8.3.3. 
 
Figure 8.7 shows the four levels of the correlation tree:  
 Level 1: A root rule that will be matched by an authentication failed 
alert. After updating the reliability value and computing the risk, the 
correlation engine jumps to the next level.  
 Level 2: Two rules with two possible actions. The left rule is matched by 
a successful authentication alert. The correlation engine updates the 
reliability value, computes the risk, and then stops. Instead, the second 
right child rule is matched by the reception of ten authentication failure 
alerts. The engine updates the reliability value and computes the risk and 
jumps to level 3. Then, it will evaluate both level 3 and 4 in the same 
way and finally fires an alarm.  
<rule type="detector" name="SSH Successful 
Authentication (After 1 failed)" reliability="1" 
occurrence="1" from="1:SRC_IP" to="1:DST_IP" 
port_from="ANY" time_out="15" port_to="ANY" 
plugin_id="4003" plugin_sid="7,8"/> 
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Figure 8.7: Four levels of the correlation tree to detect a brute force attack. 
 Example 2: To detect the Reverse Shell attack, the engine correlates the 
alerts from both OSSEC and Snort. This is a multi-stages attack 
implemented as in the scenario in Figure 8.8 [161]: 
 
Figure 8.8: The Reverse Shell attack scenario 
In this scenario, the appropriate IDS, i.e., OSSEC or Snort, fires an alert 
for each step of the attack. While an analysis of individual alerts may be 
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useless, their correlation conveys useful information. The engine applies 
both the normalization and prioritization processes. The final correlation tree 
has four levels: 
 Level 1 root rule: This rule is matched by scanning and fingerprinting 
alerts from Snort system. Then, the engine updates the reliability value 
and computes the risk before passing to level 2.  
 Level 2: This rule is matched by suspicious ftp logins alerts from 
OSSEC. After updating the reliability value and computing the risk, the 
engine jumps to level 3.  
 Level 3: This rule is matched by a file uploading alert from OSSEC. 
After updating the reliability value and computing the risk, the engine 
jumps to level 4.  
 Level 4: This rule is matched by a Snort alert that denotes the activation 
and access shell using reverse TCP. After updating the reliability and risk 
values, the engine fires an alarm. 
8.3.3 Risk Assessment: 
 This value estimates the risk for the cloud asset based on the alerts that 
have been fired. It is computed at each correlation level through Equation 
8.2:  
RISK = (Asset * Priority * Reliability)/NF…………………………… (8.2) 
Where: 
 Asset denotes the value of the resource under attack and it ranges from 0 
to A, the maximum for the assessment. The user set this value when 
configuring the IDS. 
 Priority ranges between (0-P) where P is the maximum priority value 
and it denotes how dangerous the alert is. This value is set by the firing 
IDS and it is prioritized as in Section 8.3.1. 
 Reliability (0-R) is the probability that the attack defined in a correlation 
level is real. It changes in each level as detailed in section 8.3.2. 
 NF is a normalized factor based on A, P, R and maximum risk value 
(M), where NF = (A * P * R) / M 
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Risk Assessment Methodology: 
Risk is computed when matching the alerts from each IDS in the cloud 
against the rules in each level. The computation is repeated at each level. 
Once an alert matches a rule, its reliability value will be changed according 
to the weight of each rule based on the attack signature. When the risk value 
is at least one, an alarm will be fired. Figure 8.9 shows the correlation and 
risk assessment processes with N correlation levels. Each level has different 
number of rules. 
 
Figure 8.9: The correlation and risk assessment flowchart 
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To show how each correlation level computes the risk value, we consider 
the tree in Example 1 of Section 8.3.2 to detect the “SSH Brute Force” 
attack. [62]: 
 First Level: This rule is matched by one SSH Authentication failure. 
A rule is matched if all the elements of an alert match those of the current 
rule. If this rule is satisfied, the reliability value is set to zero, while the alert 
priority and asset values are 4 and 5, respectively. Hence, the risk value will 
be zero. 
Second Level: These rules are matched if 11 SSH authentication failure 
alerts are received in less than 40 seconds. The first alert matches one rule in 
this level and the other 10 match another rule of this level.  
 
If the previous rules are satisfied, the reliability value is set to 2, while 
the alert priority and asset values are 4 and 5, respectively. Hence, the risk 
value is (2*4*5)/25 = 1.6. If no further alerts that satisfy this attack are 
received, the correlation process ends and the engine fires an alarm because 
the risk is larger than one. Otherwise, the engine will jump to the next level. 
In the same way, the third level rules set the reliability and risk values to, 
respectively, 4 and (4*4*5)/25 = 3.2 and the fourth level rules set the 
reliability to 7, and the risk value to (7*4*5)/25 = 5.6. Finally, the engine 
finishes and an alarm is fired because the risk is larger than one.  
<rule type="detector" name="SSH Successful Authentication 
(After 1 failed) "reliability="1" occurrence="1" 
from="1:SRC_IP" to="1:DST_IP" port_from="ANY" time_out="15" 
port_to="ANY" plugin_id="a" plugin_sid="7,8"/> 
<rule type="detector" name="SSH Authentication failure (10 
times)" reliability="2" occurrence="10" from="1:SRC_IP" 
to="1:DST_IP"port_from="ANY" time_out="40" port_to="ANY" 
plugin_id="4003" plugin_sid="1,2,3,6,9"sticky="true"/> 
 
<rule type="detector" name="SSH Authentication failure" 
reliability="0" occurrence="1" from="ANY" to="ANY" 
port_from="ANY" port_to="ANY" plugin_id="4003" 
plugin_sid="1,2,3,6,9"/> 
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8.4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
8.4.1 Attack Scenario 
To evaluate the detection accuracy of the proposed IDS, we run an attack 
scenario through the Metasploit library. We also consider a DDoS attacks 
scenario that uses both the LOIC and CPU death ping libraries 
independently.  
Figure 8.10 explains these scenarios where the Metasploit library 
installed in VZ1 attacks VM6 in the same zone and VMs 11 and 14 in VZ2. In 
the DDoS scenario, both LOIC and CPU death ping libraries have some 
agents distributed in VM8 in VZ1 and in VMs 5, 11, and 14 in VZ2. Each 
agent attacks one VM in each zone. Consequently, the agents of VM8 attacks 
VM6 and VM3, and the agents of VM5 attack VM3 and VM6. The agents of 
VM11 attack VM12 and the VM with the Metasploit library. Finally, the 
agents of VM14 attack VM12 and the VM with Metasploit library. LOIC 
floods the system by TCP and UDP packets, while CPU Death Ping floods 
by ICMP packets and HTTP requests. 
 
Figure 8.10: The host, network, and DDoS attacks scenarios 
8.4.2 Performance Evaluation for the Two Deployments  
This section evaluates the proposed IDS by analyzing the traffic of each 
Snort sensor in the Centralized VMs, VZ1, and VZ2. Furthermore, it 
evaluates the accuracy and the computational performance of the Centralized 
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and Distributed deployments. Figure 8.11 shows the spikes of the DDOS 
attacks resulted by the TCP floods of LOIC and the HTTP floods of the CPU 
Death PING library. Figure 8.12 shows the spikes of the DDOS attacks due 
to the UDP floods of LOIC and the ICMP floods of the CPU Death PING 
library. Both libraries run the attacks for 10 minutes. Each graph is splitted 
into four parts to show the network traffic in different situations. In part A, 
the cloud system acts in normal mode, and the system replies to legal packets 
without any problem. In part B the flooding attack starts and the traffic rate 
increases. Consequently, the cloud system can no longer respond to its users. 
In part C, the IDS starts to handle the attack and blocks the illegal packets. 
Finally, in part D, the traffic rate returns to normal again. 
 
Figure 8.11: The DDOS by TCP and HTTP floods  
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Figure 8.12: The DDoS by UDP and ICMP floods  
The two deployments are compared in terms of detection accuracy and 
computation time over 20,000 data packets. Figure 8.13 shows that the 
Centralized deployment signals a higher number, 34.3%, of true alerts than 
the Distributed one. This is due to the centralized decision on detection. 
However, Figure 8.14 shows that the Distributed deployment has a lower 
computation time, 28.8%, than the Centralized one because it distributes the 
detection overhead among several sensors and drops any packet that matches 
a rule without any further analysis. 
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Figure 8.13: Number of true alerts  
 
 
Figure 8.14: The computation time  
8.4.3 HIDS and NIDS detection outputs  
The Web Interface layer offers a visual tool to manage and admin the 
IDS components and to display the detected attacks. Figure 8.15 shows a 
snapshot of some detected attacks with their corresponding risk values after 
correlating the alerts from OSSIC and Snort IDSs. We use the attack libraries 
of VM “192.168.137.223” and other VMs as in Section 8.3.1 to attack the 
cloud.  
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Figure 8.15: A snapshot of detected host and network attacks 
Figure 8.16 shows the top 5 alerts with high risk value fired by both 
OSSEC and Snort IDSs in distinct cloud locations. Figure 8.17 shows the top 
10 VMs that signaled multiple alerts. 
 
Figure 8.16: The top 5 alerts with high risk value fired by OSSEC and Snort. 
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Figure 8.17: The top 10 VMs with multiple alerts in the cloud system. 
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Conclusion 
Cloud Computing is a new term that denotes the use of IT services and 
resources that are accessed on a service basis provided by enterprises and 
that their users  access via the internet.   
Even if there is a large consensus on the benefits of cloud computing, 
concerns are being raised about the security issues introduced through the 
adoption of this model and to the lack of control by the cloud users on some 
architectural levels. The effectiveness and efficiency of traditional protection 
mechanisms are being reconsidered as the characteristics of this innovative 
computing model and the control on shared resources widely differ from 
those of traditional architectures. Cloud computing environments are easy 
targets for intruders and pose new risks and threats to an organization 
because of their service and operational models, the underlying technologies, 
and their distributed nature.  In particular, some kind of sharing is intrinsic to 
cloud computing and cannot be avoided. In turns, this blurs the traditional 
distinction between private and shared resources. 
In principle, IDSs are among the efficient security mechanisms that can 
handle most of the threats of cloud computing. However, several deficiencies 
of current IDSs technologies and solutions hinder their adoption in a cloud.  
This thesis has proposed and developed a cloud based intrusion detection 
system that satisfies the cloud requirements and deals with several classes of 
attacks against all cloud deployment models. 
The architecture of the proposed IDS is fully distributed to provide a 
scalable and elastic solution and avoid a single point of failure. Furthermore, 
the IDS isolates the user tasks from cloud nodes and achieves a high 
coverage of attacks by integrating both knowledge and behaviour based 
techniques. The IDS adapts with distinct cloud computing environments and 
it collects and correlates the user behaviours from the cloud VMs and 
integrates the alerts from different IDSs into a single report.  
We have introduced two frameworks of the proposed IDS to support 
distinct cloud deployment models namely, the Cloud based Intrusion 
Detection System, CIDS, and its full virtual version, CIDS-VERT. CIDS 
P2P architecture hinders scalability but it achieves a high performance and 
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low network overhead in small or private clouds. Instead, the better 
scalability and controllability of CIDS-VERT makes it the ideal solution for 
hybrid and public clouds. Furthermore, the management and the 
configuration of CIDS–VERT are rather simpler than those of CIDS. 
To efficiently correlate the behaviour of the same user in distinct cloud 
nodes, we have proposed, developed and evaluated three alternative models 
that define the exchange of audit data and of alerts between the IDS 
components.  The first two models, Audit Exchange and Independent, work 
with CIDS framework, while the third, the Centralized-Backup works with 
CIDS-VERT. 
Three are the main contributions of this thesis, namely: 
(1) CIDD, a cloud intrusion detection dataset. 
(2) The behaviour based detection. 
(3) The signature based detection 
The first contribution has defined a cloud intrusion detection dataset, 
CIDD, the first dataset that can support the training and the evaluation of any 
cloud IDS. Current datasets are not suitable for these purposes because they 
neglect the typical behaviours of a cloud user and lack real attack patterns. 
CIDD solves these deficiencies and provides the complete audit parameters 
to support the detection of more than hundred instances of attacks and 
masquerades.  CIDD consists of both knowledge and behavior based audit 
data and has real instances of host and network based attacks and 
masquerades. CIDD provides complete audit parameters from heterogeneous 
environments e.g., Windows, UNIX, and NetFlow, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of detection techniques. The comparison in Chapter 4 confirms 
the larger efficiency of CIDD with respect to current datasets. To build 
CIDD, we have developed a log analyzer and correlator system to parse and 
analyze the host based log files and network packets.  
The second contribution of the thesis is the definition of the Data-Driven 
Semi-Global Alignment, DDSGA, approach and of three behavior based 
detection strategies. DDSGA is focused on the detection of anomalous user 
behaviour generated by masquerade attacks. Masquerading is by far one of 
the most critical attacks because once the attacker logs in successfully to a 
cloud, he/she can maliciously control the huge amount of resources it 
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includes. DDSGA improves both the security efficiency and the 
computational performance of SGA, a fast detection technique with low false 
positive rate that has not yet achieved the accuracy and performance for 
practical deployment. DDSGA aligns the sequence of the current user 
session to the previous ones of the same user and the presence of several 
misalignments is a strong indicator of a masquerade attack.  
From the security efficiency perspective, DDSGA supports a more 
accurate modeling of distinct users as it introduces distinct parameters to 
model their behaviours. DDSGA can tolerate changes in the low-level 
representation of the commands functionality through two scoring systems 
that categorize user commands to align distinct commands in the same class 
without reducing the alignment score. Furthermore, to tolerate changes in the 
user behavior, DDSGA updates the signatures that describe this behavior 
according to the current user behavior  All these features result in a strong 
reduction in false positive and missing alarm rates and as well as an increase 
in the detection hit ratio. According to our experiments, DDSGA achieves a 
better performance than SGA. As an example, it improves the hit ratio by 
about 21.9% and reduces Maxion-Townsend cost by 22.5%. 
From the computational perspective, DDSGA simplifies the alignment 
by dividing the signature sequence into a smaller set of overlapped 
subsequences. Furthermore, it speeds up the detection and the update 
processes by running them in parallel.  
A main reason of the low performances of current detection approaches 
is that they do not correlate the behaviour of a user in distinct environments, 
host and network, and in distinct cloud nodes. To solve this issue we have 
developed three detection strategies. The first strategy applies DDSGA to 
sequences of correlated audits from the VMs operating systems. We have 
evaluated this strategy on two distinct kinds of audits, system calls and 
security events. The second strategy analyzes NetFlow data from the 
network environment. The third strategy correlates the user behavior in host 
and network environments by integrating the other two strategies through a 
neural network. In this way, we convert masquerade detection from a binary 
problem to a classification or machine learning one. The evaluation has 
considered the three alternative correlation models mentioned before through 
both CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks based on CIDD data.  
PHD Thesis 2013 – Hesham Abdelazim Ismail Mohamed 
207 
Chapter 6 has defined two extensions of DDSGA to detect masquerade 
attacks through, respectively, system call sequences and NetFlow data. We 
build a consistent profile of system calls through a “Behaviours Triangle 
Model” that focuses on system calls to implement file operations and process 
activities. A consistent NetFlow profile is built for each source IP address in 
terms of the sequences of nodes that are accessed and the protocols that are 
used.  To efficiently correlate the user behaviour, we have evaluated the 
three correlation models i.e., Audit Exchange, Independent, and Centralized-
Backup, using both CIDS and CIDS-VERT frameworks. Empirically, we 
have verified that correlation strongly improves the hit ratio by about 
19.64% and reduces the Maxion-Townsend cost by 23.24. These 
experiments also show that the Independent model works much better with 
CIDS than the Audit Exchange model. This model is the ideal solution for 
small and private clouds as it achieves good accuracy and computational 
performance with low network overhead and short masquerade live time. 
Instead, the Centralized-Backup model works efficiently with CIDS-VERT 
in large clouds with good accuracy and computational performance, low 
network overhead and short masquerade live time.  
After tuning and optimizing the correlation of user behaviour in each of 
the two detection subsystems, we have correlated the subsystem by 
integrated their results through a neural network. This results in the best 
overall accuracy, 98.07%, with respect to 94.24% of the host based and 
83.04% of NetFlow based detection. As expected, it also results in the largest 
detection time, and the largest survival time of a masquerader because it 
waits for the results of both subsystems.  
The experiments results of Chapter 7 concerns two subsystems that 
detect masquerade attacks through, respectively, sequences of security events 
and NetFlow audits. Consistent host based user profiles and NetFlow data 
profile for each source IP address are built as in Chapter 6. DDSGA 
compares the active log sessions in both host and network environments 
against the corresponding profile and computes the detection outputs for 
each subsystem. Then, it integrates these outputs using a neural network. As 
in Chapter 6, the proposed neural network model results in the best accuracy, 
96.08%, with respect to 91.06% of host based and 88.41% of NetFlow based.  
The correlation improves the hit ratio by about 8.07% and reduces Maxion-
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Townsend cost by 16.86. The experimental results further confirm the 
conclusion of Chapter 6 that the independent model is ideal for small and 
private cloud networks while big clouds like hybrid and public ones should 
prefer the Centralized-Backup one. 
Finally, the third contribution is related to signature based detection. We 
introduce a hierarchical architecture that overcomes some limitations of 
current IDSs and supports two deployments, a Distributed and a Centralized 
one for the proposed IDS. The deployments use host based and network 
based IDSs that exploit signature based analysis techniques. The Distributed 
deployment distributes the computational overhead among several cloud 
VMs and reduces the network overhead while avoiding a single point of 
failure. However, its accuracy is lower than the one of the Centralized 
deployment. The latter also has a shorter detection time and a large overhead 
for the central VM and the cloud network. According to our experiments, the 
Centralized deployment improves the detection rate and also signals a higher 
number, 34.3%, of true alerts than the Distributed deployment. However, the 
Distributed deployment has a better detection time, 28.8%, than the 
Centralized one. For an efficient detection, we have integrated and correlated 
the HIDS and NIDS alerts through IMDEF. This helps in detecting multi-
stage or compound attacks and reduces both false alarms and the number of 
alerts from HIDS and NIDS.  
The diagram in Figure 1 resumes the work in this thesis to define, 
implement, and evaluate a general, efficient, and accurate cloud IDS that can 
be adopted in a very large number of clouds and that covers alternative 
deployment models.   
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Figure 1: The Proposed Cloud IDS Components Diagram 
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As far as concern the possible developments of this thesis, we plan to 
integrate the behaviour based detection of DDSGA with current signature 
based detection techniques. DDSGA can detect anomalous behaviours for 
both users and hosts in a network. Hence, if the hosts or their users have a 
profile of normal behaviours, DDSGA can compare it against anomalous 
actions to block an anomalous user or host. We have introduced a similar 
analysis based on the masquerade actions in system calls and NetFlow in 
Chapter 6 and another one based on the security event and NetFlow in 
Chapter 7. The anomalous actions that can be detected for DDoS include, 
among others, sending packets with a suspect total length or a number of 
packets with a total length larger than normal threshold in a specific time 
range. Another possible development concerns the adoption of alternative 
machine learning approaches to train our IDS and to maintain the validity of 
the proposed IDS over the system’s life time. It would also be interesting to 
develop an adaptive control strategy for managing and evaluating cloud 
system performance and resilience under normal and abnormal conditions 
 
Finally, we plan to extend our IDS system to provide autonomous 
capabilities particularly autonomous response and self-resilience and to 
provide a security measure to evaluate vulnerabilities and risks in a system as 
an essential milestone to build trust in cloud environments. In [165, 166 and 
167], we have introduced a mechanism to build a security measure based on 
the assessment of the risks and the criticality of the security events. 
Furthermore,  self-resilience is supported by, (a) preventing altering or 
modification of security events in the data storage, (b) avoiding single point 
of failure by replicating the intrusion detection components. The auto 
response actions are based on a set of polices defined by the system 
administrator. Lastly, we have built an early warning and forecasting model 
to predict host and network anomalies using a Hidden Markov Model and 
Holt Winter forecasting Algorithm [168]. 
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